Merge master into codex/acp-minimal-diagnostics

2026-08-29 04:26:38 +00:00 · 2026-08-25 14:49:59 +08:00
parent 8bab9d1731 5e868ef2c6
commit 13f373f0ce
216 changed files with 2329 additions and 772 deletions
@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-07-28-api-browser-trust-boundary.md
-2026-07-28-api-browser-trust-boundary.md: 92b76c109aa9b55bc72bb76f8b208ea2d814d8ce
-2026-07-28-api-browser-trust-boundary.zh.md: 653ff32f2e62bf0e2982517f82649ff2d06e40d4
+2026-07-28-api-browser-trust-boundary.md: 4401dc8e361281b1239eb84319fc5353948bc217
+2026-07-28-api-browser-trust-boundary.zh.md: c1db2632a6019585ab6a948bcb0f4f2ef853b8a7
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ English | [中文](2026-07-28-api-browser-trust-boundary.zh.md)

 ## Problem

-The web GUI host serves `/api` over plain HTTP (default `127.0.0.1:3080`, `--host 0.0.0.0` supported), and the surface includes remote-code-execution-grade methods — `session.prompt` drives an agent that runs bash. A browser turns the operator into a confused deputy against such a local API in two classic ways: a malicious page fires a "simple" cross-site POST (`text/plain` — sent without a CORS preflight) whose side effects execute even though the response stays unreadable, and a DNS-rebound origin talks to the socket as if same-origin, making CORS inapplicable entirely, with only the `Host` header betraying the attacker's domain. Before this decision the system's only browser-trust check (`isTrustedNativeDialogRequest`: loopback socket + same-origin + loopback Host) guarded exactly one cosmetic route — `host.pickDirectory`, whose native dialog pops on the host's screen — while every consequential method was unguarded. Guarding per-RPC also could not survive the in-app directory browser, whose whole point is serving legitimately remote clients that a loopback rule would refuse.
+The web GUI host serves `/api` over plain loopback HTTP (default `127.0.0.1:3080`; the CLI rejects `--host 0.0.0.0`), and the surface includes remote-code-execution-grade methods — `session.prompt` drives an agent that runs bash. A browser turns the operator into a confused deputy against such a local API in two classic ways: a malicious page fires a "simple" cross-site POST (`text/plain` — sent without a CORS preflight) whose side effects execute even though the response stays unreadable, and a DNS-rebound origin talks to the socket as if same-origin, making CORS inapplicable entirely, with only the `Host` header betraying the attacker's domain. Before this decision the system's only browser-trust check (`isTrustedNativeDialogRequest`: loopback socket + same-origin + loopback Host) guarded exactly one cosmetic route — `host.pickDirectory`, whose native dialog pops on the host's screen — while every consequential method was unguarded. Guarding per-RPC also could not survive the in-app directory browser, whose whole point is serving legitimately remote clients that a loopback rule would refuse.

 ## Decision

@@ -15,17 +15,17 @@ Enforce browser trust once, at the carrier, for the entire `/api` prefix — two
 - **Media-type fence (dsh-host-apiproxy)**: every `/api` POST must declare `application/json`, else 415 before parsing. Cross-site "simple" requests thereby stop existing: any cross-site attempt is forced into a CORS preflight this server never answers.
 - **Authority fence (dsh-client-connection, `src/api-request-trust.ts`)**: every request must present a `Host` that is loopback or matches a `trustedHosts` entry (exact on `host:port`, any port on port-less entries, WHATWG-normalized; rebinding defense). Deliberately no shortcut for unmarked requests: over plain HTTP a browser attaches neither `Origin` nor Fetch-Metadata to reads (EventSource, images, navigations — those headers go only to trustworthy destinations), so an unmarked request may be a rebound browser read whose response the page can read, and Host is the one header rebinding cannot forge; non-browser clients pass via loopback, the derived LAN IP literals, or a declared authority. An attached `Origin` must equal the Host authority; `sec-fetch-site: cross-site` is refused outright. A `trustedHosts` entry that is not a bare, canonical authority fails the plugin load — WHATWG parsing would otherwise quietly authorize the hostname inside a typo or broaden an exact-port grant. `host.pickDirectory` loses its bespoke guard and rides the same fence.

-Two boundaries stay deliberately out of scope: reachability is the webserver binding's policy (`host: 127.0.0.1 | 0.0.0.0`), and authentication for genuinely remote deployments is deferred work recorded in the connection README — the fence is a confused-deputy defense, not an auth layer. The old guard's loopback-socket check was dropped rather than generalized: with binding expressing reachability and `trustedHosts` naming remote authorities, the socket address adds nothing a header fence does not already cover.
+Reachability is the webserver binding's policy (`host: 127.0.0.1 | 0.0.0.0`), and this fence is a confused-deputy defense rather than identity. Connection applies the separate [browser token authentication](2026-08-24-browser-token-authentication.md) after the fence. The fence does not inspect peer socket addresses: binding expresses reachability, `trustedHosts` names accepted authorities, and the socket address adds nothing the Host/Origin checks need.

 ## Alternatives considered

 - **Per-RPC guards (status quo extended).** Rejected: the guard list trails the method list forever, the highest-value methods were already unguarded, and a loopback rule on browse RPCs would break the remote deployments they exist for.
 - **CORS headers + credential omission.** Rejected: we never want cross-origin reads at all, so answering preflights only widens the surface; refusing them is strictly stronger and simpler.
- **Authentication tokens.** Rejected for this change: token minting/storage/rotation is real product surface; the fence closes the browser-deputy holes without pre-deciding the auth design.
+- **Authentication tokens.** Rejected for this change: token minting, storage, and rotation are separate product decisions. The later [browser token authentication](2026-08-24-browser-token-authentication.md) owns them without changing this fence.

 ## Consequences

 - Any future `/api` method is covered by construction; there is no per-route trust decision left to forget.
- Non-loopback deployments must have their serving authorities trusted or requests are refused. The dsh CLI keeps its advertised `--host 0.0.0.0` LAN URL working by deriving the machine's LAN IP literals into the connection row (port-less entries — an IP-literal Host cannot be a rebound name, and the bound port may be OS-assigned) and offers `dsh web --trusted-host` for named authorities; compositions the CLI does not boot declare `trustedHosts` themselves. Non-browser automation rides the same fence: loopback, a derived LAN IP, or a declared authority passes; an undeclared DNS alias is refused.
+- A custom non-loopback composition must trust its serving authorities or requests are refused, then satisfy browser authentication like every loopback request. The shipped CLI rejects `--host 0.0.0.0`; `--trusted-host` only extends the Host/Origin fence and grants no identity.
 - Clients must label POST bodies `application/json` (ours always did; raw-fetch tests gained the header).
- The trusted-network assumption of an unauthenticated `0.0.0.0` deployment is now documented instead of implicit.
+- Host and Origin remain request-routing evidence only. The process token and signed cookie establish the browser identity used by every Host method.
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ Status: implemented

 ## 问题

-Web GUI 宿主以纯 HTTP 提供 `/api`（默认 `127.0.0.1:3080`，支持 `--host 0.0.0.0`），而这个面上有远程代码执行级别的方法——`session.prompt` 驱动的 agent（智能体）可以运行 bash。浏览器会用两种经典方式把操作者变成攻击此类本地 API 的「混淆代理人」：恶意页面发出跨站「简单请求」 POST（`text/plain`——不经 CORS 预检即发出），其副作用照常执行、只是响应不可读；以及 DNS rebinding 后的源以「同源」身份直连 socket，CORS 整体失效，只有 `Host` 头会暴露攻击者的域名。在本决策之前，系统里唯一的浏览器信任检查（`isTrustedNativeDialogRequest`：回环 socket、同源、回环 Host）只守着一个装饰性的路由——`host.pickDirectory`，其原生对话框弹在宿主屏幕上——而所有真正具有严重后果的方法都没有防护。按 RPC 逐个设防也活不过应用内目录浏览器：它存在的意义就是服务合法的远程客户端，回环规则恰恰会拒绝它们。
+Web GUI 宿主以纯 loopback HTTP 提供 `/api`（默认 `127.0.0.1:3080`；CLI 拒绝 `--host 0.0.0.0`），而这个面上有远程代码执行级别的方法——`session.prompt` 驱动的 agent（智能体）可以运行 bash。浏览器会用两种经典方式把操作者变成攻击此类本地 API 的「混淆代理人」：恶意页面发出跨站「简单请求」 POST（`text/plain`——不经 CORS 预检即发出），其副作用照常执行、只是响应不可读；以及 DNS rebinding 后的源以「同源」身份直连 socket，CORS 整体失效，只有 `Host` 头会暴露攻击者的域名。在本决策之前，系统里唯一的浏览器信任检查（`isTrustedNativeDialogRequest`：回环 socket、同源、回环 Host）只守着一个装饰性的路由——`host.pickDirectory`，其原生对话框弹在宿主屏幕上——而所有真正具有严重后果的方法都没有防护。按 RPC 逐个设防也活不过应用内目录浏览器：它存在的意义就是服务合法的远程客户端，回环规则恰恰会拒绝它们。

