feat(code-runtime-python): add the fd-3 frame protocol

Introduce @deepseek-ai/dsh-code-runtime-python with the versionless
JSON-lines protocol between the Node host and the CPython subprocess:
the host-side hostile-frame codec (validateChildFrame, encodeJsonPlain,
checkDoneValue, hasUnsafeIntegerToken, hasNonLosslessNumber,
logTruncationMarker) and the Python-side wire-vocabulary mirror
(py/protocol.py).

This is the protocol layer of the code-runtime-python stack, split from
#436 and based on the multi-language seam extension. The PythonCodeRuntime
implementation and its Python JSON codec land in the backend-core PR on
top of this branch.

Ship the minimal buildable package skeleton (package.json, tsconfig,
tsdown, barrel index, invariant companion, bilingual README) because the
workspace-constraint, coverage, and invariant-topology gates require the
package to exist and build the moment its directory does; the backend-core
PR extends those files rather than creating them.

Align py/protocol.py with src/protocol.ts (the round-12 review of #436
found LogMessage.truncated, DoneMessage.error.kind, and Namespace.errorClass
stale) and guard the two runtime-executed surfaces (PROTOCOL_FD and the log
truncation marker) with a real-python3 cross-language mirror e2e test.
This commit is contained in:
Chinesezjc
2026-08-07 13:27:54 +08:00
parent 2d5256fd91
commit e0f22aeaad
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/**
* Versionless, JSON-lines wire protocol between the Node host and the CPython subprocess. Frames
* travel on the child's fd 3 (one JSON object per line), leaving stdout/stderr free for the
* program's own output. Host treats every inbound frame as hostile because model code can post
* anything through the same fd; the Python bootstrap trusts host replies.
* @module @deepseek-ai/dsh-code-runtime-python/src/protocol
*/
// The protocol channel is fd 3 from the child's perspective — the host pins it
// positionally via `stdio: ['pipe','pipe','pipe','pipe']` (index.ts), and the
// Python bootstrap reads the same constant from its own protocol.py.
/**
* What the host sends immediately after spawn, as the first line on fd 3. The
* Python bootstrap reads this, applies resource limits, then waits for the
* subsequent run frame. Separated from the run so the run message stays
* pure model input.
*/
export interface BootMessage {
type: 'boot'
/** RLIMIT_CPU seconds; the Python bootstrap sets this on itself before executing model code. */
cpuSeconds: number
/** RLIMIT_AS bytes; caps address space so a runaway allocation fails cleanly. */
addressSpaceBytes: number
/** Shared byte budget for captured log text (Python-side ledger). */
maxLogBytes: number
/** Byte cap for the rendered completion value. */
maxValueBytes: number
/**
* The namespaces to materialize inside the program (globals + names;
* functions stay host-side). `errorClass` asks the bootstrap to mint a
* program-visible exception class under that global: rejected calls raise
* its instances carrying the member name on `memberNameProperty`.
*/
namespaces: { global: string; names: string[]; errorClass?: { name: string; memberNameProperty: string } }[]
}
// The run request `{ type: 'run', program }` follows BootMessage once the
// child acknowledges with `boot-ack`; the host sends it as an inline literal
// (it carries only the model's program body — caps and bindings crossed on boot).
/** Python → host: acknowledges boot completed and resource limits are in place. */
interface BootAckMessage {
type: 'boot-ack'
}
/** Python → host: one bridged binding call (`await tools.name(args)` inside the program). */
interface CallMessage {
type: 'call'
/** Python-issued correlation id; the host answers each id at most once and ignores duplicates. */
id: number
/** The namespace global the call targets. */
global: string
/** The function name within the namespace. */
name: string
/** The JSON-safe argument the model program passed. */
args: unknown
}
/**
* Python → host: captured text, streamed eagerly so output survives a
* mid-run termination (RLIMIT_CPU, SIGTERM/SIGKILL, host wall-timeout).
