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semantica/.github/workflows/security-scan.yml
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Mohd KaifandSameer6305 b59211ea7f security: SHA-pin all Actions, harden release pipeline, add pin verification (#824)
* security: SHA-pin all Actions, harden release pipeline, add pin verification

Hardens the CI/CD supply chain against the LiteLLM/Trivy-style attack (a
compromised third-party Action with a mutable tag stealing a long-lived
publishing token) and closes several related gaps found in an audit of the
actual repository state.

- Pin every third-party GitHub Action across all workflows to a full commit
  SHA (tag kept as a trailing comment); add verify-action-pins.yml, a CI
  check that confirms via the GitHub API that each pin still matches its
  tag, on every workflow change, push to main, and weekly.
- Scope release.yml permissions to the job level (workflow defaults to
  contents: read); add a concurrency group so simultaneous tag pushes can't
  race the publish job.
- Add SLSA build provenance attestation (actions/attest-build-provenance)
  for every released wheel.
- Fix a latent bug in security-scan.yml: the PR-comment step was missing
  pull-requests: write and silently failing; add bounded artifact retention
  for uploaded scan reports.
- Group github-actions Dependabot updates to cut review noise.
- Document the resulting posture in SECURITY.md for auditors/regulated
  adopters, including what's enforced and what a fork needs to reconfigure
  for itself (environment/branch protection, Trusted Publishing trust).

Also (via GitHub API, not in this diff): created a protected `pypi`
environment with a required reviewer restricted to v* tags, and enabled
branch protection on main (required review, required status checks, no
force-push/deletion).

* fix: harden verify-action-pins per PR #824 bot review

Addresses real findings from the automated review on #824:

- The script previously only matched uses: lines that already contained a
  40-hex SHA, so a newly added mutable-tag action (e.g. some/action@v1)
  would never be scanned at all and the check would pass silently. It now
  matches every uses: line and hard-fails on any ref that isn't a full
  commit SHA.
- A tag that fails to resolve via the GitHub API (rate limit, deleted tag)
  previously only logged a warning and continued; that's now a hard
  failure too, since an unverifiable pin is exactly the failure mode this
  check exists to catch.
- verify-action-pins.yml only triggered on .github/workflows/** changes,
  so an edit to the verifier script itself wouldn't run the check that
  verifies it. Added the script path to both trigger filters.

The reviewer's claim that slash-containing tag comments (release/v1) break
the API lookup did not reproduce - tested directly against
pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish@release/v1 and GitHub's commits API resolves
multi-segment refs natively - so no change was needed there.

Verified with a synthetic test workflow containing a mutable-tag action,
a correctly-pinned SHA, and a deliberately mismatched SHA: the updated
script now catches the first and third cases and passes the second. Also
re-ran against the real workflow tree (40/40 pins still verify clean).

* fix: repair broken Safety scan and PR comment formatting

The "Comment PR with Security Results" step was producing garbled output
(literal \n characters instead of newlines, "undefined:" labels) because:

- Every line in the JS comment builder used \n (escaped backslash-n)
  inside template literals, which JS renders as the literal two-character
  string \n, not a newline.
- The Semgrep section read issue.rule_id, but Semgrep's JSON field is
  check_id - hence "undefined: <path>" for every entry.

Rewrote the comment builder to construct each section as an array of
lines joined with a real '\n', with correct field names, and collapsed
long finding lists into a <details> block instead of a flat list.
Verified by extracting the exact script and running it under node against
synthetic fixtures matching each tool's real JSON schema (found/clean/
missing-report paths all render correctly).

While tracing the "undefined" and always-empty Safety section, found the
Safety step itself was silently broken:

- `safety check --json --output safety-report.json` is invalid in
  Safety 3.x: --output now selects a console format (json/text/screen),
  not a file path. The command errored on every run (swallowed by
  `|| true`), so safety-report.json was never created and the PR comment
  always fell back to a generic "scan completed" message. Switched to
  `--save-json`, which is the correct flag for writing a JSON report to
  disk, and confirmed against the real safety 3.8.1 CLI locally.
- Even with a report, the code read vuln.package - the real field is
  package_name.
- The job never installed Semantica's own dependencies before scanning,
  so `safety check` (which defaults to scanning the environment) was
  auditing the scanner tools' own dependencies, not Semantica's. Added
  `pip install -e ".[llm-litellm]"` so the project's actual dependency
  tree - including the LiteLLM extra this whole hardening effort is
  about - is what gets scanned.

Also updated the corresponding SECURITY.md bullet to describe what Safety
actually covers now.

* fix: remove unused pypdf2 dependency (CVE-2023-36464)

Now that the Safety scan step actually runs (see previous commit), it
correctly failed this PR's checks on CVE-2023-36464 in pypdf2==3.0.1 - a
real, pre-existing vulnerability that was invisible until the scan was
fixed.