 ## 决策

@@ -15,17 +15,17 @@ Web GUI 宿主以纯 HTTP 提供 `/api`（默认 `127.0.0.1:3080`，支持 `--ho
 - **媒体类型栅栏（dsh-host-apiproxy）**：每个 `/api` POST 必须声明 `application/json`，否则在解析前以 415 拒绝。跨站「简单请求」由此不复存在：任何跨站尝试都被逼进一次本服务器从不应答的 CORS 预检。
 - **权威栅栏（dsh-client-connection，`src/api-request-trust.ts`）**：每个请求的 `Host` 都必须是回环地址，或与某个 `trustedHosts` 条目匹配（带端口的 `host:port` 条目精确匹配，不带端口的条目匹配任意端口，均经 WHATWG 归一化；rebinding 防御）。刻意不为无标记请求开捷径：明文 HTTP 下浏览器的读取（EventSource、图片、导航——这些头只发给可信目标）既不带 `Origin` 也不带 Fetch-Metadata，因此无标记请求可能是被重绑页面发起且响应可被读走的读取，而 Host 是重绑唯一伪造不了的请求头；非浏览器客户端经由回环地址、推导的 LAN IP 字面量或已声明的权威通过。若带 `Origin` 则必须与 Host 权威完全一致；`sec-fetch-site: cross-site` 一律拒绝。不是单纯规范化 authority 的 `trustedHosts` 条目会导致插件加载失败——否则 WHATWG 解析会悄悄授权笔误里的 hostname，或放大精确端口授权。`host.pickDirectory` 失去专属守卫，与其他请求同栅而行。

-两条边界刻意留在范围之外：可达性由 webserver 的绑定配置（`host: 127.0.0.1 | 0.0.0.0`）控制；真正远程部署的认证是延期工作，记录在 connection README——这道栅栏是混淆代理人防御，不是认证层。旧守卫的回环 socket 检查被放弃而非泛化：绑定表达可达性、`trustedHosts` 点名远程权威之后，socket 地址提供不了头部栅栏覆盖不到的任何东西。
+可达性由 webserver 的绑定配置（`host: 127.0.0.1 | 0.0.0.0`）控制，这道栅栏是混淆代理人防御，而不是身份。Connection 在栅栏之后应用独立的[浏览器令牌认证](2026-08-24-browser-token-authentication.zh.md)。栅栏不检查对端 socket 地址：绑定表达可达性，`trustedHosts` 点名接受的 authority，socket 地址提供不了 Host/Origin 校验需要的额外信息。

 ## 曾考虑的替代方案

 - **按 RPC 设防（延续现状）。** 否决：守卫清单永远追着方法清单跑，价值最高的方法本来就没被守住，而 browse RPC 上的回环规则会破坏它们为之存在的远程部署。
 - **CORS 头与省略凭据。** 否决：我们根本不想要任何跨源读取，应答预检只会扩大暴露面；拒绝预检严格更强也更简单。
- **认证令牌。** 在本变更中否决：令牌的签发、存储、轮换是真实的产品面；栅栏能够封死浏览器混淆代理人漏洞，无需预先决定认证设计。
+- **认证令牌。** 在本变更中否决：令牌签发、存储与轮换属于独立产品决策。后续[浏览器令牌认证](2026-08-24-browser-token-authentication.zh.md)持有这些机制，不改变本栅栏。

 ## 后果

 - 未来任何 `/api` 方法天然在覆盖范围内；不存在会被遗忘的按路由信任决定。
- 非回环部署的对外服务 authority 必须列入信任范围，否则请求会被拒绝。dsh CLI 通过把本机 LAN IP 字面量推导进 connection 行（不带端口的条目——IP 字面量 Host 不可能是被重绑的域名，且绑定端口可能由操作系统分配）来保住它公布的 `--host 0.0.0.0` LAN URL，并提供 `dsh web --trusted-host` 声明具名权威；并非由 CLI 启动的组合自行声明 `trustedHosts`。非浏览器自动化走同一道栅栏：回环地址、推导的 LAN IP 或已声明的权威可通过；未声明的 DNS 别名会被拒绝。
+- 自定义非 loopback 组合必须信任其服务 authority，否则请求会被拒绝；随后仍像每个 loopback 请求一样满足浏览器认证。随附 CLI 拒绝 `--host 0.0.0.0`；`--trusted-host` 只扩展 Host/Origin 栅栏，绝不授予身份。
 - 客户端必须给 POST 体标注 `application/json`（我们自己的客户端一向如此；裸 fetch 测试补上了该头）。
- 无认证 `0.0.0.0` 部署的「可信网络」假设从隐含变为成文。
+- Host 与 Origin 仍只是请求路由证据。进程令牌与签名 cookie 建立每个 Host 方法使用的浏览器身份。
@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-07-30-config-plane-boundaries.md
-2026-07-30-config-plane-boundaries.md: 7b234ec64669cc1e6f0d5a67437005747edcea98
-2026-07-30-config-plane-boundaries.zh.md: f543c511d9374a50955331911b2eb2d62dab0675
+2026-07-30-config-plane-boundaries.md: d7ae13f08ca5c3957a8a5c1871b0022453e9b562
+2026-07-30-config-plane-boundaries.zh.md: e53a68f91f4d961af5a01fd7bbfb4472b4b17dfe
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ Three smaller defects sat beside them. `llm/adapters-updated` documented contain

 ## Decision

-**Reading configuration is as privileged as writing it.** `settings.describe` and `credentials.describe` join the loopback-only set, so the whole configuration plane stays same-origin until real authentication exists. The model catalog (`llm.providers`, `llm.models`) deliberately does not: it carries provider ids, display names, and model lists — no endpoints, no key state — and a LAN client's model picker needs it. The boundary is asserted over a real HTTP server rather than a hand-assembled request, because the `Host` header a browser actually sends is what decides it.
+**Reading configuration is as privileged as writing it.** `settings.describe`, `credentials.describe`, the model catalog, and every other Host operation require one browser session. The configuration plane still redacts secrets independently of authentication. The boundary is asserted over a real HTTP server rather than a hand-assembled request, proving that a forged loopback `Host` value never establishes identity.

 **The plane serves exactly the namespaces a registered model provider addresses.** `ctx.llm.listConfigurableProviders()` is the allow-list, so the product boundary is enforced rather than inferred from the installed plugin set, and a future namespace becomes web-configurable only by joining that directory. An unregistered namespace and an unexposed one answer identically (`settings-not-exposed`), so probing cannot enumerate the registry.

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ Status: implemented

 ## 决策

-**读取配置与写入配置同样属于特权操作。**`settings.describe` 与 `credentials.describe` 加入仅限回环的集合，因此在真正的认证层出现之前，整个配置面都保持同源。模型目录（`llm.providers`、`llm.models`）刻意不在其中：它携带的是提供方 id、显示名与模型列表——没有端点、没有密钥状态——而 LAN 客户端的模型选择器正需要它。这条边界由一台真实 HTTP 服务器来断言，而不是手工拼装的请求，因为真正决定它的，是浏览器实际发出的那个 `Host` 头。
+**读取配置与写入配置同样属于特权操作。**`settings.describe`、`credentials.describe`、模型目录及其他所有 Host 操作都要求同一个浏览器会话。配置面仍独立于认证对 secret 脱敏。这条边界由真实 HTTP 服务器而非手工请求来断言，证明伪造 loopback `Host` 值绝不建立身份。

 **这个面恰好服务于已注册模型提供方所指向的那些 namespace。**`ctx.llm.listConfigurableProviders()` 就是允许列表，于是产品边界是被执行的，而不是从已安装的插件集合里推断出来的；将来的 namespace 只有加入该目录才会变得可在 Web 上配置。未注册的 namespace 与未暴露的 namespace 得到完全相同的答复（`settings-not-exposed`），因此探测无法枚举注册表。

@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-07-30-web-config-plane.md
-2026-07-30-web-config-plane.md: c8397d03cd7b8eb4ea127cdc26124f5e721e822d
-2026-07-30-web-config-plane.zh.md: b0724c3a8cb160cbac5fc88fe07d35e79accfc49
+2026-07-30-web-config-plane.md: d5bd9c05e8352536c5c6f8b265db7dbd56a4fb84
+2026-07-30-web-config-plane.zh.md: 3c7f801766b1a6c197cc208a3c4a030b8aaac771
@@ -12,11 +12,11 @@ The request-level configuration seam made LLM adapter configuration restart-free

 ## Decision

-**Wire domains on the compiled RPC map, rejections as codes, owner events forwarded verbatim.** `settings.describe/openDocument/update/replace/mutate`, `credentials.describe/set/unset`, `llm.providers`, and `llm.models` join `RpcMethodMap`, so the compiler-locked wiring sites keep schema, handler, and client in lockstep. Seam rejections fold into `settings-rejected {ns}` / `credential-rejected {ref}` business errors, while clients subscribe to forwarded settings, credentials, and LLM owner events and converge without polling ([forwarded Remote events](2026-08-10-remote-event-delivery.md)). Settings reads, native actions, and writes join `pickDirectory`/`openPath` in the connection guard's privileged set: loopback + same-origin or 403, because a LAN-exposed dsh web must not accept configuration access from another origin.
+**Wire domains on the compiled RPC map, rejections as codes, owner events forwarded verbatim.** `settings.describe/openDocument/update/replace/mutate`, `credentials.describe/set/unset`, `llm.providers`, and `llm.models` join `RpcMethodMap`, so the compiler-locked wiring sites keep schema, handler, and client in lockstep. Seam rejections fold into `settings-rejected {ns}` / `credential-rejected {ref}` business errors, while clients subscribe to forwarded settings, credentials, and LLM owner events and converge without polling ([forwarded Remote events](2026-08-10-remote-event-delivery.md)). Connection authenticates settings reads, native actions, writes, `pickDirectory`, `openPath`, and every other Host operation with one browser session; Host/Origin failures still return 403 before identity is checked.

