mirror of
https://github.com/semantica-agi/semantica.git
synced 2026-08-29 04:26:20 +00:00
Mohd KaifandSameer6305
b59211ea7f
* security: SHA-pin all Actions, harden release pipeline, add pin verification
Hardens the CI/CD supply chain against the LiteLLM/Trivy-style attack (a
compromised third-party Action with a mutable tag stealing a long-lived
publishing token) and closes several related gaps found in an audit of the
actual repository state.
- Pin every third-party GitHub Action across all workflows to a full commit
SHA (tag kept as a trailing comment); add verify-action-pins.yml, a CI
check that confirms via the GitHub API that each pin still matches its
tag, on every workflow change, push to main, and weekly.
- Scope release.yml permissions to the job level (workflow defaults to
contents: read); add a concurrency group so simultaneous tag pushes can't
race the publish job.
- Add SLSA build provenance attestation (actions/attest-build-provenance)
for every released wheel.
- Fix a latent bug in security-scan.yml: the PR-comment step was missing
pull-requests: write and silently failing; add bounded artifact retention
for uploaded scan reports.
- Group github-actions Dependabot updates to cut review noise.
- Document the resulting posture in SECURITY.md for auditors/regulated
adopters, including what's enforced and what a fork needs to reconfigure
for itself (environment/branch protection, Trusted Publishing trust).
Also (via GitHub API, not in this diff): created a protected `pypi`
environment with a required reviewer restricted to v* tags, and enabled
branch protection on main (required review, required status checks, no
force-push/deletion).
* fix: harden verify-action-pins per PR #824 bot review
Addresses real findings from the automated review on #824:
- The script previously only matched uses: lines that already contained a
40-hex SHA, so a newly added mutable-tag action (e.g. some/action@v1)
would never be scanned at all and the check would pass silently. It now
matches every uses: line and hard-fails on any ref that isn't a full
commit SHA.
- A tag that fails to resolve via the GitHub API (rate limit, deleted tag)
previously only logged a warning and continued; that's now a hard
failure too, since an unverifiable pin is exactly the failure mode this
check exists to catch.
- verify-action-pins.yml only triggered on .github/workflows/** changes,
so an edit to the verifier script itself wouldn't run the check that
verifies it. Added the script path to both trigger filters.
The reviewer's claim that slash-containing tag comments (release/v1) break
the API lookup did not reproduce - tested directly against
pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish@release/v1 and GitHub's commits API resolves
multi-segment refs natively - so no change was needed there.
Verified with a synthetic test workflow containing a mutable-tag action,
a correctly-pinned SHA, and a deliberately mismatched SHA: the updated
script now catches the first and third cases and passes the second. Also
re-ran against the real workflow tree (40/40 pins still verify clean).
* fix: repair broken Safety scan and PR comment formatting
The "Comment PR with Security Results" step was producing garbled output
(literal \n characters instead of newlines, "undefined:" labels) because:
- Every line in the JS comment builder used \n (escaped backslash-n)
inside template literals, which JS renders as the literal two-character
string \n, not a newline.
- The Semgrep section read issue.rule_id, but Semgrep's JSON field is
check_id - hence "undefined: <path>" for every entry.
Rewrote the comment builder to construct each section as an array of
lines joined with a real '\n', with correct field names, and collapsed
long finding lists into a <details> block instead of a flat list.
Verified by extracting the exact script and running it under node against
synthetic fixtures matching each tool's real JSON schema (found/clean/
missing-report paths all render correctly).
While tracing the "undefined" and always-empty Safety section, found the
Safety step itself was silently broken:
- `safety check --json --output safety-report.json` is invalid in
Safety 3.x: --output now selects a console format (json/text/screen),
not a file path. The command errored on every run (swallowed by
`|| true`), so safety-report.json was never created and the PR comment
always fell back to a generic "scan completed" message. Switched to
`--save-json`, which is the correct flag for writing a JSON report to
disk, and confirmed against the real safety 3.8.1 CLI locally.
- Even with a report, the code read vuln.package - the real field is
package_name.
- The job never installed Semantica's own dependencies before scanning,
so `safety check` (which defaults to scanning the environment) was
auditing the scanner tools' own dependencies, not Semantica's. Added
`pip install -e ".[llm-litellm]"` so the project's actual dependency
tree - including the LiteLLM extra this whole hardening effort is
about - is what gets scanned.
Also updated the corresponding SECURITY.md bullet to describe what Safety
actually covers now.
* fix: remove unused pypdf2 dependency (CVE-2023-36464)
Now that the Safety scan step actually runs (see previous commit), it
correctly failed this PR's checks on CVE-2023-36464 in pypdf2==3.0.1 - a
real, pre-existing vulnerability that was invisible until the scan was
fixed.