*/
interface LogMessage {
type: 'log'
text: string
/**
* Set when this frame IS the child ledger's truncation marker rather than
* program output. The two ledgers can exhaust at different points — one
* child entry larger than `maxLogBytes` sends only the marker while the host
* ledger is still nearly empty — so the host cannot infer the child's state
* from its own budget, and comparing the text against the marker string
* would also honour a program that printed that string itself. Carrying it
* as a field lets the host stop capturing at the same point the child did
* and keeps exactly one marker in `logs`.
*/
truncated?: boolean
}
/**
* Python → host: the program settled. `error` carries a program exception
* (traceback text), an `invalid-output` (completion value was not lossless
* JSON), or an `output-limit` (serialized completion exceeded the configured
* cap); wall/CPU budgets, aborts, and substrate death are observed host-side.
* `value` is present only on a clean completion that produced one, and crosses
* as exact lossless JSON — never substituted or truncated.
*/
interface DoneMessage {
type: 'done'
value?: unknown
error?: { kind: 'exception' | 'invalid-output' | 'output-limit'; message: string }
}
/**
* Every message the Python side sends. The member interfaces stay module-
* private: consumers match on the union's discriminant; the host sends the
* boot and run frames as inline literals.
*/
export type ChildToHost = BootAckMessage | CallMessage | LogMessage | DoneMessage
/** Host → Python: the answer to one {@link CallMessage}. */
export type ReplyMessage =
| { type: 'reply'; id: number; ok: true; value: unknown }
| { type: 'reply'; id: number; ok: false; message: string }
/**
* The in-band marker text announcing that log capture stopped at the byte
* budget. Shared wire vocabulary: the Python-side LogBuffer emits it when ITS
* ledger exhausts, and the host emits identical text when its own ledger drops
* a frame first (forged fd-3 traffic, stray stdout bytes) — a truncated run
* reads the same however the cap was hit.
* @param maxBytes - the configured `maxLogBytes` the marker names.
* @returns the marker line.
*/
export function logTruncationMarker(maxBytes: number): string {
return `[dsh-code-runtime-python] log capture truncated at ${maxBytes} bytes`
}
/**
* Serialize one JSON-parse-produced value without recursion. `JSON.stringify`
* recurses per nesting level and throws `RangeError` a few thousand levels
* deep, but the seam's `CodeJsonValue` has no depth limit — an honest deep
* completion or binding resolution below the byte budget must cross intact
* (the worker backend's wire is equally stack-safe). Callers must pass a value
* produced by `JSON.parse` (or equally JSON-plain): only `null`, finite
* numbers, booleans, strings, dense arrays, and plain objects — this encoder
* validates nothing. Output is byte-identical to compact `JSON.stringify`.
* @param value - a JSON-plain value (e.g. straight from `JSON.parse`).
* @returns the compact JSON encoding.
*/
export function encodeJsonPlain(value: unknown): string {
type Task = { text: string } | { value: unknown }
const chunks: string[] = []
const tasks: Task[] = [{ value }]
for (let task = tasks.pop(); task !== undefined; task = tasks.pop()) {
if ('text' in task) {
chunks.push(task.text)
continue
}
const current = task.value
if (typeof current === 'string') {
chunks.push(JSON.stringify(current))
} else if (Array.isArray(current)) {
chunks.push('[')
tasks.push({ text: ']' })
for (let index = current.length - 1; index >= 0; index--) {
if (index < current.length - 1) tasks.push({ text: ',' })
tasks.push({ value: current[index] })
}
} else if (typeof current === 'object' && current !== null) {
const record = current as Record<string, unknown>
chunks.push('{')
tasks.push({ text: '}' })
const keys = Object.keys(record)
for (let index = keys.length - 1; index >= 0; index--) {
const key = keys[index] as string
if (index < keys.length - 1) tasks.push({ text: ',' })
tasks.push({ value: record[key] })
tasks.push({ text: `${JSON.stringify(key)}:` })
}
} else {
chunks.push(scalarJson(current))
}
}
return chunks.join('')
}
/**
* One scalar (null, boolean, finite number) as JSON text. A beyond-safe-range
* integral double needs BigInt digits: `String(2 ** 60)` emits the ROUNDED
* `...847000` form, and echoing that to the child would silently change the
* integer the seam promised to carry losslessly — `BigInt(2 ** 60)` prints the
* exact `...846976` the double actually holds.