 **`describe()` grows layers and structural secret redaction.** `SettingsDescriptor` carries `base`/`user` beside the effective value, so the form marks "overridden" by presence in the user layer, not value inequality (an override *equal* to the base is still an override). `describe({ redactSecrets: true })` — mandatory at every wire face — strips `role('secret')` subtrees from all three layers via a pure structural walk of the schema (object/dict/array containers; a secret-role subtree is one opaque leaf) and enumerates the stripped slots as `{path, set}`, so a page can render write-only inputs without ever receiving a value.

-**The Host identifies and opens the local settings document.** The settings seam exposes optional `documentPath` provider metadata and a `prepareDocument()` operation; `settings-file` returns its fully resolved custom or `$DSH_HOME/settings.yaml` filename and exclusively creates an absent empty document with owner-only permissions, while non-file providers retain the base `undefined`. The loopback-only `settings.describe` response carries only the boolean `hasDocument` capability beside the redacted namespace views. `ui-settings-general` registers a `settings.action` entry only on loopback pages, shows it only after the metadata confirms that a provider-owned local document can be prepared, and invokes pathless `settings.openDocument`; the Host resolves the provider path again before a text-document handoff (`open -t` on macOS so an arbitrary YAML file association cannot redirect the gesture, `xdg-open` on desktop Linux, `Invoke-Item` on Windows, and `wslpath -w` followed by that Windows handoff on WSL). Generic workspace paths retain the default intent, including its browser preference for browser-renderable documents. The browser neither derives `$DSH_HOME` nor receives a filesystem target; remote pages make no privileged settings read for this action.
+**The Host identifies and opens the local settings document.** The settings seam exposes optional `documentPath` provider metadata and a `prepareDocument()` operation; `settings-file` returns its fully resolved custom or `$DSH_HOME/settings.yaml` filename and exclusively creates an absent empty document with owner-only permissions, while non-file providers retain the base `undefined`. The browser-authenticated `settings.describe` response carries only the boolean `hasDocument` capability beside the redacted namespace views. `ui-settings-general` registers a `settings.action` entry only on loopback pages, shows it only after the metadata confirms that a provider-owned local document can be prepared, and invokes pathless `settings.openDocument`; the Host resolves the provider path again before a text-document handoff (`open -t` on macOS so an arbitrary YAML file association cannot redirect the gesture, `xdg-open` on desktop Linux, `Invoke-Item` on Windows, and `wslpath -w` followed by that Windows handoff on WSL). Generic workspace paths retain the default intent, including its browser preference for browser-renderable documents. The browser neither derives `$DSH_HOME` nor receives a filesystem target; non-loopback pages retain the Client policy that makes no Host settings read for this action.

 **The llm seam declares configurability and announces topology.** `registerConfigurableProviders()` is an all-or-nothing, fiber-scoped directory of `{provider, displayName, settingsNs, settingsPath}` — the addressing a config page needs to open the right settings subtree for a route that may not exist yet; `listConfigurableProviders()` merges with live routes in the wire handler so undeclared live routes still report active. The zero-payload `'llm/adapters-updated'` event fires from all four registration/unregistration commit points with contained listener dispatch (INVARIANT rethrow), following the settings/commands precedent. `llm-deepseek`'s route renamed to `deepseek-official` because the pi-ai catalog legitimately owns `deepseek` as an aggregator entry; pre-release stance, no alias.

@@ -12,11 +12,11 @@ Status: implemented

 ## 决策

-**wire 领域挂上编译期 RPC 映射，拒绝落为错误码，owner 事件原样转发。**`settings.describe/openDocument/update/replace/mutate`、`credentials.describe/set/unset`、`llm.providers` 与 `llm.models` 一同加入 `RpcMethodMap`，由编译器锁定的接线位点让 schema、处理器与客户端保持步调一致。seam 侧拒绝折叠为业务错误，客户端则订阅转发的 settings、credentials 与 LLM owner 事件，无需轮询即可收敛（见[转发的 Remote 事件](2026-08-10-remote-event-delivery.zh.md)）。settings 读取、原生操作与写入和 `pickDirectory`/`openPath` 一起进入连接守卫的特权集合：回环 + 同源，否则 403，因为暴露在局域网上的 dsh web 绝不能接受来自其他源的配置访问。
+**wire 领域挂上编译期 RPC 映射，拒绝落为错误码，owner 事件原样转发。**`settings.describe/openDocument/update/replace/mutate`、`credentials.describe/set/unset`、`llm.providers` 与 `llm.models` 一同加入 `RpcMethodMap`，由编译器锁定的接线位点让 schema、处理器与客户端保持步调一致。seam 侧拒绝折叠为业务错误，客户端则订阅转发的 settings、credentials 与 LLM owner 事件，无需轮询即可收敛（见[转发的 Remote 事件](2026-08-10-remote-event-delivery.zh.md)）。Connection 用一个浏览器会话认证 settings 读取、原生操作、写入、`pickDirectory`、`openPath` 与其他所有 Host 操作；Host/Origin 失败仍会在身份校验前返回 403。

 **`describe()` 增加分层与结构化 secret 脱敏。**`SettingsDescriptor` 在生效值之外携带 `base`/`user`，表单据此按「字段是否出现在用户层」来标记「已覆盖」，而非按值是否不等（与 base *相等*的覆盖仍然是覆盖）。`describe({ redactSecrets: true })`——在每个 wire 面都强制启用——经由对 schema 的纯结构遍历（object/dict/array 容器；secret 角色子树整体是一个不透明叶节点）从全部三层剥除 `role('secret')` 子树，并把剥除的槽位枚举为 `{path, set}`，页面因此不必收到任何值就能渲染只写输入框。

-**Host 识别并打开本地设置文档。** settings seam 暴露可选的 `documentPath` 提供方元数据和 `prepareDocument()` 操作；`settings-file` 返回已完全解析的自定义文件名或 `$DSH_HOME/settings.yaml` 文件名，并在文档缺失时以仅属主可访问的权限独占创建空文档，非文件提供方则保留基类的 `undefined`。仅限回环访问的 `settings.describe` 响应会在脱敏 namespace 视图旁只携带布尔型 `hasDocument` 能力。`ui-settings-general` 只在回环页面注册一条 `settings.action` 条目，只有元数据确认可准备好一份由提供方持有的本地文档后才显示，并调用无路径参数的 `settings.openDocument`；Host 会在文本文档交接前再次解析提供方路径（macOS 上使用 `open -t`，使任意 YAML 文件关联无法重定向这次操作；桌面 Linux 上使用 `xdg-open`；Windows 上使用 `Invoke-Item`；WSL 上先执行 `wslpath -w`，再使用同一 Windows 交接）。通用 Workspace 路径仍保留默认意图，包括针对浏览器可渲染文档的浏览器偏好。浏览器既不推导 `$DSH_HOME`，也不会收到文件系统目标；远程页面不会为这项操作发起特权 settings 读取。
+**Host 识别并打开本地设置文档。** settings seam 暴露可选的 `documentPath` 提供方元数据和 `prepareDocument()` 操作；`settings-file` 返回已完全解析的自定义文件名或 `$DSH_HOME/settings.yaml` 文件名，并在文档缺失时以仅属主可访问的权限独占创建空文档，非文件提供方则保留基类的 `undefined`。经浏览器认证的 `settings.describe` 响应会在脱敏 namespace 视图旁只携带布尔型 `hasDocument` 能力。`ui-settings-general` 只在回环页面注册一条 `settings.action` 条目，只有元数据确认可准备好一份由提供方持有的本地文档后才显示，并调用无路径参数的 `settings.openDocument`；Host 会在文本文档交接前再次解析提供方路径（macOS 上使用 `open -t`，使任意 YAML 文件关联无法重定向这次操作；桌面 Linux 上使用 `xdg-open`；Windows 上使用 `Invoke-Item`；WSL 上先执行 `wslpath -w`，再使用同一 Windows 交接）。通用 Workspace 路径仍保留默认意图，包括针对浏览器可渲染文档的浏览器偏好。浏览器既不推导 `$DSH_HOME`，也不会收到文件系统目标；非 loopback 页面保留 Client 策略，不为这项操作发起 Host settings 读取。

 **llm seam 声明可配置性并公布拓扑。**`registerConfigurableProviders()` 是一个全有或全无、以 fiber 为作用域的目录，条目为 `{provider, displayName, settingsNs, settingsPath}`——这正是配置页要为一条可能尚不存在的路由打开正确设置子树时所需要的寻址；`listConfigurableProviders()` 在 wire 处理器里与存活路由合并，未声明的存活路由因此仍报告为激活。零负载的 `'llm/adapters-updated'` 事件从全部四个注册／注销提交点触发，listener 派发带异常隔离（INVARIANT 重抛），沿用 settings/commands 的先例。`llm-deepseek` 的路由重命名为 `deepseek-official`，因为 pi-ai catalog 名正言顺地拥有 `deepseek` 这个聚合器条目；依预发布立场，不设别名。

@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-08-03-per-session-agent-presets.md
-2026-08-03-per-session-agent-presets.md: b2195004580e1f4bf4be5527c61a8ee9b816c964
-2026-08-03-per-session-agent-presets.zh.md: 9f689c74dd570d6ec9aaa7cd1274618326a836dd
+2026-08-03-per-session-agent-presets.md: 97352a0e3376ce1fe26bac62b88c2c674202adc7
+2026-08-03-per-session-agent-presets.zh.md: b62baf3e3097ba99247c2e86cc3fb5b7e43e2fab
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ Which preset an unnamed session gets is a user setting (`agent-presets.default`)

 **Switching is allowed only while a session is blank.** Once a turn has run, that history was produced under the preset's tools and swapping them would strand logged tool calls, so `agentPreset.select` answers `agent-preset-locked`. A blank switch keeps the agent and the session and replaces only the subtree, because the host discards the `AgentHandle` it creates and there is no delete RPC — and keeping them is the better outcome anyway, since the session id, its workspace attachment, and its projections all stay put. The swap is unmount-then-mount (two compositions would register the same tool names into one layer), so it resolves the new preset before tearing anything down and restores the previous one when the new mount fails.