PyPDF2 is not a patchable dependency here: the project is discontinued
(merged into `pypdf`), 3.0.1 is its final release, and there is no fixed
version to upgrade to. Grepping the repo for `import PyPDF2` / `from
PyPDF2` turns up nothing - it was never actually imported anywhere. Its
only presence outside pyproject.toml was in docstrings describing a
"PyPDF2.PdfReader() fallback" for PDF parsing that was never implemented
in code; pdfplumber is the library actually used. Removed the dependency
and corrected the stale docstrings in parse/__init__.py, parse/methods.py,
parse/pdf_parser.py, and ingest/email_ingestor.py accordingly.

* fix: suppress Bandit B324 false positives on non-cryptographic MD5 use

Same pattern as the previous pypdf2 commit: fixing the Safety scan
surfaced this PR's own Bandit HIGH-severity gate actually blocking on 10
pre-existing findings, all Bandit B324 ("Use of weak MD5 hash for
security").

Checked each of the 10 call sites: every one uses hashlib.md5() to build
a short deterministic cache key, entity ID, or IRI suffix from already-
non-secret input (query text, entity text/type, class/property names) -
none are used for passwords, tokens, or integrity verification of
untrusted data. This is exactly the case Bandit's own message points at
("Consider usedforsecurity=False").

Did not use usedforsecurity=False itself: that keyword argument was
added to hashlib in Python 3.9, and pyproject.toml declares
`requires-python = ">=3.8"` - adding it unconditionally risks a TypeError
on 3.8. Used a targeted `# nosec B324` comment with a one-line
justification instead, which suppresses only this specific check and
carries no runtime behavior change on any supported Python version.

Verified locally: bandit -r semantica/ -ll now reports 0 HIGH-severity
findings (was 10).

* docs: add CHANGELOG entry for #824 CI/CD supply-chain hardening

Covers the SHA-pinning + verify-action-pins.yml enforcement, release.yml
hardening (job-scoped permissions, concurrency, SLSA provenance), the
pypi environment/branch protection GitHub-side config, the
security-scan.yml Safety/comment-formatting fixes, and the two
vulnerabilities those fixes surfaced (pypdf2 CVE-2023-36464 removal,
Bandit B324 suppression).

* fix: close two remaining gaps missed by upstream bot-review fixes

verify-action-pins.sh:
- Quoted uses: lines (e.g. uses: owner/action@SHA) were not matched
  by the existing regex, so a SHA-pinned action written with quotes would
  silently skip verification. Updated the main ERE to accept an optional
  leading/trailing single or double quote around the owner/action@ref
  value, and excluded quote chars from the inner character classes so the
  ref is still extracted cleanly.
- The grep input glob only covered *.yml. GitHub also treats *.yaml as a
  valid workflow extension. Added *.yaml to the glob and a 2>/dev/null
  guard so the command doesn't fail when no *.yaml files exist.

security-scan.yml (on top of Kaif's --save-json fix in 67c7ec2a):
- Kaif's fix kept the '|| echo 0' fallback on the VULNS= line, so all
  five scanner-failure modes (file missing, empty file, malformed JSON,
  valid JSON with no 'vulnerabilities' key, vulnerabilities: null) still
  silently produce VULNS=0 or VULNS=null and pass the merge-blocker check.
- Added guard 1: '[ ! -s safety-report.json ]' fails loudly if Safety
  crashed before writing a report (covers missing and empty-file cases).
- Dropped the '|| echo 0' fallback and added guard 2: '[[ ! VULNS =~
  ^[0-9]+$ ]]' fails loudly on non-integer VULNS (covers malformed JSON,
  missing key, and null cases). Both guards emit ::error:: annotations.
- Verified with a 7-case simulation: all 5 failure modes now exit 1;
  genuine zero-vuln and real-vuln cases still behave correctly.

* fix: correct bash [[ =~ ]] quoting that broke verify-action-pins.sh in CI

The regex for matching uses: lines was embedded directly inline in a
[[ =~ ]] test with literal \" and \' escape sequences. Bash's conditional-
expression parser interprets these as shell syntax rather than regex
literals, producing:

  syntax error in conditional expression: unexpected token ')'

at line 27 on every CI run.

Fix: move the regex into a USES_PATTERN variable using safe single-quote
shell-string concatenation so the [[ =~ ]] parser receives an unquoted
variable reference ($USES_PATTERN) rather than a literal pattern containing
bash-special characters. The regex semantics are identical: optional
leading/trailing quote around owner/action@ref, quote chars excluded from
capture groups.