* @param current - a JSON-plain scalar (JSON.parse emits nothing else).
* @returns its JSON encoding.
*/
function scalarJson(current: unknown): string {
if (typeof current === 'number' && Number.isInteger(current) && !Number.isSafeInteger(current)) {
return BigInt(current).toString()
}
return String(current)
}
/**
* Meter a forged done value's compact-JSON byte length AND its number
* losslessness in one bounded traversal, stopping the instant `maxBytes` is
* crossed. A forged `done.value` arrives straight off fd 3 and can sit anywhere
* below the 256 MiB frame ceiling while `maxValueBytes` defaults to 32 KiB. The
* previous split — an unbounded `hasNonLosslessNumber` scan in
* {@link validateChildFrame} followed by a separate byte meter — pushed every
* member of a wide flat payload onto a scan stack before any cap check ran, so
* a below-ceiling forgery could still force a hundreds-of-megabytes host
* allocation. Folding both jobs here rejects over-budget BEFORE enqueuing an
* array's or object's children, keeping the traversal O(cap). A non-lossless
* number (non-finite, negative zero) is caught only when the value fits the
* budget — an over-budget value is rejected regardless, so the distinction is
* moot. Same JSON-plain precondition and traversal shape as
* {@link encodeJsonPlain}; per-scalar encoding delegates to `JSON.stringify`.
* @param value - a JSON-plain value (e.g. straight from `JSON.parse`).
* @param maxBytes - the completion-value budget in bytes.
* @returns `{ ok: true, bytes }` with the exact serialized size, or
* `{ ok: false, reason }` — `over-budget` once the size exceeds `maxBytes`,
* `non-lossless` on a non-finite or negative-zero number.
*/
export function checkDoneValue(value: unknown, maxBytes: number): { ok: true; bytes: number } | { ok: false; reason: 'over-budget' | 'non-lossless' } {
let bytes = 0
const stack: unknown[] = [value]
while (stack.length > 0) {
const current = stack.pop()
if (typeof current === 'number') {
if (!Number.isFinite(current) || Object.is(current, -0)) return { ok: false, reason: 'non-lossless' }
bytes += Buffer.byteLength(scalarJson(current), 'utf8')
} else if (typeof current === 'string') {
// Lower-bound BEFORE materializing the escaped form: every UTF-16 code
// unit is at least one UTF-8 byte plus the two quotes, so a huge or
// control-heavy forged string (whose escaped copy expands severalfold)
// is rejected without allocating that copy.
if (bytes + current.length + 2 > maxBytes) return { ok: false, reason: 'over-budget' }
bytes += Buffer.byteLength(JSON.stringify(current), 'utf8')
} else if (Array.isArray(current)) {
// Brackets plus one comma per gap; elements add themselves. Reject
// BEFORE enqueuing children: every element serializes to at least one
// byte, so a forged flat array below the frame ceiling but far above
// the budget fails here without growing the host stack by millions of
// entries first.
bytes += 2 + (current.length > 1 ? current.length - 1 : 0)
if (bytes + current.length > maxBytes) return { ok: false, reason: 'over-budget' }
for (const item of current) stack.push(item)
} else if (typeof current === 'object' && current !== null) {
const record = current as Record<string, unknown>
// Count own keys WITHOUT Object.entries/Object.keys: either would
// allocate one slot (entries: one pair array) per member before the
// bound below could run, recreating the spike the bound exists to stop.
let count = 0
for (const key in record) if (Object.hasOwn(record, key)) count += 1
bytes += 2 + (count > 1 ? count - 1 : 0)
// Same pre-enqueue bound: each entry contributes its quoted key (>= 2
// bytes), the colon, and a >= 1-byte value.
