/** * LocalSandboxProvider tests. No real runner is assumed to exist on the test * host: `runnerCommand` injects deterministic runner argvs, and `internals` * injects probe verdicts plus fake Landlock launcher / `sandbox-exec` * scripts, so profile dialects, ladder selection, verdict caching, * probe-report parsing, per-rung denial signatures, and fail-closed behavior * are all exercised through the real `confine()` path. */ import { mkdtempSync, realpathSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs' import { tmpdir } from 'node:os' import { join } from 'node:path' import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest' import { Context } from '@deepseek-ai/cordis' import { LAUNCHER_FAILURE_EXIT } from '@deepseek-ai/node-addon-landlock-run' import { SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE, SandboxUnavailableError } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox' import type { SandboxPolicy } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox' import { LocalSandboxProvider, } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-local' import type { Config } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-local' import { bwrapProfileArgs, landlockProfileArgs, seatbeltProfileArgs } from '../src/profiles.ts' const RO: SandboxPolicy = { mode: 'read-only', workspaceRoot: '/ws' } const WW: SandboxPolicy = { mode: 'workspace-write', workspaceRoot: '/ws' } async function setup(config: Config = {}, internals: LocalSandboxProvider['internals'] = {}) { const ctx = new Context() await ctx.plugin(LocalSandboxProvider, config) const sandbox = ctx.sandbox as LocalSandboxProvider sandbox.internals = internals return { ctx, sandbox } } /** * A path inside a fresh temp dir where no file is written, pinning the * built-entry `existsSync` check to false. Without it the resolution depends on * whether the checkout has run `build:lib:host`, which emits * `sandbox-windows-acl/lib/runner.js`. */ function absentRunnerEntry(): string { return join(mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'dsh-absent-acl-entry-')), 'runner.js') } /** Write an executable fake `landlock-run` that answers `--probe` with `report`. */ function fakeLauncher(report = 'landlock: fully enforced'): string { const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'dsh-fake-landlock-')) const launcher = join(dir, 'landlock-run') writeFileSync(launcher, `#!/bin/sh\nif [ "$1" = "--probe" ]; then echo "${report}"; exit 0; fi\nexit ${LAUNCHER_FAILURE_EXIT}\n`, { mode: 0o755 }) return launcher } /** Write an executable fake `sandbox-exec` that exits `status` for any invocation. */ function fakeSeatbeltExec(status: number): string { const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'dsh-fake-seatbelt-')) const exec = join(dir, 'sandbox-exec') writeFileSync(exec, `#!/bin/sh\nexit ${status}\n`, { mode: 0o755 }) return exec } /** The seatbelt read-only profile — every seatbelt profile starts with these forms. */ const SEATBELT_RO_PROFILE = '(version 1) (allow default) (deny file-write*) (allow file-write* (literal "/dev/null"))' describe('profile dialects', () => { it('bwrap read-only: whole tree read-only with fresh /dev and private PID-scoped /proc, no writable mounts', () => { expect(bwrapProfileArgs(RO)).toEqual(['--ro-bind', '/', '/', '--dev', '/dev', '--unshare-pid', '--proc', '/proc', '--die-with-parent']) }) it('bwrap workspace-write: adds an ephemeral /tmp and rebinds the workspace root', () => { expect(bwrapProfileArgs(WW)).toEqual([ '--ro-bind', '/', '/', '--dev', '/dev', '--unshare-pid', '--proc', '/proc', '--die-with-parent', '--tmpfs', '/tmp', '--bind', '/ws', '/ws', ]) }) it('landlock read-only: readable tree plus a writable /dev/null, nothing else', () => { // /dev/null specifically, NOT /dev: a whole-/dev grant would let confined // commands write real host paths beneath it (/dev/shm) under read-only. expect(landlockProfileArgs(RO)).toEqual(['--ro', '/', '--rw', '/dev/null']) }) it('landlock workspace-write: adds the host /tmp and the workspace root', () => { expect(landlockProfileArgs(WW)).toEqual(['--ro', '/', '--rw', '/dev/null', '--rw', '/tmp', '--rw', '/ws']) }) it('seatbelt read-only: allow-default with every file write denied except the /dev/null literal', () => { expect(seatbeltProfileArgs(RO)).toEqual(['-p', SEATBELT_RO_PROFILE]) }) it('seatbelt workspace-write: one more allow for the canonicalized workspace root, /tmp, and the user temp dir', () => { // `/ws` does