# @deepseek-ai/dsh-workflow-workerthread

The [`WorkflowService`](../workflow/README.md) implementation, on **`node:worker_threads`**: each run gets its OWN worker thread (one run = one worker, no pooling — a run is heavyweight, so the ~tens-of-ms thread spin-up is noise), the script executes in a vm context INSIDE that worker with the workflow hooks injected, and every `agent()` call bridges back over the message port to [`ctx.subagents`](../../subagent/README.md) on the host. Child agents are I/O-bound LLM loops and stay on the host event loop; the thread isolates the SCRIPT, the only part that can spin synchronously.

## Trust premise: what the thread buys (and what it does not)

Workflow scripts are **model-written** — the same trust level as the model's existing bash access — so this engine defends against **buggy** scripts, never hostile ones. A worker thread is NOT a security boundary: the vm context inside it is escapable by construction (`node:vm` shares object machinery with its surrounding realm, so a script can reach the `Function` constructor via `globalThis.constructor.constructor` and from it `process` and every Node builtin), and an escapee holds the same process privileges as the host — Node's permission model is process-wide. The absent globals are API surface that keeps honest scripts portable, not walls. What the thread concretely buys:

- **The host never blocks**: `start()` returns without running any script code on the host; a synchronous spin anywhere in the script occupies the worker's loop, not the harness's.
- **Termination is real**: a script that outlives its post-cancel grace is `worker.terminate()`d — nothing of it survives `dispose()`, where an in-process engine could only abandon the spin on its own loop.
- **No ambient credentials**: the worker spawns with an EMPTY environment (`env: {}` plus hermetic `execArgv`, the same stance as `dsh-code-runtime-worker`; the unbuilt dev shape forwards exactly one loader variable, `TSX_TSCONFIG_PATH` — path plumbing, not a secret), so an escapee reading `process.env` finds no harness secrets — ambient-channel hardening only; the process-wide privileges above (fs and the rest) remain, so a genuine sandbox is still the engine swap.
- **Serialization by construction**: everything crossing the thread is structured-clone data, and plain JSON before that — the `materializeFromRealm` walk rejects loud what JSON cannot carry, which is also what makes every postMessage hop total.

What the seam guarantees regardless, because benign scripts hit these constantly: `result` never rejects, a dropped hook promise never becomes an unhandled rejection, values JSON cannot carry are rejected **loud** instead of silently mangled, and hook misuse is fatal instead of dissolving into a per-item `null`. Genuine sandboxing (containing what an escaped script may touch) remains an isolated-vm/separate-process engine swap behind the seam, still deferred.

## The script contract it executes

- **Meta as DATA** (`validateMeta`, host-side): the workflow's identity arrives on the start request as plain JSON (the tool carries it as its schema-validated `meta` parameter — never as script text) and is shape-validated loud, every violation named (`name`/`description` required; unknown fields rejected). The engine deliberately evaluates NO script text to obtain meta: an evaluated meta literal could smuggle getters that run on the host outside any vm timeout — the exact spin the worker thread exists to isolate. A body that still opens with a Claude Code-style `export const meta` statement is rejected with a pointed `SCRIPT_PARSE` message.
- **Hooks**: `agent(prompt, {label, phase, schema, model})` (schema = the [structured-output subset](../../core/tools/README.md), forwarded as `outputSchema`; result = validated object, or final text without a schema; a failed child resolves `null`), `parallel(thunks)`, `pipeline(items, ...stages)` with NO cross-stage barrier and `(prev, item, index)` stage callbacks, `phase(title)`, `log(message)`, and the `args` global. Anything else — `effort`/`isolation`/`agentType`, unknown options, malformed arguments, schemas outside the subset — throws a FATAL `WorkflowError` that `parallel`/`pipeline` re-throw rather than nulling (see the seam README's failure discipline).
- **No ambient APIs**: no timers, filesystem, or Node APIs are injected into the context (absence is API surface, not containment — see the trust premise).

## How a run executes

`start()` shape-validates the meta DATA host-side and parse-checks the body with the identical wrapper the worker compiles (`new vm.Script`, discarded), preserving the seam's synchronous `META_INVALID`/`SCRIPT_PARSE` throws; one redundant parse per run is the deliberate price. It then spawns the worker (`src/worker.ts` unbuilt via an explicit tsx `execArgv`; the sibling `lib/worker.js` bundle when built) with the meta, body, `args`, and worker-side limits as `workerData`.