if (bytes + count * 4 > maxBytes) return { ok: false, reason: 'over-budget' }
for (const key in record) {
if (!Object.hasOwn(record, key)) continue
// The same string lower bound, before escaping the key.
if (bytes + key.length + 3 > maxBytes) return { ok: false, reason: 'over-budget' }
bytes += Buffer.byteLength(JSON.stringify(key), 'utf8') + 1
stack.push(record[key])
}
} else {
bytes += Buffer.byteLength(scalarJson(current), 'utf8')
}
if (bytes > maxBytes) return { ok: false, reason: 'over-budget' }
}
return { ok: true, bytes }
}
/**
* Whether a raw JSON line contains an integer token that would lose precision
* as a JavaScript number. `JSON.parse` silently rounds such a token
* (`9007199254740993` becomes `...992`) BEFORE any validation can see it, so
* the check must read the source text; a beyond-safe-range token whose double
* parse round-trips exactly (`2**53`, `2**60`) is lossless and passes. The scan walks the line skipping string literals (a digit run
* inside a string is data, not a number token) and tests every number token
* in plain integer form — no fraction or exponent, which parse as doubles by
* intent. A reviver cannot do this job: the reviver walk recurses per nesting
* level and would reintroduce the depth limit `encodeJsonPlain` removes.
* @param line - the raw UTF-8 text of one JSON-lines frame.
* @returns true when an unsafe integer token is present outside strings.
*/
export function hasUnsafeIntegerToken(line: string): boolean {
for (let index = 0; index < line.length; index++) {
const char = line[index]
if (char === '"') {
// Skip the string literal, honoring backslash escapes.
for (index++; index < line.length; index++) {
if (line[index] === '\\') index++
else if (line[index] === '"') break
}
continue
}
if (char === '-' || (char !== undefined && char >= '0' && char <= '9')) {
let end = index + 1
while (end < line.length) {
const c = line[end] as string
if ((c >= '0' && c <= '9') || c === '.' || c === 'e' || c === 'E' || c === '+' || c === '-') end++
else break
}
const token = line.slice(index, end)
// Beyond the safe range an integer token is still lossless IFF the
// double parse round-trips exactly (2**53 does; 2**53+1 rounds) — the
// canonical boundary accepts every JS-double-exact value, so only a
// genuinely rounding token marks the frame as forged.
if (/^-?\d+$/.test(token)) {
const parsed = Number(token)
// A token that parses to Infinity is trivially lossy; a finite
// beyond-safe-range one is lossy only when the BigInt round-trip
// disagrees.
if (!Number.isFinite(parsed)) return true
if (!Number.isSafeInteger(parsed) && BigInt(token) !== BigInt(parsed)) return true
}
index = end - 1
}
}
return false
}
/**
* Lazily yield one plain object's own enumerable property values. A generator
* (not `Object.values`/`Object.entries`) because {@link hasNonLosslessNumber}
* traverses breadth it cannot bound: those helpers copy the whole member list
* up front, so a wide forged object would cost a second full-breadth
* allocation before a single value is examined.
* @param record - a JSON-parse-produced object.
* @yields each own enumerable property value, in key order.
*/
function* ownValues(record: object): Generator {
for (const key in record) {
if (Object.hasOwn(record, key)) yield (record as Record<string, unknown>)[key]
}
}
/**
* Whether a JSON.parse-produced value contains a number outside lossless
* JSON: non-finite (`1e400` parses to `Infinity`) or negative zero (`-0.0`
* parses to JS `-0`, whose sign bit a re-serialization drops). The honest
* child's validator rejects these before sending, so a frame carrying one is
* forged.
*
* Runs on `call.args`, which — unlike a completion value — has NO seam byte
* cap, so there is no budget to reject a wide payload against the way
* {@link checkDoneValue} does. The traversal therefore holds ONE cursor per
* NESTING LEVEL (an array or {@link ownValues} iterator) instead of one entry
* per member: a forged flat `args` just below the 256 MiB frame ceiling would
* otherwise push tens of millions of stack entries — and `Object.values` would
* copy each object's full breadth — allocating hundreds of megabytes beyond
* what `JSON.parse` already holds. Iterative either way, so a deep frame
* cannot overflow the host stack.