PyPDF2 is not a patchable dependency here: the project is discontinued
(merged into `pypdf`), 3.0.1 is its final release, and there is no fixed
version to upgrade to. Grepping the repo for `import PyPDF2` / `from
PyPDF2` turns up nothing - it was never actually imported anywhere. Its
only presence outside pyproject.toml was in docstrings describing a
"PyPDF2.PdfReader() fallback" for PDF parsing that was never implemented
in code; pdfplumber is the library actually used. Removed the dependency
and corrected the stale docstrings in parse/__init__.py, parse/methods.py,
parse/pdf_parser.py, and ingest/email_ingestor.py accordingly.
* fix: suppress Bandit B324 false positives on non-cryptographic MD5 use
Same pattern as the previous pypdf2 commit: fixing the Safety scan
surfaced this PR's own Bandit HIGH-severity gate actually blocking on 10
pre-existing findings, all Bandit B324 ("Use of weak MD5 hash for
security").
Checked each of the 10 call sites: every one uses hashlib.md5() to build
a short deterministic cache key, entity ID, or IRI suffix from already-
non-secret input (query text, entity text/type, class/property names) -
none are used for passwords, tokens, or integrity verification of
untrusted data. This is exactly the case Bandit's own message points at
("Consider usedforsecurity=False").
Did not use usedforsecurity=False itself: that keyword argument was
added to hashlib in Python 3.9, and pyproject.toml declares
`requires-python = ">=3.8"` - adding it unconditionally risks a TypeError
on 3.8. Used a targeted `# nosec B324` comment with a one-line
justification instead, which suppresses only this specific check and
carries no runtime behavior change on any supported Python version.
Verified locally: bandit -r semantica/ -ll now reports 0 HIGH-severity
findings (was 10).
* docs: add CHANGELOG entry for #824 CI/CD supply-chain hardening
Covers the SHA-pinning + verify-action-pins.yml enforcement, release.yml
hardening (job-scoped permissions, concurrency, SLSA provenance), the
pypi environment/branch protection GitHub-side config, the
security-scan.yml Safety/comment-formatting fixes, and the two
vulnerabilities those fixes surfaced (pypdf2 CVE-2023-36464 removal,
Bandit B324 suppression).
* fix: close two remaining gaps missed by upstream bot-review fixes
verify-action-pins.sh:
- Quoted uses: lines (e.g. uses: owner/action@SHA) were not matched
by the existing regex, so a SHA-pinned action written with quotes would
silently skip verification. Updated the main ERE to accept an optional
leading/trailing single or double quote around the owner/action@ref
value, and excluded quote chars from the inner character classes so the
ref is still extracted cleanly.
- The grep input glob only covered *.yml. GitHub also treats *.yaml as a
valid workflow extension. Added *.yaml to the glob and a 2>/dev/null
guard so the command doesn't fail when no *.yaml files exist.
security-scan.yml (on top of Kaif's --save-json fix in 67c7ec2a):
- Kaif's fix kept the '|| echo 0' fallback on the VULNS= line, so all
five scanner-failure modes (file missing, empty file, malformed JSON,
valid JSON with no 'vulnerabilities' key, vulnerabilities: null) still
silently produce VULNS=0 or VULNS=null and pass the merge-blocker check.
- Added guard 1: '[ ! -s safety-report.json ]' fails loudly if Safety
crashed before writing a report (covers missing and empty-file cases).
- Dropped the '|| echo 0' fallback and added guard 2: '[[ ! VULNS =~
^[0-9]+$ ]]' fails loudly on non-integer VULNS (covers malformed JSON,
missing key, and null cases). Both guards emit ::error:: annotations.
- Verified with a 7-case simulation: all 5 failure modes now exit 1;
genuine zero-vuln and real-vuln cases still behave correctly.
* fix: correct bash [[ =~ ]] quoting that broke verify-action-pins.sh in CI
The regex for matching uses: lines was embedded directly inline in a
[[ =~ ]] test with literal \" and \' escape sequences. Bash's conditional-
expression parser interprets these as shell syntax rather than regex
literals, producing:
syntax error in conditional expression: unexpected token ')'
at line 27 on every CI run.
Fix: move the regex into a USES_PATTERN variable using safe single-quote
shell-string concatenation so the [[ =~ ]] parser receives an unquoted
variable reference ($USES_PATTERN) rather than a literal pattern containing
bash-special characters. The regex semantics are identical: optional
leading/trailing quote around owner/action@ref, quote chars excluded from
capture groups.
Verified in real bash 5.2.21 (Git for Windows):
No syntax error on the real 40-pin workflow tree (Checked 40)
Unquoted SHA pin: MATCH, correct repo+ref extracted
Double-quoted SHA pin: MATCH, correct repo+ref extracted
Single-quoted SHA pin: MATCH, correct repo+ref extracted
.yaml extension file: MATCH, correct repo+ref extracted
./local-action: NO MATCH (correct)
docker://: NO MATCH (correct)
* docs: add 3 missing items to fork-reconfiguration checklist in SECURITY.md
The checklist covered Trusted Publishing trust, protected environment,
branch protection, and Dependabot github-actions entry. Three non-forking
controls described elsewhere in SECURITY.md were omitted:
- GitHub secret scanning and push protection (repo settings, not copied
on fork)
- GitGuardian (GitHub App installation scoped to this specific repo,
requires separate install on any fork)
- CodeQL Default Setup vs Advanced Setup state (repo setting that affects
whether the upload-sarif step in codeql.yml does anything)
Added as items 5, 6, 7 matching the existing numbered bullet style.