-**Authoring a preset is an RPC, and a privileged one.** A composition is a file, but "edit it on the filesystem" is not a browser affordance, so the roster gained `read`/`write`/`remove` beside `select`. Those three are loopback-pinned: a composition names the plugins a session runs, so reading one is reconnaissance and writing one is arbitrary capability. `list` and `select` deliberately stay ordinary. The roster carries ids and trust only, and a LAN client's picker needs it; and choosing a preset looked like escalation — one of them mounts the toolset that edits the live runtime — but `session.create` already takes an `agentPreset`, so pinning only the switch would have left the same capability one method over. The capability is not the preset's to grant either: the deployment's own default already carries `bash` and the filesystem tools, so any caller that may start a session at all can already run commands as this process. Containment is a property of the id (`[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*`), checked before it becomes a directory name rather than by inspecting the joined path afterwards; the text is parsed with the loader's own schema and dialect, so a save cannot leave a file no session could load. Shipped presets are refused for writes and deletes, because the deployment's copy is what a broken local preset is compared against — which also makes "duplicate, then edit" the authoring path rather than an afterthought.
+**Authoring a preset is an RPC, and a privileged one.** A composition is a file, but "edit it on the filesystem" is not a browser affordance, so the roster gained `read`/`write`/`remove` beside `select`. Connection authenticates authoring, `list`, `select`, and the complete Host API with one browser session: a composition names the plugins a session runs, so reading one is reconnaissance and writing one is arbitrary capability, while choosing a preset grants nothing `session.create` with `agentPreset` did not already grant. The capability is not the preset's to grant either: the deployment's own default already carries `bash` and the filesystem tools, so any caller that may start a session at all can already run commands as this process. Containment is a property of the id (`[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*`), checked before it becomes a directory name rather than by inspecting the joined path afterwards; the text is parsed with the loader's own schema and dialect, so a save cannot leave a file no session could load. Shipped presets are refused for writes and deletes, because the deployment's copy is what a broken local preset is compared against — which also makes "duplicate, then edit" the authoring path rather than an afterthought.

 **A service with a consumer outside the agent plane cannot move into a preset.** The aggressive split moved the `subagents` registry and its spawn/fork backends into the delegation group's entry-local realm, and `dsh web` then failed to boot: `dsh-host-apiproxy` is a HOST row that injects `subagents` to answer the browser's cross-session queries (`listChildren`, `followup`), so it waited forever for a service only sessions now provided. A per-session copy is wrong twice over — a provider name registers once, so the second session would have collided anyway. The registry and every shared backend, including the [fixed Codex and Claude Code product providers](2026-08-10-product-subagent-providers-in-shared-host.md), are host-plane; a preset contributes whichever delegation TOOLS its agent should see, and those tools resolve the host registry. `workflows` stays entry-local because nothing outside an agent reads it. Grepping injectors is what should have caught this and did not: the search has to include the host packages, not just the agent-plane ones.

@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ Status: implemented

 **只有空白会话才允许切换。** 一旦跑过任何轮次，那段历史就是在该 preset 的工具下产生的，替换会留下无法执行的已记录 tool call，因此 `agentPreset.select` 返回 `agent-preset-locked`。空白期的切换保留 agent 与 session，只替换子树——因为宿主丢弃了它创建的 `AgentHandle`，也没有 delete RPC；而保留它们本身就是更好的结果，会话 id、workspace 挂接与 projections 都原地不动。该替换是"先卸后装"（两份组装会把同名工具注册进同一分层），因此它在拆除任何东西之前先解析新 preset，并在新组装装载失败时恢复原来的那一份。

-**创作 preset 是一次 RPC，而且是特权 RPC。** 组装是一个文件，但“去文件系统里改它”并不是浏览器能提供的操作，因此名单在 `select` 之外新增了 `read`/`write`/`remove`。这三者被固定在环回地址：组装指明了一个会话所运行的插件，因此读取它是侦察，写入它是任意能力。`list` 与 `select` 刻意保持为普通方法。名单只携带 id 与信任级别，而局域网客户端的选择器需要它；至于选择本身，它看起来像提权——其中一个 preset 会挂载可编辑活动运行时的工具集——但 `session.create` 本就接受 `agentPreset`，只固定切换会把同一能力留在隔壁一个方法上。这份能力也不由 preset 授予：部署自带的默认 preset 本就带着 `bash` 与文件系统工具，因此任何被允许开启会话的调用方，早已能以本进程的身份执行命令。约束是 id 自身的性质（`[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*`），在它成为目录名之前就检查，而不是事后再去审视拼接出的路径；文本使用 loader 自身的 schema 与方言解析，因此保存不会留下任何会话都无法加载的文件。随部署提供的 preset 拒绝写入与删除，因为部署自带的那一份正是用来对照有问题的本地 preset 的——这也让“先复制、再编辑”成为创作路径本身，而非事后补充。
+**创作 preset 是一次 RPC，而且是特权 RPC。** 组装是一个文件，但“去文件系统里改它”并不是浏览器能提供的操作，因此名单在 `select` 之外新增了 `read`/`write`/`remove`。Connection 用一个浏览器会话认证创作操作、`list`、`select` 与完整 Host API：组装指明一个会话所运行的插件，因此读取它是侦察，写入它是任意能力；选择 preset 则没有授予 `session.create` 携带 `agentPreset` 时尚未拥有的能力。这份能力也不由 preset 授予：部署自带的默认 preset 本就带着 `bash` 与文件系统工具，因此任何被允许开启会话的调用方，早已能以本进程的身份执行命令。约束是 id 自身的性质（`[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*`），在它成为目录名之前就检查，而不是事后再去审视拼接出的路径；文本使用 loader 自身的 schema 与方言解析，因此保存不会留下任何会话都无法加载的文件。随部署提供的 preset 拒绝写入与删除，因为部署自带的那一份正是用来对照有问题的本地 preset 的——这也让“先复制、再编辑”成为创作路径本身，而非事后补充。

 **在 agent 平面之外还有消费方的服务，不能搬进 preset。** 激进拆分把 `subagents` 注册表连同 spawn/fork 后端一起搬进了 delegation 组的 entry-local realm，于是 `dsh web` 直接起不来：`dsh-host-apiproxy` 是宿主行，它注入 `subagents` 来回答浏览器的跨会话查询（`listChildren`、`followup`），因而永远等待一个此刻只有会话才提供的服务。按会话各一份在两个层面上都是错的——provider 名只能注册一次，第二个会话本来也会相撞。注册表与所有共享后端，包括[固定的 Codex 与 Claude Code 产品 provider](2026-08-10-product-subagent-providers-in-shared-host.zh.md)，都属于宿主平面；preset 只贡献自己的 agent 应看见的委派**工具**，这些工具解析宿主注册表。`workflows` 保持 entry-local，因为 agent 之外没有任何东西读它。本该拦下它的是「检索注入方」这一步，而它没拦住：检索必须覆盖宿主包，而不只是 agent 平面的包。

@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-08-04-draft-provider-endpoint-interrogation.md
-2026-08-04-draft-provider-endpoint-interrogation.md: 6a545ea5c97ef7e7f0e916c1676c1361f7a9bf3b
-2026-08-04-draft-provider-endpoint-interrogation.zh.md: eb8133d0f2ec4a1999770468782db9c47ba170c8
+2026-08-04-draft-provider-endpoint-interrogation.md: 0132dba5888faa1b9e6a4e59b45ee56a259eeef7
+2026-08-04-draft-provider-endpoint-interrogation.zh.md: 8cea5d2809611696606113b2e38578f1b54b4e09
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ Interrogation is keyed by **settings namespace**, not by provider route:
 - `ctx.llm.registerModelDiscovery(settingsNs, discover)` lets an adapter plugin offer to interrogate endpoints for the namespace it owns, and `ctx.llm.discoverModels(settingsNs, request)` asks. There is no way to enumerate which namespaces registered: a surface that cannot interrogate learns it from the refusal, and a list nothing consumed would be a required wire field doing nothing. The namespace is the right key because a configuration surface already holds it from the configurable-provider directory, and because a provider being added has no route to name.
 - `LlmModelDiscoveryRequest` carries the draft — an optional `provider`, an optional `baseURL`, an optional `api`, an optional `apiKey`, and a signal — and needs at least one of `provider` or `baseURL` to have anything to answer about. `provider` exists because a route the adapter already describes is answered from its own registry with no network call at all; only a route it does not describe reaches an endpoint. Nothing in this path writes settings or credentials. The one read is the credential of a route the request names: a configuration surface holds a redacted descriptor rather than the stored secret, so the draft's `apiKey` is present only while the user is typing one, and without that read an already-configured route would be interrogated unauthenticated and answer 401. The typed key wins, being the one under test.
 - `LlmDiscoveredModel` makes every field but `id` optional, because most listings disclose an id and nothing else. The reply is candidates, not a catalog: a surface adopting one still owes the capacities the adapter requires.
- `llm.discoverModels` carries the same draft over the wire. Its `apiKey` is the third and last payload on which a secret may ride, alongside `settings.update`/`mutate` and `credentials.set`, and it is never stored or echoed back. It does ride the client's outgoing envelope like every other secret-bearing payload, where a `subscribeEnvelopes()` observer can see it; redacting that tap is a configuration-plane-wide change, not this method's to make alone. The method is loopback-only for a second reason besides the key: it makes the host issue a GET to a caller-chosen URL and reports the outcome, which is a probe an anonymous LAN caller must not have. Every refusal folds into `model-discovery-failed`, whose message is the adapter's own text and whose details name the endpoint asked but never the credential offered.
+- `llm.discoverModels` carries the same draft over the wire. Its `apiKey` is the third and last payload on which a secret may ride, alongside `settings.update`/`mutate` and `credentials.set`, and it is never stored or echoed back. It does ride the client's outgoing envelope like every other secret-bearing payload, where a `subscribeEnvelopes()` observer can see it; redacting that tap is a configuration-plane-wide change, not this method's to make alone. Connection authenticates the method with the complete Host API: it makes the host issue a GET to a caller-chosen URL and reports the outcome, which an anonymous caller must not receive. Every refusal folds into `model-discovery-failed`, whose message is the adapter's own text and whose details name the endpoint asked but never the credential offered.