* @param value - a JSON-parse-produced value from an fd-3 frame.
* @returns true when any contained number is non-finite or negative zero.
*/
export function hasNonLosslessNumber(value: unknown): boolean {
const cursors: Iterator<unknown>[] = [[value].values()]
while (cursors.length > 0) {
// The loop condition guarantees a top cursor.
const cursor = cursors.at(-1) as Iterator<unknown>
const step = cursor.next()
if (step.done === true) {
cursors.pop()
continue
}
const current = step.value
if (typeof current === 'number') {
if (!Number.isFinite(current) || Object.is(current, -0)) return true
} else if (Array.isArray(current)) {
cursors.push((current as unknown[]).values())
} else if (typeof current === 'object' && current !== null) {
cursors.push(ownValues(current))
}
}
return false
}
/**
* Runtime shape gate for inbound fd-3 traffic. Model code has full access to
* fd 3 and can post anything — `null`, primitives, poisoned fields — so the
* compile-time union means nothing here: every field is validated and REBUILT
* before the host reads it (forged extras never ride along; a non-number id
* can never be echoed into a reply). Junk returns `undefined` and is dropped
* so a throw in the host's `message` handler cannot crash the host process.
* @param raw - one JSON-parsed frame from fd 3.
* @returns the rebuilt frame, or `undefined` to drop it silently.
*/
export function validateChildFrame(raw: unknown): ChildToHost | undefined {
if (typeof raw !== 'object' || raw === null) return undefined
const m = raw as Record<string, unknown>
switch (m.type) {
case 'boot-ack':
return { type: 'boot-ack' }
case 'log':
if (typeof m.text !== 'string') return undefined
// Rebuilt, not passed through: a forged `truncated` of any other type
// would reach the host as a truthy value and silence capture for the
// rest of the run. Only the literal `true` counts.
return { type: 'log', text: m.text, ...m.truncated === true ? { truncated: true } : {} }
case 'call': {
// The id must be a finite number: it is echoed verbatim into the reply
// frame, and a forged `1e400` id (Infinity after JSON.parse) would make
// the reply unencodable as strict JSON.
if (typeof m.id !== 'number' || !Number.isFinite(m.id) || typeof m.global !== 'string' || typeof m.name !== 'string') return undefined
// A forged frame can omit `args` entirely; rebuilding it as `undefined`
// would invoke the binding with a non-JSON value, bypassing the
// lossless-JSON argument boundary. Any PRESENT value is JSON-plain by
// construction (the frame came from JSON.parse), so presence is the
// whole check.
if (!Object.hasOwn(m, 'args')) return undefined
// JSON.parse yields Infinity for 1e400 and preserves -0; both are
// outside lossless JSON, and the honest child never sends them.
if (hasNonLosslessNumber(m.args)) return undefined
return { type: 'call', id: m.id, global: m.global, name: m.name, args: m.args }
}
case 'done': {
// The value passes through untouched here: scanning it for non-lossless
// numbers would push every member of a wide forged payload before any
// byte cap runs. The done handler's bounded `checkDoneValue` folds the
// losslessness check into the metered traversal, rejecting over-budget
// before it enqueues children.
const err = m.error
if (err === undefined) {
return m.value === undefined ? { type: 'done' } : { type: 'done', value: m.value }
}
if (typeof err !== 'object' || err === null) return undefined
const { kind, message } = err as Record<string, unknown>
if (typeof message !== 'string') return undefined
if (kind !== 'exception' && kind !== 'invalid-output' && kind !== 'output-limit') return undefined
return m.value === undefined
? { type: 'done', error: { kind, message } }
: { type: 'done', value: m.value, error: { kind, message } }
}
default:
return undefined
}
}