Inside the worker, `runWorkerSession` builds the execution core (hooks, combinators, concurrency semaphore, caps, fatal-error discipline) over a **child port**: `agent()` sends `child-start` and the host starts the child on `ctx.subagents` (parent attribution, the shared per-run abort signal, `outputSchema`/`model` pass-through), replying with the child id, its settlement (a JSON projection; an infrastructure REJECTION crosses as `child-failed` and stays the fatal `AGENT_RESULT`), and dispose acks. Observer narration (`phase`/`log`/`agent-start`/`agent-end`) crosses as messages and re-emits as the seam's `workflow/*` events. A **ready→go handshake** gates the body: a cancellation racing worker boot arrives before `go`, so a run cancelled before start never executes the body at all.

## The value boundary

Values LEAVING the script (hook options/schemas, the script's return) are materialized by `materializeFromRealm`: a plain recursive walk that rejects loud everything JSON cannot carry (exotic prototypes, functions, symbols, cycles, sparse arrays, non-finite numbers, nested `undefined`), copying into plain containers via `defineProperty` so a `"__proto__"` key becomes a data property, never a prototype mutation. Getters are read ordinarily — the RESULT is what crosses; a read that throws fails loud; both run in the WORKER, never on the host. Values ENTERING the realm (`args`, `agent()` results, hook promises and their failures, combinator arrays) are handed over directly as worker-realm values — the script is trusted, so outer prototypes are not a leak; `args` is cloned once at start so a script scribbling on it cannot mutate the caller's object. One script-visible consequence: an error thrown by a hook is built OUTSIDE the script's vm context, so `e instanceof Error` inside the script is `false` — branch on `e.name`/`e.code` instead (the combinators recognize fatality by `instanceof` against their own realm's class, which a script-built object can never pass, so fatal-vs-null cannot be forged or dissolved).

## Cancellation, death, disposal

Per-run limits: a concurrency semaphore (`maxConcurrentAgents`), a total-`agent()` cap (`maxTotalAgents`), and a per-call item cap (`maxItemsPerCall`), all config. `cancel()` posts the cancel to the worker (its hooks start throwing `CANCELLED`; the script dies at its next await) and cancels every host-side child NOW on **both seam channels** — the shared request signal aborts AND each registered child's explicit `cancel()` is called host-side, because the seam leaves a provider free to honor either channel and a worker wedged in a synchronous spin could not relay its own per-child cancel RPCs (those later land as idempotent no-ops). The grace then arms: a run still unsettled `disposeGraceMs` later force-settles `cancelled` and the worker is **terminated**. A cancellation that lands before the body runs (the ready→go handshake) reports `cancelled` without executing anything; a worker `result` racing an in-flight host cancellation reports `cancelled` too (first-wins settlement — the seam-visible result had not settled when cancellation was requested); post-cancel `phase`/`log` narration is suppressed host-side, while cancelled children still deliver their paired `agent-end`.

A worker that dies unexpectedly (an OOM, a script reaching `process.exit` through the documented vm escape) settles the run `stopReason: 'error'` with the exit diagnostics — or `'cancelled'` when a cancel was in flight — and the host-side child registry is what winds every surviving child down. `dispose()` = cancel + immediate host-driven disposal of every registered child (a wedged worker can relay no dispose RPC, so child teardown overlaps the grace instead of starting after it; the worker's own dispose RPCs join the same per-child disposal) + bounded wait (result, then child-registry quiescence, capped by the grace) + unconditional `worker.terminate()`: the thread never outlives its run. Once a run settles, stray children a script fired without awaiting are cancelled too, and `dispose()` waits for their disposal (bounded by the grace) before returning. `agent-start`/`agent-end` pairing is host-guaranteed the same way: forwarded starts live in a ledger, worker-reported ends pair them on the graceful paths, and the termination paths (grace force-settle, worker death) synthesize the missing ends (outcome `cancelled`) before the run settles — a start still in flight across the force-settle can surface after `workflow/end`, immediately paired the same way.

**Engine-specific limitations**: worker startup is paid per run; on a termination path `agentsStarted` reports the HOST-observed count (accepted `child-start`s — calls still queued worker-side for a concurrency slot are unknowable then); and a returned promise or thenable resolves per JavaScript semantics BEFORE materialization — that is what makes an un-awaited `return agent('x')` work — with the value-boundary guard applying to the resolution.

## Config

| Key | Default | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| `provider` | `spawn` | The `ctx.subagents` provider children run on (host-side). |
| `maxConcurrentAgents` | `0` (auto) | Concurrent `agent()` ceiling; `0` resolves to `min(16, max(1, cores - 2))`. |
| `maxTotalAgents` | `1000` | Total `agent()` calls one run may start (runaway-loop backstop). |
| `maxItemsPerCall` | `4096` | Items accepted by one `parallel()`/`pipeline()` call. |
| `syncTimeoutMs` | `5000` | vm timeout for the script's initial synchronous slice (in the worker). |
| `disposeGraceMs` | `5000` | How long a cancelled run may stay unsettled before force-settle + terminate; also bounds `dispose()`. |