 `dsh-llm-pi-ai` implements the wire path as a plain `GET {baseURL}/models`, reading `openai-completions` and `openai-responses`: their `GET /models` shape with bearer auth is the one a gateway, a self-hosted server, and the official endpoints all agree on. Azure is excluded despite its OpenAI lineage — it authenticates with an `api-key` header and requires an `api-version` query — and Codex uses OAuth; both would have reported an authentication failure as a provider with no models. Every other protocol answers `DISCOVERY_UNSUPPORTED`, so the surface falls back to hand-entry rather than reporting a guessed response shape as an empty provider. `baseURL` is treated as a prefix rather than a URL to resolve against, so a deployment path such as `https://gateway.example/openai/v1` keeps its segments. The reply is read under a four-megabyte ceiling enforced on the bytes actually received — the endpoint is a URL the user typed, so a declared `content-length` is checked first as a courtesy but never trusted as the bound, matching `dsh-web-fetch`'s two-stage shape for its own caller-supplied URLs.

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ Status: implemented
 - `ctx.llm.registerModelDiscovery(settingsNs, discover)` 让适配器插件为自己拥有的 namespace 提供「询问端点」的能力，`ctx.llm.discoverModels(settingsNs, request)` 发起询问。没有任何办法枚举哪些 namespace 注册过：询问不了的界面会从那句拒绝里知道，而一份无人消费的列表只会变成一个什么都不做的必填协议字段。以 namespace 为键是对的，因为配置界面已经从可配置提供方目录里拿到了它，也因为正在新增的提供方没有路由可点名。
 - `LlmModelDiscoveryRequest` 携带草稿——可选的 `provider`、可选的 `baseURL`、可选的 `api`、可选的 `apiKey`，以及一个 signal——且 `provider` 与 `baseURL` 至少要有一个，才有东西可答。`provider` 之所以存在，是因为适配器已经描述过的路由直接由它自己的注册表作答、完全不联网；只有它未描述的路由才会抵达某个端点。这条路径不写 settings 与 credentials。唯一的读取是请求所点名路由的凭据：配置界面拿到的是脱敏描述符而非已存的机密，因此草稿里的 `apiKey` 只在用户正键入时才存在；没有这次读取，已配置好的路由就会被不带认证地询问，只换回一个 401。键入的密钥优先，因为那正是被测试的那一把。
 - `LlmDiscoveredModel` 除 `id` 外每个字段都可选，因为大多数列表只公布 id。回复是候选而非 catalog：采纳其中一条的界面仍要补上适配器所需的容量。
- `llm.discoverModels` 把同一份草稿送过协议层。它的 `apiKey` 是可承载机密的第三个、也是最后一个载荷（另两个是 `settings.update`/`mutate` 与 `credentials.set`），且绝不被存储或回显。它确实会像其他承载机密的载荷一样随客户端外发信封同行，`subscribeEnvelopes()` 观察者看得到；把那个抽头脱敏是整个配置面的改动，不该由这一个方法独自决定。除密钥之外，将它限制为仅可通过回环访问还有第二个理由：它让宿主向调用方选定的 URL 发起 GET 并回报结果，这是匿名 LAN 调用者不该拥有的探测能力。每一种拒绝都折叠为 `model-discovery-failed`，其消息是适配器自己的文本，details 点名被询问的端点，绝不点名所提供的凭据。
+- `llm.discoverModels` 把同一份草稿送过协议层。它的 `apiKey` 是可承载机密的第三个、也是最后一个载荷（另两个是 `settings.update`/`mutate` 与 `credentials.set`），且绝不被存储或回显。它确实会像其他承载机密的载荷一样随客户端外发信封同行，`subscribeEnvelopes()` 观察者看得到；把那个抽头脱敏是整个配置面的改动，不该由这一个方法独自决定。Connection 用与完整 Host API 相同的会话认证该方法：它让宿主向调用方选定的 URL 发起 GET 并回报结果，匿名调用者绝不能获得这类探测能力。每一种拒绝都折叠为 `model-discovery-failed`，其消息是适配器自己的文本，details 点名被询问的端点，绝不点名所提供的凭据。

 `dsh-llm-pi-ai` 的实现只是一次朴素的 `GET {baseURL}/models`，且仅限 OpenAI 兼容协议。它们的列表形状是网关、自建服务与官方端点三方一致认可的那一种，而这正是该动作存在的场景。其余协议一律以 `DISCOVERY_UNSUPPORTED` 回答，让界面回退到手工填写，而不是把猜错的响应形状报成一个空提供方。`baseURL` 按前缀而非待解析 URL 处理，因此 `https://gateway.example/openai/v1` 这类部署路径会保留其路径段。回复在四兆字节上限下读取，且上限落在实际收到的字节上——端点是用户自己填的 URL，因此会先看声明的 `content-length` 作为善意提示，但绝不把它当作边界；这与 `dsh-web-fetch` 面对自己的调用方提供 URL 时所用的两段式形状一致。

@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-08-04-websocket-downlink-carrier.md
-2026-08-04-websocket-downlink-carrier.md: f757487c7b0880cfff25b93644341dc85b5e0e38
-2026-08-04-websocket-downlink-carrier.zh.md: 5fa603b9a8dc66146c777f54dfbdc25cb131debd
+2026-08-04-websocket-downlink-carrier.md: 420a0d30f31cca58448adc0afd46a5d6d5e9107f
+2026-08-04-websocket-downlink-carrier.zh.md: 5f277a4ed33ffe97b51587fef960746b93eff1c1
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ WebSocket carries only the host→browser downlink. All client→host unary call

 ## Upgrade and lifecycle boundaries

-`dsh-host-webserver` provides an exact upgrade-route registration point alongside ordinary routes, dispatches Node upgrade sockets by pathname only, contains raw-socket errors, and waits for surviving upgraded connections to close during server teardown; it knows nothing about Harness frames or WebSocket messages. `dsh-client-connection` owns the WebSocket handshake, frame output, and stream cancellation, and reuses the `/api` Host/Origin trust fence before upgrade. An untrusted authority or cross-origin Origin is rejected before `ctx.apiProxy.events.*` starts.
+`dsh-host-webserver` provides an exact upgrade-route registration point alongside ordinary routes, dispatches Node upgrade sockets by pathname only, contains raw-socket errors, and waits for surviving upgraded connections to close during server teardown; it knows nothing about Harness frames or WebSocket messages. `dsh-client-connection` owns the WebSocket handshake, frame output, and stream cancellation. Before upgrade it applies the `/api` Host/Origin checks followed by the same signed browser-cookie authentication as unary HTTP. An untrusted authority or cross-origin Origin receives 403; a trusted but unauthenticated request receives 401; neither starts a Remote stream.

 A browser abort or socket close cancels the corresponding host stream; plugin teardown also waits for that source iterator's cleanup. If a host stream throws midway, the carrier sends one existing `stream/error` frame and then closes the socket; the client treats that frame as connection loss rather than delivering it to a business sink. Each WebSocket reports open independently, and the existing readiness handshake still waits until mux and host are both open and the `host.describe` HTTP call has succeeded before publishing connected.

