``requests.exceptions.RequestException`` subclasses ``OSError``, so the
``except (ImportError, OSError)`` handler in ``load_from_api`` swallowed
genuine network failures (connection errors, timeouts, HTTP errors) and
reported them as "requests library not available", hiding the real cause.
Remove the obsolete handler so those failures fall through to the generic
handler, which reports "Failed to load from API: ..." and chains the real
exception as ``__cause__``. Update the docstring's ``Raises`` section to
match the actual behavior.
Fixes#949
Co-authored-by: Pravit Ampapathini <pravit.amp@gmail.com>
* fix(security): prevent auth header leakage across redirects
* fix(security): harden redirect credential handling
Address Copilot and Qodo review findings for #947.
- Remove unused variables, imports, and unnecessary pass statements from tests.
- Harden cross-origin redirect handling for per-request auth credentials.
- Strip session-level auth handlers before cross-origin redirect hops.
- Prevent session.auth from regenerating Authorization headers.
- Disable trust_env during cross-origin hops to prevent .netrc credential injection.
- Restore session auth and trust_env state reliably with try/finally.
- Add regression coverage for auth=, session.auth, trust_env, and multi-hop redirects.
- Preserve existing security behavior and same-origin authentication semantics.
Validated with 189/189 security and affected tests passing.
* fix(security): scope allow_private_ips to same-host redirects, fix error handling gaps
Follow-up to review findings on #1067:
- MCPClient hardcoded allow_private_ips=True for every redirect hop, not
just its operator-configured host, so a compromised/malicious MCP server
could 302 into private address space (e.g. cloud metadata) unchecked.
request_with_ssrf_guard() gains allow_private_ips_on_redirect: a redirect
target inherits the original host's private-IP trust only when it matches
that host; MCPClient now pins it to False.
- detect_public_api() only caught requests.exceptions.RequestException, but
the SSRF guard raises ValidationError for blocked hosts/redirects, unlike
its sibling ingest_public_api(). Now catches and re-raises it the same way.
- detect_public_api()/ingest_public_api() forwarded session/allow_private_ips
through **options into request_with_ssrf_guard(), which already passes
both explicitly -- a caller supplying either would hit a duplicate-kwarg
TypeError. Both are now popped from request_options first.
New regression coverage for all three in tests/ingest/, plus a CHANGELOG
entry under Unreleased/Security.
---------
Co-authored-by: KaifAhmad1 <kaifahmad087@gmail.com>
Fix DBIngestor calls in load_from_database , it was never actually reaching the db.
execute_query/export_table need the connection string as their first arg,
but we were only passing it to the constructor's config dict, which
those methods don't read. Every call blew up with a TypeError before
connecting.
Also split the ImportError/OSError handling , they were caught together
so a real connection failure got reported as "module not available",
which sent people looking in the wrong place. OSError now surfaces as
an actual failure with the original exception chained via `from e`.
Fixes#973.
* feat(seed): add allow_private_ips opt-in for trusted internal API sources (Closes#943)
SeedDataManager.load_from_api now delegates to the shared SSRF guard
(semantica/ingest/ssrf.py, added in #906) instead of raw requests.get,
gaining redirect validation and bounded DNS resolution for free.
New config option allow_private_ips (parsed via the shared parse_bool
helper) lets trusted internal deployments load from private APIs while
the secure default (block private/loopback/link-local) is unchanged.
Tests updated to mock request_with_ssrf_guard; new tests cover the
block-by-default behavior and the opt-in flag reaching the guard.
19/19 green in test_seed_manager.py, 25/25 across both seed suites.
Signed-off-by: Yunare Maia <yunare@gmail.com>
* fix(ssrf): strip sensitive headers on cross-host redirects (Qodo finding)
request_with_ssrf_guard reused the caller's headers on every redirect hop,
so an Authorization bearer token from load_from_api could leak to a
different redirect target host. Now strips Authorization and
Proxy-Authorization when the redirect origin (netloc) changes, while
keeping them for same-host hops (matching requests semantics).
2 new tests: cross-host redirect drops the credential; same-host keeps it.
37/37 green in test_ssrf_protection.py. load_from_api docstring now also
documents cloud-metadata blocking and per-hop redirect validation.
Signed-off-by: Yunare Maia <yunare@gmail.com>
* fix(ssrf): strip credentials on https->http downgrade redirects (review feedback)
_should_strip_auth now mirrors requests' should_strip_auth semantics:
strip on hostname change, port change, or scheme downgrade; keep the
credential only for the safe http->https upgrade on default ports.
Previously only netloc was compared, so an https->http redirect on the
same host replayed the Authorization header in cleartext.
---------
Signed-off-by: Yunare Maia <yunare@gmail.com>
- Robust ID extraction in CentralityCalculator, CommunityDetector, and ConnectivityAnalyzer
- Support for direct Entity objects and dictionaries as node identifiers
- Improved Entity hashability in utils/types.py
- Added integration test to verify fix and prevent regression