not exist, so it is granted as spelled (the canonicalization // fallback); `/tmp` and `os.tmpdir()` exist everywhere and are granted // CANONICALIZED — Seatbelt matches resolved paths (`/tmp` IS // `/private/tmp` on macOS), and both collapse to one grant on hosts // where they resolve to the same directory. const roots = [...new Set(['/ws', realpathSync('/tmp'), realpathSync(tmpdir())])] const allow = `(allow file-write* ${roots.map(root => `(subpath "${root}")`).join(' ')})` expect(seatbeltProfileArgs(WW)).toEqual(['-p', `${SEATBELT_RO_PROFILE} ${allow}`]) }) it('seatbelt workspace-write dedups a workspace root that already IS the temp dir', () => { const profile = seatbeltProfileArgs({ mode: 'workspace-write', workspaceRoot: tmpdir() })[1] as string const grant = `(subpath "${realpathSync(tmpdir())}")` expect(profile).toContain(grant) expect(profile.split(grant)).toHaveLength(2) }) }) describe('runnerCommand config', () => { it('a non-empty runnerCommand skips the chain: runner argv + bwrap-shaped profile + -- + caller argv, asserted full', async () => { const probeBwrap = vi.fn(() => false) const probeLandlock = vi.fn(() => 'unusable' as const) const probeSeatbelt = vi.fn(() => false) const { sandbox } = await setup({ runnerCommand: ['fake-runner', '--flag'], runnerFailureSignatures: ['fake-runner: profile rejected'], }, { probeBwrap, probeLandlock, probeSeatbelt }) const confined = sandbox.confine(['bash', '-c', 'echo hi'], WW) expect(confined).toEqual({ argv: ['fake-runner', '--flag', ...bwrapProfileArgs(WW), '--', 'bash', '-c', 'echo hi'], enforcement: 'full', // An operator runner's kernel mechanism is unknown: both Linux // file-denial dialects, never bare EPERM. denialSignatures: ['read-only file system', 'permission denied'], runnerFailureRules: [{ fatalSignatures: ['fake-runner: profile rejected'] }], }) expect(probeBwrap).not.toHaveBeenCalled() expect(probeLandlock).not.toHaveBeenCalled() expect(probeSeatbelt).not.toHaveBeenCalled() }) it('an EMPTY runnerCommand means unconfigured: the platform chain still gates the wrap', async () => { const probeBwrap = vi.fn(() => false) const { sandbox } = await setup({ runnerCommand: [] }, { platform: 'linux', probeBwrap, probeLandlock: () => 'unusable' }) expect(() => sandbox.confine(['true'], RO)).toThrow(SandboxUnavailableError) expect(probeBwrap).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1) }) it('requires an operator-owned failure dialect for every configured runner', async () => { await expect(setup({ runnerCommand: ['fake-runner'] })).rejects.toThrow( 'runnerCommand requires at least one runnerFailureSignatures entry', ) }) it('rejects runner failure signatures when no custom runner consumes them', async () => { await expect(setup({ runnerFailureSignatures: ['profile rejected'] })).rejects.toThrow( 'runnerFailureSignatures requires runnerCommand', ) }) it.each([' ', 'fatal\ncontinued', 'fatal\rcontinued'])( 'rejects an unusable configured-runner failure signature %j', async (signature) => { await expect(setup({ runnerCommand: ['fake-runner'], runnerFailureSignatures: [signature] })).rejects.toThrow( 'runnerFailureSignatures entries must be non-empty single-line strings', ) }, ) }) describe('the platform chains', () => { it('linux probes bwrap first: a passing probe wraps with the bwrap dialect at full enforcement', async () => { const probeBwrap = vi.fn(() => true) const probeLandlock = vi.fn(() => 'full' as const) const { sandbox } = await setup({}, { platform: 'linux', probeBwrap, probeLandlock }) const confined = sandbox.confine(['true'], RO) expect(confined).toEqual({ argv: ['bwrap', ...bwrapProfileArgs(RO), '--', 'true'], enforcement: 'full', denialSignatures: ['read-only file system'], runnerFailureRules: [{ fatalSignatures: ['bwrap: '] }], }) expect(probeLandlock).not.toHaveBeenCalled() }) it('linux falls back to the launcher when the bwrap probe fails, speaking the landlock dialect', async () => { const probeBwrap = vi.fn(() => false) const probeLandlock = vi.fn(() => 'full' as const) const launcher = fakeLauncher() const { sandbox } = await setup({}, { platform: 'linux', probeBwrap, probeLandlock, landlockLauncher: launcher }) const confined = sandbox.confine(['bash', '-c', 'echo hi'], WW) expect(confined).toEqual({ argv: [launcher, ...landlockProfileArgs(WW), '--', 'bash', '-c', 'echo hi'], enforcement: 'full', denialSignatures: ['permission denied'], runnerFailureRules: [{ allowedExitCodes: [LAUNCHER_FAILURE_EXIT], fatalSignatures: ['landlock-run: '], informationalLines: ['landlock-run: partial enforcement (older Landlock ABI)'], }], }) expect(probeLandlock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(launcher) }) it('darwin selects its sole candidate WITHOUT probing: nothing to arbitrate', async () => { // The safety property moves to execution time: an unusable sandbox-exec // refuses to run the command, and the wrap's runnerFailureRules let // the consumer classify that as a sandbox failure, not a task failure. const probeSeatbelt = vi.fn(() => true) const { sandbox } = await setup({}, { platform: 'darwin', probeSeatbelt }) const confined = sandbox.confine(['bash', '-c', 'echo hi'], RO) expect(confined).toEqual({ argv: ['sandbox-exec', ...seatbeltProfileArgs(RO), '--', 'bash', '-c', 'echo hi'], enforcement: 'full', denialSignatures: ['operation not permitted'], runnerFailureRules: [{ fatalSignatures: ['sandbox-exec: '] }], }) expect(probeSeatbelt).not.toHaveBeenCalled() }) it('a platform with no chain fails closed without a single probe: the command never runs', async () => { const probeBwrap = vi.fn(() => true) const probeLandlock = vi.fn(() => 'full' as const) const probeSeatbelt = vi.fn(() => true) const { sandbox } = await setup({}, { platform: 'freebsd', probeBwrap, probeLandlock, probeSeatbelt }) expect(() => sandbox.confine(['true'], RO)).toThrow(expect.objectContaining({ name: 'SandboxUnavailableError', code: SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE })) expect(probeBwrap).not.toHaveBeenCalled() expect(probeLandlock).not.toHaveBeenCalled() expect(probeSeatbelt).not.toHaveBeenCalled() }) // The win32 chain's argv contract, denial dialect, and runner-failure rules // live in @deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-windows-acl/tests/provider-chain.spec.ts // (platform-independent assertions that run in every CI lane, including // Windows where this package's POSIX-only suites are excluded). it('caches the verdict for the provider lifetime: one chain walk across wraps', async () => { const probeBwrap = vi.fn(() => true) const { sandbox } = await setup({}, { platform: 'linux', probeBwrap }) sandbox.confine(['true'], RO) sandbox.confine(['true'], WW) expect(probeBwrap).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1) }) it('the unavailable verdict is cached too, and the error is structured', async () => { const probeBwrap = vi.fn(() => false) const probeLandlock = vi.fn(() => 'unusable' as const) const { sandbox } = await setup({}, { platform: 'linux', probeBwrap, probeLandlock }) expect(() => sandbox.confine(['true'], RO)).toThrow(expect.objectContaining({ name: 'SandboxUnavailableError', code: SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE })) expect(() => sandbox.confine(['true'], RO)).toThrow(SandboxUnavailableError) expect(probeBwrap).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1) expect(probeLandlock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1) }) it('a multi-rung chain probes a seatbelt rung like any other (the walk, not the platform table, decides)', async () => { // The product chains reach seatbelt only as darwin's sole (unprobed) // candidate; the probe chain exercises the path it would take in // a grown chain, keeping the default seatbelt probe honest. const exec = fakeSeatbeltExec(0) const probeBwrap = vi.fn(() => false) const { sandbox } = await setup({}, { chain: ['bwrap', 'seatbelt'], probeBwrap, seatbeltExec: exec }) const confined = sandbox.confine(['true'], RO) expect(confined.argv[0]).toBe(exec) expect(confined.enforcement).toBe('full') expect(probeBwrap).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1) }) it('a rogue chain entry throws via the probe walk\'s exhaustiveness guard (closed union)', async () => { // Same convention as the wrap switch below: the union is closed, so a runner added later // fails to compile at the probe switch instead of silently selecting without a probe. const { sandbox } = await setup({}, { chain: ['chroot', 'bwrap'] as unknown as readonly ['bwrap'] }) expect(() => sandbox.confine(['true'], RO)).toThrow('unreachable variant') }) it('a rogue cached runner tag throws via the exhaustiveness guard (closed union)', async () => { // Only a cast can create this rogue closed-union tag. It must hit `assertNever`, ensuring a new // runner cannot silently use another runner's wrap or denial dialect. const { sandbox } = await setup() ;(sandbox as unknown as { selectedRunner: unknown }).selectedRunner = { runner: 'chroot', enforcement: 'full' } expect(() => sandbox.confine(['true'], RO)).toThrow('unreachable variant') }) it('runs the real default probes on the linux chain when none are injected (usable here or fail closed there)', async () => { // Pinning the platform (not the probes) makes the REAL defaultProbeBwrap // spawn run on every host: bwrap answers on a Linux box, ENOENT reads as // an unusable rung anywhere else — either way the walk is genuine. const { sandbox } = await setup({}, { platform: 'linux' }) const verdict = (() => { try { sandbox.confine(['true'], RO) return 'usable' } catch (error: unknown) { if (error instanceof SandboxUnavailableError) return 'unavailable' throw error } })() expect(['usable', 'unavailable']).toContain(verdict) }) it('walks the real platform chain when nothing is injected (usable here or fail closed there)', async () => { const { sandbox } = await setup({}, {}) const verdict = (() => { try { sandbox.confine(['true'], RO) return 'usable' } catch (error: unknown) { if (error instanceof SandboxUnavailableError) return 'unavailable' throw error } })() expect(['usable', 'unavailable']).toContain(verdict) }) }) describe('the default landlock probe (launcher CLI contract)', () => { it('parses a fully-enforced probe report as full enforcement', async () => { const { sandbox } = await setup({}, { platform: 'linux', probeBwrap: () => false, landlockLauncher: fakeLauncher() }) expect(sandbox.confine(['true'], RO).enforcement).toBe('full') }) it('parses a partially-enforced (older-ABI) probe report as partial enforcement', async () => { const launcher = fakeLauncher('landlock: partially enforced (older ABI)') const { sandbox } = await setup({}, { platform: 'linux', probeBwrap: () => false, landlockLauncher: launcher }) expect(sandbox.confine(['true'], RO).enforcement).toBe('partial') }) it('reads a failing launcher as unusable: the chain ends and fails closed', async () => { const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'dsh-fake-landlock-')) const launcher = join(dir, 'landlock-run') writeFileSync(launcher, `#!/bin/sh\nexit ${LAUNCHER_FAILURE_EXIT}\n`, { mode: 0o755 }) const { sandbox } = await setup({}, { platform: 'linux', probeBwrap: () => false, landlockLauncher: launcher }) expect(() => sandbox.confine(['true'], RO)).toThrow(expect.objectContaining({ code: SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE })) }) }) describe('probeTimeoutMs config', () => { it('rejects 0 at construction: Node treats a 0 spawnSync timeout as UNBOUNDED, the opposite of the field', async () => { const ctx = new Context() await expect(ctx.plugin(LocalSandboxProvider, { probeTimeoutMs: 0 })) .rejects.toThrow(/probeTimeoutMs must be a positive finite number/) }) it('bounds the default probes: a launcher slower than the configured timeout reads as unusable', async () => { // The same 1s launcher reads usable under a generous budget and unusable // under a 250ms one — the config demonstrably reaches spawnSync. Both bounds // keep a wide margin from the launcher's 1s runtime so a loaded host (where // spawnSync blocks the worker and fork/exec latency inflates wall-clock) // cannot flip either verdict; the vitest timeout clears the patient budget. const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'dsh-slow-landlock-')) const launcher = join(dir, 'landlock-run') writeFileSync(launcher, '#!/bin/sh\nsleep 1\necho "landlock: fully enforced"\nexit 0\n', { mode: 0o755 }) const patient = await setup( { probeTimeoutMs: 15_000 }, { platform: 'linux', probeBwrap: () => false, landlockLauncher: launcher }, ) expect(patient.sandbox.confine(['true'], RO).enforcement).toBe('full') const impatient = await setup( { probeTimeoutMs: 250 }, { platform: 'linux', probeBwrap: () => false, landlockLauncher: launcher }, ) expect(() => impatient.sandbox.confine(['true'], RO)).toThrow(expect.objectContaining({ code: SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE })) }, 30_000) }) describe('the default seatbelt probe (sandbox-exec contract)', () => { // The product chains reach seatbelt only unprobed (darwin's sole // candidate), so the default probe's contract is pinned through the provider // chain: a grown chain must probe it like any other rung. it('selects the rung when the executable applies the read-only profile and exits 0', async () => { const exec = fakeSeatbeltExec(0) const { sandbox } = await setup({}, { chain: ['bwrap', 'seatbelt'], probeBwrap: () => false, seatbeltExec: exec }) const confined = sandbox.confine(['true'], RO) expect(confined).toEqual({ argv: [exec, ...seatbeltProfileArgs(RO), '--', 'true'], enforcement: 'full', denialSignatures: ['operation not permitted'], runnerFailureRules: [{ fatalSignatures: ['sandbox-exec: '] }], }) }) it('reads a failing executable as unusable: the chain ends and fails closed', async () => { const { sandbox } = await setup({}, { chain: ['bwrap', 'seatbelt'], probeBwrap: () => false, seatbeltExec: fakeSeatbeltExec(1) }) expect(() => sandbox.confine(['true'], RO)).toThrow(expect.objectContaining({ code: SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE })) }) }) describe('the windows-acl probe (runner invocation contract)', () => { // The product chain reaches windows-acl only unprobed (win32's sole // candidate), so the probe case and the runner-entry resolution are pinned // through the chain seam, mirroring the seatbelt default-probe contract. it('selects the rung when the injected probe passes, speaking the ACL dialect', async () => { const probeWindowsAcl = vi.fn(() => true) const { sandbox } = await setup({}, { chain: ['windows-acl', 'bwrap'], probeWindowsAcl, probeBwrap: () => false, windowsAclRunnerArgs: ['node', 'windows-acl-runner.js'], }) const confined = sandbox.confine(['true'], RO) expect(probeWindowsAcl).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1) expect(confined.argv.slice(-4)).toEqual(['--mode', 'read-only', '--', 'true']) expect(confined.enforcement).toBe('partial') expect(confined.denialSignatures).toEqual(['access is denied', 'access to the path', 'permission denied']) expect(confined.runnerFailureRules).toEqual([{ allowedExitCodes: [127], fatalSignatures: ['windows-acl-run: '] }]) }) it('reads a failing probe as unusable and walks to the next rung', async () => { const probeWindowsAcl = vi.fn(() => false) const { sandbox } = await setup({}, { chain: ['windows-acl', 'bwrap'], probeWindowsAcl, probeBwrap: () => true }) const confined = sandbox.confine(['true'], RO) expect(confined.argv[0]).toBe('bwrap') expect(probeWindowsAcl).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1) }) it('runs the REAL default probe against the resolved runner invocation when none is injected', async () => { // No entry injected: this covers the production resolution through // import.meta.resolve. Which arm of the existsSync check it takes depends // on whether the checkout has run build:lib:host (which emits // sandbox-windows-acl/lib/runner.js), so this asserts only what holds // either way — the runner cannot init off win32, so the probe reads // unusable and the walk falls through to the injected bwrap verdict. const { sandbox } = await setup({}, { chain: ['windows-acl', 'bwrap'], probeBwrap: () => true }) const confined = sandbox.confine(['true'], RO) expect(confined.argv[0]).toBe('bwrap') }, 30_000) it('falls back to the runner source through tsx when the built entry is absent', async () => { // The absent entry pins the source-through-tsx arm regardless of build // state: on a checkout where build:lib:host has run, the real resolution // above takes the built-entry arm instead and would leave this uncovered. const { sandbox } = await setup({}, { chain: ['windows-acl', 'bwrap'], probeWindowsAcl: () => true, windowsAclRunnerEntry: absentRunnerEntry(), }) const confined = sandbox.confine(['true'], RO) expect(confined.argv.slice(0, 3)).toEqual([process.execPath, '--import', 'tsx/esm']) expect(confined.argv[3]).toMatch(/runner\.ts$/) }) it('reads an empty runner invocation as unusable (the probe\'s empty-argv guard)', async () => { // windowsAclRunnerInvocation always yields [node, ...] in product; an // override returning [] exercises the default probe's empty-argv guard. const { sandbox } = await setup({}, { chain: ['windows-acl', 'bwrap'], probeBwrap: () => true, windowsAclRunnerArgs: [] }) const confined = sandbox.confine(['true'], RO) expect(confined.argv[0]).toBe('bwrap') }) it('prefers the built lib/runner.js entry when the resolved file exists', async () => { const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'dsh-fake-acl-entry-')) const builtEntry = join(dir, 'runner.js') writeFileSync(builtEntry, '') const { sandbox } = await setup({}, { chain: ['windows-acl', 'bwrap'], probeWindowsAcl: () => true, windowsAclRunnerEntry: builtEntry, }) const confined = sandbox.confine(['true'], RO) expect(confined.argv.slice(0, 2)).toEqual([process.execPath, builtEntry]) }) })