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ WebSocket 只承担 host→browser 下行。所有 client→host unary 调用和

 ## Upgrade 与生命周期边界

-`dsh-host-webserver` 提供与普通 route 并列的精确 upgrade-route 注册点，只按 pathname 分发 Node upgrade socket，隔离原始 socket 错误，并在 server teardown 期间等待仍存活的升级连接关闭；它不认识 Harness 帧或 WebSocket 消息。`dsh-client-connection` 拥有 WebSocket handshake、frame 写出和流取消，并在 upgrade 前复用 `/api` 的 Host／Origin 信任栅栏。未受信任的 authority 或跨来源 Origin 在 `ctx.apiProxy.events.*` 启动前即被拒绝。
+`dsh-host-webserver` 提供与普通 route 并列的精确 upgrade-route 注册点，只按 pathname 分发 Node upgrade socket，隔离原始 socket 错误，并在 server teardown 期间等待仍存活的升级连接关闭；它不认识 Harness 帧或 WebSocket 消息。`dsh-client-connection` 拥有 WebSocket handshake、frame 写出和流取消。upgrade 前先执行 `/api` Host／Origin 校验，再执行与一元 HTTP 相同的签名浏览器 cookie 认证。未受信任的 authority 或跨来源 Origin 得到 403；Host 可信但未认证的请求得到 401；两者都不会启动 Remote stream。

 浏览器 abort 或 socket close 会取消对应的 host 流；插件 teardown 还会等待该 source iterator 完成清理。host 流中途抛错时，载体发送一个现有的 `stream/error` frame 后关闭 socket；客户端把该 frame 收敛为连接丢失，不投递给业务 sink。每条 WebSocket 独立报告 open，既有 readiness handshake 仍等待 mux、host 都 open 且 `host.describe` HTTP 调用成功后才发布 connected。

@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-08-12-plugin-owned-settings-surface.md
-2026-08-12-plugin-owned-settings-surface.md: daed91b8ac4ce0acb81e19908ec08c9f3f7ac21e
-2026-08-12-plugin-owned-settings-surface.zh.md: ba39b84faaf90be413ad8d7b8327c67b2fa27cea
+2026-08-12-plugin-owned-settings-surface.md: f1c9b48abd3459ed58e3e10fbdd95558884c9a22
+2026-08-12-plugin-owned-settings-surface.zh.md: ff9f37290a8dd8f1ab9ef1bfef3790a3ef20086b
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Keying makes absence the signal, and that is what removes the bookkeeping the pr

 The gate did keep one thing off the wire, and this note states it plainly because the decision has to survive the accurate version: a registered namespace the list did not name never had its resolved, `base`, or `user` values reach the browser at all. The plugin inventory page is not a substitute — `PluginInventoryEntry` carries `entryId`, `moduleName`, `enabled`, and `fiberPhase`, and its "configuration" row renders an enabled/disabled tag, never a stored value.

-What the gate was not is the boundary its position suggested. Every `settings.*` method sits in `PRIVILEGED_METHODS` (`packages/client/connection`), so a non-loopback or cross-origin request is refused with 403 before reaching this code; `role('secret')` fields are structurally stripped from every layer of every response; and the document the plane edits is the user's own `settings.yaml`, which the same settings page offers to open. The writes it did not block were also the consequential ones: `permission` (which can widen the approval preset) and `agent-presets` (which decides what a session mounts) were both already served.
+What the gate was not is the security boundary its position suggested. Connection authenticates every Host API request before reaching this code; `role('secret')` fields are structurally stripped from every layer of every response; and the document the plane edits is the user's own `settings.yaml`, which the same settings page offers to open. The writes it did not block were also the consequential ones: `permission` (which can widen the approval preset) and `agent-presets` (which decides what a session mounts) were both already served.

 So the exposure this change actually adds, in this repository, is one namespace: `agent-default-model`, whose two fields name a provider and a model and which no browser half renders. A future namespace whose values genuinely must not cross the wire is answered per field by `role('secret')` — finer than a namespace switch, and already enforced.

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Status: implemented

 这道门确实挡住了一样东西，本 note 如实写出，因为这个决策必须在准确版本下也站得住：不在名单上的已注册命名空间，其 resolved、`base` 与 `user` 值根本不会抵达浏览器。插件清单页不能替代它——`PluginInventoryEntry` 携带的是 `entryId`、`moduleName`、`enabled` 与 `fiberPhase`，它那一行「configuration」渲染的是启用／停用标签，从不是任何已存值。

-这道门不是的，是它所处位置暗示的那种边界。每个 `settings.*` 方法都在 `PRIVILEGED_METHODS` 里（`packages/client/connection`），非回环或跨源请求在到达这段代码之前就以 403 被拒；`role('secret')` 字段在每种响应的每一层都被结构性剥离；而这个面所编辑的文档，本就是用户自己的 `settings.yaml`，同一个设置页还提供了打开它的入口。它没有挡住的写入，恰恰是有分量的那些：`permission`（能放宽审批预设）与 `agent-presets`（决定一个会话挂载什么）本来就已被服务。
+这道门不是的，是它所处位置暗示的那种安全边界。Connection 在到达这段代码前认证每个 Host API 请求；`role('secret')` 字段在每种响应的每一层都被结构性剥离；而这个面所编辑的文档，本就是用户自己的 `settings.yaml`，同一个设置页还提供了打开它的入口。它没有挡住的写入，恰恰是有分量的那些：`permission`（能放宽审批预设）与 `agent-presets`（决定一个会话挂载什么）本来就已被服务。

 因此本次改动在本仓库实际新增的暴露面是一个命名空间：`agent-default-model`——它的两个字段指明一个提供方与一个模型，且没有任何浏览器半侧渲染它。将来若某个命名空间的值确实不该跨越协议，由 `role('secret')` 逐字段作答：比整命名空间开关更精细，而且已经在执行。