Verified in real bash 5.2.21 (Git for Windows):
  No syntax error on the real 40-pin workflow tree (Checked 40)
  Unquoted SHA pin:      MATCH, correct repo+ref extracted
  Double-quoted SHA pin: MATCH, correct repo+ref extracted
  Single-quoted SHA pin: MATCH, correct repo+ref extracted
  .yaml extension file:  MATCH, correct repo+ref extracted
  ./local-action:        NO MATCH (correct)
  docker://:             NO MATCH (correct)

* docs: add 3 missing items to fork-reconfiguration checklist in SECURITY.md

The checklist covered Trusted Publishing trust, protected environment,
branch protection, and Dependabot github-actions entry. Three non-forking
controls described elsewhere in SECURITY.md were omitted:

- GitHub secret scanning and push protection (repo settings, not copied
  on fork)
- GitGuardian (GitHub App installation scoped to this specific repo,
  requires separate install on any fork)
- CodeQL Default Setup vs Advanced Setup state (repo setting that affects
  whether the upload-sarif step in codeql.yml does anything)

Added as items 5, 6, 7 matching the existing numbered bullet style.

* fix: update github/codeql-action pins to v4 tip (SHA drift caught by verify check)

verify-action-pins caught that github/codeql-action@v4 tag was re-pointed
upstream:

  old: f205ea1c3313d32999d8d6a48b4f6530d4437b38
  new: d1ba80a13dd99fba24a470575428917156a28b43

Updated all 8 occurrences across codeql.yml (init x3, autobuild, analyze,
upload-sarif) and defender-for-devops.yml (upload-sarif x2). Tag comment
# v4 unchanged — the tag itself hasn't changed, only what commit it points to.

