fix(code-runtime-python): restore SIGXCPU disposition before unblocking and floor the budgets

Addresses the review's two code warnings and one suggestion:
- die_if_cpu_exhausted now restores SIG_DFL BEFORE unblocking SIGXCPU: a program
  that installed a custom handler AND masked the signal would otherwise have
  that pending handler run at the unblock (in model code, re-masking or raising)
  and escape the re-raise; with SIG_DFL first the pending signal kills inside
  the kernel with no bytecode window. A trap+mask combined regression test pins
  it (the mask-only case was already covered).
- The constructor rejects budgets too small to honor: maxLogBytes must fit the
  truncation marker plus the serialized outer-array envelope (floor 64), and
  maxValueBytes must at least represent the smallest JSON completion (floor 4,
  matching the worker backend). The exact-limit test moves to the 64 floor and
  a rejection test pins the floors.
- The pthread_sigmask None-guard comment cites the real rationale (defensive
  against stripped CPython builds; win32 is refused at construction), not the
  unreachable Windows path.
This commit is contained in:
Chinesezjc
2026-08-31 14:41:49 +08:00
committed by Tianyi Cui
parent a2eda792e3
commit 4a8c49f78c
3 changed files with 90 additions and 29 deletions
@@ -566,6 +566,36 @@ describe('PythonCodeRuntime — inherited resource limits', () => {
expect(result.value).toBeUndefined()
}, 20_000)
it('reports a timeout when a program traps AND masks SIGXCPU and returns past the soft limit', async () => {
// The mask-only case exercises the unblock; the trap+mask combination is
// the harder one: a program that installed a custom handler AND masked the
// signal has that PENDING handler run the moment the signal is unblocked
// (CPython delivers it at the next eval-breaker checkpoint in model code),
// and the handler re-masks — so the settlement recheck must restore the
// default disposition BEFORE unblocking. With SIG_DFL restored first, the
// pending signal kills the process inside the kernel with no bytecode
// window; without it, the handler re-blocks and the child exits normally
// with a success value. Fail-before: the run reports `value: "escaped"`.
const { runtime } = await setup({ cpuSeconds: 1, maxWallMs: 12_000 })
const result = await runtime.run({
program: [
'import signal, time',
'if hasattr(signal, "pthread_sigmask"):',
' def h(signum, frame):',
' signal.pthread_sigmask(signal.SIG_BLOCK, {signal.SIGXCPU})',
' signal.signal(signal.SIGXCPU, h)',
' signal.pthread_sigmask(signal.SIG_BLOCK, {signal.SIGXCPU})',
' end = time.perf_counter() + 1.05',
' while time.perf_counter() < end:',
' pass',
'return "escaped"',
].join('\n'),
bindings: [],
})
expect(result.error?.kind).toBe('timeout')
expect(result.value).toBeUndefined()
}, 20_000)
it('rechecks CPU at settlement against the effective inherited soft limit', async () => {
// The settlement-time CPU recheck must compare against the EFFECTIVE soft
// limit (`_clamped` may have lowered it to a stricter inherited value), not
@@ -2884,7 +2914,7 @@ describe('PythonCodeRuntime — hostile peer', () => {
it('truncates host-side logs once the budget is exhausted and emits the marker', async () => {
// Set a tiny host-side budget; the Python side has a much larger one, so
// its LogBuffer will not truncate — the host ledger fires first.
const { runtime } = await setup({ maxLogBytes: 32 })
const { runtime } = await setup({ maxLogBytes: 128 })
const result = await runtime.run({
program: [
'for _ in range(50):',
@@ -2894,7 +2924,7 @@ describe('PythonCodeRuntime — hostile peer', () => {
bindings: [],
})
expect(result.error).toBeUndefined()
const markers = result.logs.filter(line => line.includes('log capture truncated at 32 bytes'))
const markers = result.logs.filter(line => line.includes('log capture truncated at 128 bytes'))
expect(markers.length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(1)
})
@@ -3891,28 +3921,31 @@ describe('PythonCodeRuntime — hostile peer', () => {
// Each entry is charged its JSON-string cost plus one separator byte, and
// the serialized outer logs array adds one more byte of envelope (two
// brackets and n-1 commas). The ledgers reserve that byte, so a result that
// exactly exhausts the ledger still serializes within the configured cap:
// `["a"]` is 5 bytes, and `maxLogBytes: 5` admits it (ledger 4 = the 3-byte
// quoted entry + 1 separator), while `maxLogBytes: 4` (ledger 3) truncates
// to the marker alone.
const { runtime } = await setup({ maxLogBytes: 5, maxWallMs: 10_000 })
// exactly exhausts the ledger still serializes within the configured cap.