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+# Bilingual-pair consistency record (docs/i18n/README.md): the git blob hash of each
+# side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
+# after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
+#   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-08-24-browser-token-authentication.md
+2026-08-24-browser-token-authentication.md: c75f561d9529296ff668791c29453e522f309cc3
+2026-08-24-browser-token-authentication.zh.md: d4a5059619fefda9d9060e9879d10c0a2197f8f3
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+# Agent Note: Browser launch-token authentication
+
+Status: implemented
+
+English | [中文](2026-08-24-browser-token-authentication.zh.md)
+
+## Problem
+
+The Web Host runs tool-capable Sessions with the current operating-system user's authority, but its HTTP interface identified privileged callers from request routing facts. In particular, the method-specific loopback list treated a loopback `Host` value as local authority even though an HTTP client controls that header. A caller that could reach the server could therefore name `localhost`, enter configuration methods, and use Host-side operations such as model discovery to disclose stored credentials. Binding the shipped CLI to loopback limits ordinary reachability but does not authenticate a request forwarded or otherwise delivered to that socket.
+
+## Decision
+
+`dsh-client-connection` authenticates the complete Host API before dispatch. Every API Proxy method, Remote unary call, generic Connection channel, and Remote WebSocket stream requires the same browser session; endpoint ownership and method names do not alter authority. The existing Host/Origin checks run first and retain their DNS-rebinding and cross-site-request role, returning 403 when they fail. A trusted Host without a valid browser session receives 401. The browser-trust rules remain owned by the [carrier-level browser trust decision](2026-07-28-api-browser-trust-boundary.md).
+
+Each Host process generates a random launch token, retained by the root application context across Connection hot reloads. `dsh-web-app` prints and opens the normal root URL with that token in the query once per process. `frontend-static` asks Connection to authorize index responses: only `GET /?token=...` exchanges the process token for a cookie, then redirects to clean `/`; the token is not accepted on API paths or in an Authorization header. An obsolete token paired with a valid cookie redirects to clean `/`. Missing and invalid credentials receive one minimal 401 response. Static non-index assets remain public.
+
+The cookie is a signed, authority-bound bearer. Its deterministic name and signed payload both include the normalized hostname plus port, so one Harness home can run independent Web ports without cookie collisions. The payload carries safe-integer issue and expiry times under an absolute lifetime; `cookieMaxAgeDays` defaults to 30. The cookie is host-only, `Path=/`, `HttpOnly`, and `SameSite=Strict`. It omits `Secure` because the shipped server uses loopback HTTP. There is no logout operation or reverse-proxy-specific handling.
+
+The HMAC secret is a versioned `grant` record at `client-connection/browser-session` in `ctx.credentials`; the local provider stores it in `$DSH_HOME/.credentials.yaml`. Connection loads or creates the record during activation and retains the secret for synchronous request verification. An active Connection continues using its loaded secret if the durable record changes; the next activation loads the replacement or creates a missing record, so deleting the record and restarting the process revokes every existing cookie. Invalid owner payloads fail loud instead of being replaced. The launch token itself is never persisted and changes on every process start, while an unexpired cookie remains valid across restarts on the same authority.
+
+The in-page Web Worker preview exposes no network socket. Its page-owned `postMessage` tunnel enters the real route first, then retries a 401 or 403 through the worker-local fetch handler. This keeps Connection interceptors while limiting the authentication bypass to the page that created the Host worker.
+
+The shipped CLI continues to reject `--host 0.0.0.0`. Authentication does not imply supported network deployment, TLS, forwarding-header interpretation, or proxy configuration.
+
+## Verification
+
+Unit coverage pins process-token retention across Connection reloads, one secret load per activation, synchronous verification without credential-provider reads, cookie attributes, HMAC and payload validation, authority and lifetime checks, record deletion taking effect on the next activation, invalid durable records, and cleanup of obsolete token URLs backed by valid cookies. Host transport suites pin uniform 401/403 behavior for API Proxy, generic RPC, Typert Remote HTTP, and WebSocket upgrade paths. The frontend real-composition test boots credentials, Connection, webserver, and static serving through Loader and proves token exchange before index reads while static assets remain public. Packed-worker tests prove portable cookie encoding and worker-local retry for both authentication and trust rejection. A real-CLI test starts `dsh web` twice on one port with a temporary `DSH_HOME`, proves that forged `Host: localhost` is unauthenticated, calls `host.describe` with the exchanged cookie, observes a new process token, and reuses the old cookie after restart.
+
+## Alternatives considered
+
+**Determine privileged callers from the TCP peer address.** A direct peer address still identifies a local forwarding process rather than the browser user, retains a second authority model beside the API's command-execution capability, and requires proxy policy to answer who the original caller was. One application credential is the enforceable identity used for every operation.
+
+**Keep a method-specific privileged list and restrict stored credentials to configured targets.** The list can omit new endpoints and does not constrain callers that already control a tool-capable Session. A `discoverModels` target rule would not form a security boundary because the same authenticated principal can update settings and run commands. Uniform authentication covers the operation that grants process control.
+
+**Persist or accept the launch token as an API bearer.** A durable launch token would become a second long-lived credential, while Authorization-header support would add a non-browser client contract with no current consumer. The process token performs one browser-cookie exchange only.
+
+**Rotate the signing secret on every restart.** This prevents an existing browser from reconnecting after an ordinary DSH restart. Persisting only the signing secret keeps that workflow while process-token rotation limits the startup URL to one process lifetime.
+
+**Add logout, TLS-proxy, and forwarding-header configuration.** None is required by the loopback Web application or the reported authentication gap. Adding them would define deployment contracts without current consumers. Browser site-data controls revoke one browser session; deleting the credential record and restarting the process revokes all sessions.
+
+## Consequences
+
+Possession of the browser cookie authorizes the complete tool-capable Host API, matching the authority the Web application exposes after Session creation. `Host` does not grant a higher method tier, and a method migration between API Proxy and Typert Remote cannot change its caller set.
+
+The persistent secret makes cookies survive restarts but gives a stolen cookie up to the configured absolute lifetime. Deleting the record and restarting the process is the global revocation mechanism; the active Connection intentionally avoids credential-provider work on each request. Omitting `Secure` preserves loopback HTTP and permits plaintext transmission if an operator makes the same cookie authority reachable over an unencrypted network. The startup URL contains a process credential and must be treated as sensitive output; runtime diagnostics do not repeat it.
+
+The decision partially supersedes the authentication deferral and unauthenticated non-loopback consequences in the [browser trust note](2026-07-28-api-browser-trust-boundary.md). That note remains active authority for media-type, Host, Origin, Fetch-Metadata, and configured-authority validation. No active Agent Note is archived: the overlap is partial and both security rules retain future decision value.
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+# Agent Note: 浏览器启动令牌认证
+
+Status: implemented
+
+[English](2026-08-24-browser-token-authentication.md) | 中文
+
+## 问题
+
+Web Host 以当前操作系统用户的权限运行具有工具能力的 Session，但其 HTTP 接口用请求路由事实识别特权调用者。具体而言，按方法维护的 loopback 列表把 loopback `Host` 值视为本地 authority，尽管 HTTP 客户端可以控制该 header。能够到达服务器的调用者因此可以声明 `localhost`、进入配置方法，再利用模型发现等 Host 侧操作披露存储的凭据。随附 CLI 绑定 loopback 可以限制普通可达性，却不能认证被转发或以其他方式送达该 socket 的请求。
+
+## 决策
+
+`dsh-client-connection` 在分发前认证完整 Host API。每个 API Proxy 方法、Remote 一元调用、通用 Connection channel 和 Remote WebSocket stream 都要求同一个浏览器会话；endpoint 所有权与方法名称不改变 authority。既有 Host/Origin 校验先执行，继续负责 DNS rebinding 和跨站请求防御，失败时返回 403。Host 可信但没有有效浏览器会话时返回 401。浏览器信任规则仍由[载体级浏览器信任决策](2026-07-28-api-browser-trust-boundary.zh.md)持有。
+
+每个 Host 进程生成随机启动令牌，并由应用根 context 跨 Connection 热重载保留。`dsh-web-app` 每个进程只打印并打开一次 query 中带该令牌的普通根 URL。`frontend-static` 请求 Connection 授权 index 响应：只有 `GET /?token=...` 会把进程令牌交换为 cookie，再重定向到干净的 `/`；API 路径和 Authorization header 都不接受该令牌。过时令牌如果同时带有有效 cookie，会重定向到干净的 `/`。缺失与无效凭据得到同一份最小 401 响应。非 index 静态资产保持公开。
+
+cookie 是签名且绑定 authority 的 bearer。确定性名称与签名 payload 都包含规范化 hostname 和 port，因此同一 Harness home 可以在不同 Web port 运行而不发生 cookie 冲突。payload 在绝对有效期内携带安全整数形式的签发与过期时间；`cookieMaxAgeDays` 默认为 30。cookie 是 host-only、`Path=/`、`HttpOnly`、`SameSite=Strict`。随附服务器使用 loopback HTTP，因此不设置 `Secure`。这里没有 logout 操作或反向代理专用处理。
+
+HMAC 密钥是 `ctx.credentials` 中位于 `client-connection/browser-session` 的版本化 `grant` 记录；本地提供方将其存入 `$DSH_HOME/.credentials.yaml`。Connection 在激活期间加载或创建该记录，并保留密钥以同步校验请求。持久记录发生变化后，当前 Connection 继续使用已加载的密钥；下一次激活会加载替换记录或创建缺失记录，因此删除记录并重启进程会撤销全部既有 cookie。无效 owner payload 会明确失败，而不是被覆盖。启动令牌本身绝不持久化并在每次进程启动时变化；未过期 cookie 则能在相同 authority 上跨重启继续有效。
+
+页内 Web Worker preview 不暴露网络 socket。其由页面持有的 `postMessage` tunnel 先进入真实 route，收到 401 或 403 后再经 worker 本地 fetch handler 重试。这样既保留 Connection interceptor，又把认证绕过限制在创建 Host worker 的页面内。
+
+随附 CLI 继续拒绝 `--host 0.0.0.0`。认证不代表支持网络部署、TLS、转发 header 解释或代理配置。
+
+## 验证
+
+单元覆盖 Connection 重载时保留进程令牌、每次激活只加载一次密钥、无需读取凭据提供方的同步校验、cookie 属性、HMAC 与 payload 校验、authority 与有效期校验、记录删除在下一次激活时生效、无效持久记录，以及用有效 cookie 清理过时令牌 URL。Host 传输套件固定 API Proxy、通用 RPC、Typert Remote HTTP 和 WebSocket upgrade 路径上一致的 401/403 行为。frontend 真实组合测试经 Loader 启动 credentials、Connection、webserver 与静态服务，证明读取 index 前完成令牌交换，同时静态资产仍公开。打包 worker 测试证明 cookie 编码可移植，并覆盖认证与信任拒绝后的 worker 本地重试。真实 CLI 测试在临时 `DSH_HOME` 上用同一端口两次启动 `dsh web`，证明伪造 `Host: localhost` 仍未认证，以交换所得 cookie 调用 `host.describe`，观测新的进程令牌，并在重启后复用旧 cookie。
+
+## 曾考虑的替代方案
+
+**从 TCP 对端地址判定特权调用者。** 直接对端地址仍可能只识别本地转发进程，而非浏览器用户；它会在 API 的命令执行能力旁保留第二套 authority 模型，并要求代理策略回答原始调用者是谁。一个应用凭据才是每项操作都能执行的身份。
+
+**保留按方法的特权列表，并把存储凭据限制在已配置目标。** 列表可能漏掉新 endpoint，也不能约束已经控制工具型 Session 的调用者。`discoverModels` 目标规则不构成安全边界，因为同一已认证主体可以更新 settings 并运行命令。统一认证覆盖授予进程控制权的操作。
+
+**持久化启动令牌或把它作为 API bearer 接受。** 持久启动令牌会成为第二份长期凭据；Authorization header 支持则会增加没有当前 consumer 的非浏览器客户端约定。进程令牌只完成一次浏览器 cookie 交换。
+
+**每次重启都轮换签名密钥。** 这会阻止既有浏览器在普通 DSH 重启后重连。只持久化签名密钥既保留该工作流，又由进程令牌轮换把启动 URL 限定在一个进程生命周期。
+
+**增加 logout、TLS 代理和转发 header 配置。** loopback Web 应用与已报告认证缺口都不需要这些能力；加入它们会在没有当前 consumer 时定义部署约定。浏览器站点数据控制会撤销单个浏览器会话；删除凭据记录并重启进程会撤销全部会话。
+
+## 后果
+
+持有浏览器 cookie 就能调用完整的工具型 Host API，这与 Web 应用在创建 Session 后暴露的 authority 一致。`Host` 不授予更高的方法层级，方法在 API Proxy 与 Typert Remote 之间迁移也不会改变调用者集合。
+
+持久密钥使 cookie 跨重启生效，也让被盗 cookie 最多保有配置的绝对有效期。删除记录并重启进程是全局撤销机制；当前 Connection 刻意避免在每个请求上访问凭据提供方。不设置 `Secure` 保留 loopback HTTP，但如果操作者让同一 cookie authority 经未加密网络可达，cookie 会以明文传输。启动 URL 含进程凭据，必须视为敏感输出；运行时诊断不会重复它。
+
+本决策部分取代[浏览器信任说明](2026-07-28-api-browser-trust-boundary.zh.md)中的认证延期与未认证非 loopback 后果。该说明仍是媒体类型、Host、Origin、Fetch-Metadata 和配置 authority 校验的有效权威。没有 active Agent Note 被归档：重叠只发生在局部，两条安全规则都保有未来决策价值。
@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/bug-fix/2026-08-06-host-backed-web-preferences.md
-2026-08-06-host-backed-web-preferences.md: 2e33d05417bf6c347a57b5c0b6c7281ff1392b5b
-2026-08-06-host-backed-web-preferences.zh.md: 79c15af723347b92fb0b0a15ccb8de80841dd3b0
+2026-08-06-host-backed-web-preferences.md: 83d4b87f35e2bb3710ecea60d64a8c800ce5df08
+2026-08-06-host-backed-web-preferences.zh.md: ead4a0d27a3bf94f6ef3ffc2915ba721c8379075
@@ -12,13 +12,13 @@ The first theme implementation moved only Appearance to Host settings but awaite

 ## Decision

-The owning Host halves register three schemas: optional `locale.preference` (`zh` or `en`, where absence delegates to the browser), `ui-theme.preference` (`light`, `dark`, or `system`, default `system`), and `ui-conversation.busyEnter` (`queue` or `steer`, default `queue`). The local settings provider stores explicit choices in `$DSH_HOME/settings.yaml`, which resolves to `~/.dsh/settings.yaml` under the default home. The API proxy serves every registered namespace to a loopback client; field roles still redact secrets.
+The owning Host halves register three schemas: optional `locale.preference` (`zh` or `en`, where absence delegates to the browser), `ui-theme.preference` (`light`, `dark`, or `system`, default `system`), and `ui-conversation.busyEnter` (`queue` or `steer`, default `queue`). The local settings provider stores explicit choices in `$DSH_HOME/settings.yaml`, which resolves to `~/.dsh/settings.yaml` under the default home. The API proxy serves every registered namespace behind Connection's browser authentication; field roles still redact secrets.