* fix: update github/codeql-action pins to v4 tip (SHA drift caught by verify check)
verify-action-pins caught that github/codeql-action@v4 tag was re-pointed
upstream:
old: f205ea1c3313d32999d8d6a48b4f6530d4437b38
new: d1ba80a13dd99fba24a470575428917156a28b43
Updated all 8 occurrences across codeql.yml (init x3, autobuild, analyze,
upload-sarif) and defender-for-devops.yml (upload-sarif x2). Tag comment
# v4 unchanged — the tag itself hasn't changed, only what commit it points to.
---------
Co-authored-by: Sameer6305 <sskadam6305@gmail.com>
98 lines
3.7 KiB
YAML
98 lines
3.7 KiB
YAML
name: CodeQL
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on:
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push:
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branches: [main]
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pull_request:
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branches: [main]
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schedule:
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- cron: '30 1 * * 1' # Every Monday 7 AM IST
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permissions:
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contents: read
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security-events: write
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actions: read
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jobs:
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analyze:
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name: Analyze Python
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runs-on: ubuntu-latest
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steps:
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- name: Checkout repository
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uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
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# The CodeQL bundle download (github/codeql-action/init's "Setup CodeQL
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# tools" step) streams a ~1GB tarball from GitHub's release CDN and
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# does not retry on a transient connection reset (ECONNRESET) itself
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# (github/codeql-action, unresolved as of v4 / CLI 2.26.1: the HTTP
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# error is retryable but isn't retried internally). Since a `uses:`
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# step can't be wrapped by a shell-level retry action, attempt init
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# up to 3 times; each retry is a fresh download attempt with no
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# meaningful state carried over from a failed attempt.
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- name: Initialize CodeQL (attempt 1)
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id: codeql-init-1
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uses: github/codeql-action/init@d1ba80a13dd99fba24a470575428917156a28b43 # v4
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continue-on-error: true
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with:
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languages: python
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queries: security-and-quality
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config-file: .github/codeql/codeql-config.yml
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- name: Initialize CodeQL (attempt 2)
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id: codeql-init-2
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if: steps.codeql-init-1.outcome == 'failure'
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uses: github/codeql-action/init@d1ba80a13dd99fba24a470575428917156a28b43 # v4
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continue-on-error: true
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with:
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languages: python
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queries: security-and-quality
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config-file: .github/codeql/codeql-config.yml
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- name: Initialize CodeQL (attempt 3)
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id: codeql-init-3
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if: steps.codeql-init-2.outcome == 'failure'
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uses: github/codeql-action/init@d1ba80a13dd99fba24a470575428917156a28b43 # v4
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with:
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languages: python
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queries: security-and-quality
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config-file: .github/codeql/codeql-config.yml
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- name: Autobuild
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uses: github/codeql-action/autobuild@d1ba80a13dd99fba24a470575428917156a28b43 # v4
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- name: Perform CodeQL Analysis
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uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@d1ba80a13dd99fba24a470575428917156a28b43 # v4
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with:
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category: "/language:python"
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upload: false
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id: codeql
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- name: Upload SARIF (Advanced Setup only)
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# Uploads results only when Default Setup is not active.
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# If Default Setup is still enabled, this step skips gracefully
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# instead of failing the workflow with HTTP 409.
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uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@d1ba80a13dd99fba24a470575428917156a28b43 # v4
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with:
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sarif_file: ${{ steps.codeql.outputs.sarif-output }}
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category: "/language:python"
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wait-for-processing: true
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continue-on-error: true
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# NOTE: Auto-dismissal by rule-id is intentionally removed.
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# Dismissing every alert that matches a rule ID would silently suppress
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# future real vulnerabilities of the same type. The alerts below were
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# individually triaged and dismissed manually in the security-enhancement
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# PR (alerts #12–#18). New alerts must be reviewed and dismissed by hand,
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# or will auto-close when the underlying code no longer triggers them.
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#
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# If you need to dismiss a specific known-safe alert, pin its alert NUMBER
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# here and remove it once CodeQL stops reporting it naturally. Example:
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#
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# PINNED_ALERT_NUMBERS=(12 13 14 15 16 17 18)
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# for NUM in "${PINNED_ALERT_NUMBERS[@]}"; do
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# gh api repos/$REPO/code-scanning/alerts/$NUM \
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# -X PATCH -f state=dismissed -f dismissed_reason="false positive" \
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# -f dismissed_comment="<reason>"
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# done
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