---------

Co-authored-by: Sameer6305 <sskadam6305@gmail.com>
2026-08-03 19:17:10 +05:30

237 lines
9.7 KiB
YAML

name: Security Scan
on:
schedule:
- cron: '30 1 * * 1,4' # Mon/Thu 7 AM IST
push:
branches: [main]
paths-ignore:
- 'docs/**'
- 'mkdocs.yml'
- 'requirements-docs.txt'
- '**/*.md'
pull_request:
branches: [main]
paths-ignore:
- 'docs/**'
- 'mkdocs.yml'
- 'requirements-docs.txt'
- '**/*.md'
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
security-scan:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: read
security-events: write
actions: read
# Needed for the "Comment PR with Security Results" step below. Safe on
# pull_request (not pull_request_target): GitHub always forces a
# read-only token for PRs from forks regardless of this permission.
pull-requests: write
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
- name: Set up Python
uses: actions/setup-python@5fda3b95a4ea91299a34e894583c3862153e4b97 # v7
with:
python-version: '3.11'
- name: Install dependencies
run: |
python -m pip install --upgrade pip
pip install safety bandit semgrep jq
# Install the project itself (core deps + the LiteLLM provider extra)
# so Safety scans Semantica's actual dependency tree, not just the
# scanner tools' own dependencies.
pip install -e ".[llm-litellm]"
- name: Run Safety Check (Package Vulnerabilities)
run: |
# NOTE: Safety 3.x repurposed --output to select a console format
# (json/text/screen/...), not a file path. Writing JSON to a file
# now requires --save-json; the previous `--output safety-report.json`
# usage was silently invalid and never produced a report.
safety check --save-json safety-report.json || true
# Guard 1: fail loudly if Safety exited before writing a report at all
# (network error, API auth failure, tool crash). Without this check a
# missing or empty file causes jq to fall back to "0", making a broken
# scanner indistinguishable from a clean scan.
if [ ! -s safety-report.json ]; then
echo "::error::Safety scan produced no report (safety-report.json is missing or empty). Treating as failure — check for network errors, API auth failures, or Safety crashes in the logs above."
exit 1
fi
echo "Checking for package vulnerabilities..."
# No || echo "0" fallback: if jq fails (malformed JSON, missing key,
# vulnerabilities:null) VULNS will be empty or "null" so guard 2 below
# catches it rather than silently treating the broken report as zero.
VULNS=$(jq '.vulnerabilities | length' safety-report.json 2>/dev/null)
# Guard 2: ensure VULNS is a non-negative integer before the -gt
# comparison. "null" (missing/null key) or "" (jq parse failure) would
# cause bash's -gt to throw an arithmetic error and fall through to the
# success branch — the same silent-pass bug as a missing file.
if ! [[ "$VULNS" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]]; then
echo "::error::Safety report exists but 'vulnerabilities' is missing or non-numeric (got: '${VULNS}'). The report may be malformed or Safety may have written an error-only JSON. Treating as failure."
exit 1
fi
if [ "$VULNS" -gt 0 ]; then
echo "❌ Security vulnerabilities found: $VULNS"
echo "CI will fail to prevent merging of vulnerable dependencies"
echo ""
echo "Vulnerability details:"
jq -r '.vulnerabilities[] | "- \(.package_name)==\(.analyzed_version): \(.vulnerability_id) (\(.CVE // "no CVE assigned"))"' safety-report.json || true
exit 1
else
echo "✅ No security vulnerabilities found"
fi
- name: Run Bandit (Code Security Linter)
run: |
bandit -r semantica/ -f json -o bandit-report.json || true
echo "Checking for HIGH severity security issues..."
# Count HIGH severity issues
HIGH_ISSUES=$(bandit -r semantica/ -f json -ll 2>/dev/null | jq -r '.results[]? | select(.issue_severity == "HIGH") | .test_name' 2>/dev/null | wc -l || echo "0")
if [ "$HIGH_ISSUES" -gt 0 ]; then
echo "❌ HIGH severity security issues found: $HIGH_ISSUES"
echo "CI will fail to prevent merging of high-risk code"
echo ""
echo "High severity issues:"
bandit -r semantica/ -ll | grep "Severity: High" -A 5 -B 1 || true
exit 1
else
echo "✅ No HIGH severity security issues found"
fi
- name: Run Semgrep (Static Analysis)
run: |
echo "Running Semgrep static analysis..."
semgrep --config=auto --json --output=semgrep-report.json semantica/ || true
# Run security-focused rules
echo "Checking for security patterns..."
SECURITY_ISSUES=$(semgrep --config=p/security --json semantica/ 2>/dev/null | jq '.results | length' 2>/dev/null || echo "0")
if [ "$SECURITY_ISSUES" -gt 0 ]; then
echo "⚠️ Security patterns found: $SECURITY_ISSUES"
echo "Review these findings for potential improvements"
semgrep --config=p/security semantica/ || true
else
echo "✅ No security patterns found"
fi
- name: Upload Security Reports
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7
with:
name: security-reports
retention-days: 14
path: |
safety-report.json
bandit-report.json
semgrep-report.json
- name: Comment PR with Security Results
if: github.event_name == 'pull_request'
uses: actions/github-script@3a2844b7e9c422d3c10d287c895573f7108da1b3 # v9
with:
script: |
const fs = require('fs');
// Renders one tool's findings as a section. `items` is already
// the list of pre-formatted "- `thing` in `where`" strings; this
// just handles the found/not-found/report-missing framing and
// collapses long lists into a <details> block so the comment
// doesn't turn into a wall of text.
function renderSection(title, reportPath, parse) {
let data;
try {
data = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(reportPath, 'utf8'));
} catch (e) {
return [
`### ${title}`,
`⚠️ No report found at \`${reportPath}\` — the scan may have failed before producing output. Check the job logs.`,
].join('\n');
}
const items = parse(data);
if (items.length === 0) {
return [`### ${title}`, `✅ No findings.`].join('\n');
}
const lines = [`### ${title}`, `Found **${items.length}**.`, ''];
const shown = items.slice(0, 15);
if (items.length > 15) {
lines.push('<details>', '<summary>Show all findings</summary>', '');
lines.push(...items);
lines.push('', '</details>');
} else {
lines.push(...shown);
}
return lines.join('\n');
}
const safetySection = renderSection(
'Safety — dependency vulnerabilities',
'safety-report.json',
(data) => (data.vulnerabilities || []).map(
(v) => `- \`${v.package_name}==${v.analyzed_version}\`: ${v.vulnerability_id}` +
(v.CVE ? ` (${v.CVE})` : '') + ` — ${v.advisory || 'no advisory text'}`
)
);
const banditSection = renderSection(
'Bandit — HIGH-severity code issues',
'bandit-report.json',
(data) => (data.results || [])
.filter((issue) => issue.issue_severity === 'HIGH')
.map((issue) => `- \`${issue.test_name}\` in \`${issue.filename}:${issue.line_number}\``)
);
const semgrepSection = renderSection(
'Semgrep — static analysis patterns',
'semgrep-report.json',
(data) => (data.results || []).map(
(issue) => `- \`${issue.check_id}\` in \`${issue.path}:${issue.start?.line ?? '?'}\``
)
);
const comment = [
'# 🔒 Security Scan Results',
'',
safetySection,
'',
banditSection,
'',
semgrepSection,
'',
'---',
'',
'*This security scan runs automatically on source-code PRs and bi-weekly (skipped for doc/markdown-only changes).*',
'',
'📊 **Security Policy**: CI fails on Safety vulnerabilities and Bandit HIGH-severity findings. Semgrep findings above are informational and do not block merge.',
].join('\n');
try {
await github.rest.issues.createComment({
issue_number: context.issue.number,
owner: context.repo.owner,
repo: context.repo.repo,
body: comment,
});
console.log('✅ Security comment posted successfully');
} catch (error) {
console.log('⚠️ Could not post security comment:', error.message);
console.log('📋 Security scan results saved to artifacts');
}