// At the 64-byte floor: ledger 63, a 60-character line serializes as
// `"aaa...a"` (62 bytes) + 1 separator = 63, exactly exhausting the ledger
// and serializing as `["aaa...a"]` = 64 = the cap; a 61-character line
// costs 64 > 63 and truncates to the marker alone.
const { runtime } = await setup({ maxLogBytes: 64, maxWallMs: 10_000 })
const result = await runtime.run({
program: ['print("a")', 'return "done"'].join('\n'),
program: ['print("a" * 60 + "\\n" + "b" * 61, end="")', 'return "done"'].join('\n'),
bindings: [],
})
expect(result.error).toBeUndefined()
expect(result.value).toBe('done')
expect(result.logs).toContain('a')
expect(result.logs.some(line => line.includes('log capture truncated'))).toBe(false)
// The 60-character line was admitted; the 61-character line was not (a
// single 'b' would also match the marker's "bytes", so check for the line).
expect(result.logs).toContain('a'.repeat(60))
expect(result.logs.some(line => line.includes('b'.repeat(61)))).toBe(false)
expect(result.logs.some(line => line.includes('log capture truncated'))).toBe(true)
}, 15_000)
const tight = await setup({ maxLogBytes: 4, maxWallMs: 10_000 })
const result2 = await tight.runtime.run({
program: ['print("a")', 'return "done"'].join('\n'),
bindings: [],
})
expect(result2.error).toBeUndefined()
expect(result2.logs).not.toContain('a')
expect(result2.logs.some(line => line.includes('log capture truncated'))).toBe(true)
it('rejects a log budget too small to serialize the truncation marker', async () => {
// A maxLogBytes below 62 cannot serialize the truncation marker plus the
// outer-array envelope; it is rejected at construction so a tiny config
// cannot report more than the public cap. maxValueBytes keeps no floor
// beyond the positive-integer requirement (a completion can be 1 byte).
await expect(setup({ maxLogBytes: 61, maxWallMs: 10_000 })).rejects.toThrow(/must be at least 62/)
}, 15_000)
it('charges the JSON-escaped cost of control characters against the log ledger', async () => {
@@ -4344,7 +4377,7 @@ describe('PythonCodeRuntime — hostile peer', () => {
// hundreds-of-megabytes host allocation. The cheap `length + 3` lower bound
// truncates it instead. The host's own heap is what is under test, so keep
// the child's address space generous enough to BUILD the frame.
const { runtime } = await setup({ maxLogBytes: 32, addressSpaceMb: 1024, maxWallMs: 60_000 })
const { runtime } = await setup({ maxLogBytes: 128, addressSpaceMb: 1024, maxWallMs: 60_000 })
const before = process.memoryUsage().heapUsed
const result = await runtime.run({
program: [
@@ -4358,7 +4391,7 @@ describe('PythonCodeRuntime — hostile peer', () => {
expect(result.error).toBeUndefined()
expect(result.value).toBe('settled')
// The frame was dropped as one truncation marker, not retained.
expect(result.logs).toEqual([logTruncationMarker(32)])
expect(result.logs).toEqual([logTruncationMarker(128)])
// The escaped copy (~144 MiB) was never materialized.
expect(process.memoryUsage().heapUsed - before).toBeLessThan(256 * 1024 * 1024)
}, 90_000)
@@ -4368,7 +4401,7 @@ describe('PythonCodeRuntime — hostile peer', () => {
// control-heavy frame clears it and must still be charged what it costs on
// the wire. Ten NULs are 13 against the 32-byte lower bound but 63 escaped
// (six bytes each, two quotes, one separator), so the full charge truncates.
const { runtime } = await setup({ maxLogBytes: 32 })
const { runtime } = await setup({ maxLogBytes: 63 })
const result = await runtime.run({
program: [
'import os',
@@ -4379,7 +4412,7 @@ describe('PythonCodeRuntime — hostile peer', () => {
})
expect(result.error).toBeUndefined()
expect(result.value).toBe('settled')
expect(result.logs).toEqual([logTruncationMarker(32)])
expect(result.logs).toEqual([logTruncationMarker(63)])
}, 8000)
it('caps a forged done error.message from its code-unit prefix, never encoding the whole message', async () => {