 `dsh-client-ui-settings` owns one browser-wide settings describe mirror and provides `ctx.settingsScope.bind(spec)` as a per-namespace selector over it. The mirror installs `settings/document-updated` and `connection/reset` listeners before starting its background read, so no settings transport can block plugin activation and an invalidation cannot fall into a read-before-subscribe gap. Each bound scope publishes a snapshot store (status, section value, revision, writability, host/memory mode) the domain service subscribes to, without adding a wire read or listener of its own. The default decoder validates each incoming section against the namespace's own serialized wire schema, rehydrated through the colocated `ctx.settingsSchema` service, so domains carry no hand-written wire guards. Domain services take the scope as an ordinary constructor collaborator, publish their provisional defaults immediately—browser-derived locale, system theme, and Queue—then adopt an accepted Host section without writing it back; a service constructed without a scope (standalone dictionary or policy fixtures) simply stays process-local. The shared read and invalidation lifecycle is specified by the later [settings describe mirror decision](../architecture/2026-08-17-settings-describe-mirror.md).

 User changes update the live service synchronously and queue a `settings.mutate` path operation through `scope.set`. The scope serializes gestures, sends the latest known namespace revision as `expectedRevision`, records every successful revision, and lets only the latest write settlement republish live state. A rejected or failed latest write reloads Host state. Disposal rejects new work, skips queued operations, suppresses publication by the in-flight operation, and waits for that operation to settle before the plugin reaches quiescence.

-Remote browsers cannot call the loopback-only configuration API, so their preferences remain process-local. Dynamic third-party theme ids remain in-process extensions outside the built-in Host schema; removing one resets the live registry without replacing the last durable built-in preference.
+The Client keeps Host persistence disabled on non-loopback pages, so their preferences remain process-local even though Connection authenticates the complete API. Dynamic third-party theme ids remain in-process extensions outside the built-in Host schema; removing one resets the live registry without replacing the last durable built-in preference.

 ## Alternatives considered

@@ -12,13 +12,13 @@ Web 的 Appearance、Language 和繁忙态 Enter 偏好原本存在浏览器 `lo

 ## 决策

-各领域所属的 Host half 注册三份 schema：可选的 `locale.preference`（`zh` 或 `en`，缺失时交由浏览器决定）、`ui-theme.preference`（`light`、`dark` 或 `system`，默认为 `system`），以及 `ui-conversation.busyEnter`（`queue` 或 `steer`，默认为 `queue`）。本地 settings 提供方将显式选择存入 `$DSH_HOME/settings.yaml`，在使用默认 home 时，该路径解析为 `~/.dsh/settings.yaml`。API 代理会向回环客户端服务每一个已注册的 namespace；字段角色仍会脱敏机密值。
+各领域所属的 Host half 注册三份 schema：可选的 `locale.preference`（`zh` 或 `en`，缺失时交由浏览器决定）、`ui-theme.preference`（`light`、`dark` 或 `system`，默认为 `system`），以及 `ui-conversation.busyEnter`（`queue` 或 `steer`，默认为 `queue`）。本地 settings 提供方将显式选择存入 `$DSH_HOME/settings.yaml`，在使用默认 home 时，该路径解析为 `~/.dsh/settings.yaml`。API 代理在 Connection 浏览器认证之后服务每一个已注册的 namespace；字段角色仍会脱敏机密值。

 `dsh-client-ui-settings` 持有一个浏览器全局的 settings describe 镜像，并提供 `ctx.settingsScope.bind(spec)` 作为该镜像上的逐 namespace selector。镜像在开始后台读取之前安装 `settings/document-updated` 和 `connection/reset` 监听器，因此任何 settings 传输都不会阻塞插件激活，失效通知也不会掉入先读取、后订阅的空档。每个绑定的 scope 会发布一个供领域服务订阅的快照 store（状态、分节值、revision、可写性、host／内存模式），自身不再增加协议读取或监听器。默认解码器会对照该 namespace 自身的序列化 wire schema（经同包的 `ctx.settingsSchema` 服务还原）校验每个传入分节，因此各领域无需携带手写的 wire 校验器。领域服务把 scope 当作普通的构造函数协作者接收，立即发布各自的暂定默认值：由浏览器派生的 locale、系统主题和 Queue；随后采纳已获接受的 Host 分节，但不将其写回；不带 scope 构造的服务——独立词典或政策 fixture（测试前置数据）——则仅停留在进程本地。共享读取与失效生命周期由后续的 [settings describe 镜像决策](../architecture/2026-08-17-settings-describe-mirror.zh.md)规定。

 用户变更会同步更新实时服务，并经 `scope.set` 将一项 `settings.mutate` 路径操作排入队列。scope 会串行处理手势，以最新已知 namespace revision 作为 `expectedRevision` 发送，记录每次成功写入的 revision，并且只允许最新写入的结算结果重新发布实时状态。最新写入被拒或失败时，scope 会重新加载 Host 状态。插件释放会拒绝新工作、跳过已排队操作、抑制运行中操作发布状态，并等待该操作结算后才让插件达到完全停稳。

-远程浏览器无法调用仅限回环请求的配置 API，因此其偏好仅保留在进程内。动态第三方主题 id 仍是内置 Host schema 之外的进程内扩展；移除其中一个会重置实时注册表，但不会替换上一个持久化的内置偏好。
+Client 在非 loopback 页面禁用 Host 持久化，因此这些页面的偏好仍只保留在进程内，尽管 Connection 认证完整 API。动态第三方主题 id 仍是内置 Host schema 之外的进程内扩展；移除其中一个会重置实时注册表，但不会替换上一个持久化的内置偏好。

 ## 曾考虑的替代方案

@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-16-persistent-pty-sessions.md
-2026-07-16-persistent-pty-sessions.md: 3ca35cdd59f38570be478fddf4213335665556a5
-2026-07-16-persistent-pty-sessions.zh.md: a277a97fc73b8e8a901b6524918cdf4f9997461d
+2026-07-16-persistent-pty-sessions.md: 08ccf64586034b5a0524889f33da89213ac7275d
+2026-07-16-persistent-pty-sessions.zh.md: 5225d781fc8eba1fb4a6c7f4d3b5d4d87547b71d
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ With `run_in_background: true`, `dsh-tool-terminal` registers the in-flight send

 The local backend first recognizes a private OSC prompt marker emitted by its controlled bash startup, then requires the printable tail after the latest marker to exactly equal the controlled `PS1` before declaring prompt readiness and runs three bounded fallback tiers. Carrying that tail across data callbacks covers delivery where the marker and prompt arrive separately; requiring the exact tail rejects a delayed earlier prompt once echoed input or output follows it, so it cannot settle the current send. The marker is removed before output reaches the model and avoids a fixed silence delay for ordinary shell commands on both platforms. Unpublished startup does not accept zero-output silence as readiness; timeout rejects the spawn. If caller cancellation wins during startup, the backend closes the private session and propagates the exact `AbortSignal.reason`; a foreground PGID that is not observable yet cannot replace cancellation with a lookup error. All timings are validated config fields: `pollIntervalMs`, `exactProbeAfterMs`, `idleSilenceMs`, `handoffGraceMs`, and `timeoutMs`.

-On Linux, the inspector reads the shell's terminal foreground PGID from `/proc/<shellPid>/stat`, enumerates every process and thread in that process group, and probes their current syscalls. A positive Tier 1 result requires an observed stdin wait: direct `read(0)`, a permitted read of a `select`/`pselect6` or `poll`/`ppoll` argument containing fd 0, or an epoll interest list containing fd 0. A wait already present before terminal input is not post-write readiness: the same PGID must be observed outside that wait before re-entering it, while a changed foreground PGID is new evidence. Unreadable process memory and unrecognized syscalls are misses, never positive guesses. Architecture tables contain only syscall numbers defined by the corresponding Linux UAPI; unsupported architectures skip Tier 1.
+On Linux, the inspector reads the shell's terminal foreground PGID from `/proc/<shellPid>/stat`, enumerates every process and thread in that process group, and probes their current syscalls. A positive Tier 1 result requires an observed stdin wait: direct `read(0)`, a permitted read of a `select`/`pselect6` or `poll`/`ppoll` argument containing fd 0, or an epoll interest list containing fd 0. The waiting thread's `/proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/fd/0` must identify the shell's controlling terminal device, so a thread-local fd table cannot substitute its leader's terminal descriptor and a pipeline reader blocked on its pipe remains a running command. Direct PTY descriptors use their device number; `/dev/tty` uses the owning process's `tty_nr` because `stat` reports the alias device rather than the selected PTY. A wait already present before terminal input is not post-write readiness: the same PGID must be observed outside that wait before re-entering it, while a changed foreground PGID is new evidence. Unreadable process memory and unrecognized syscalls are misses, never positive guesses. A host policy that denies `/proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/syscall`, including hardened ptrace policy, likewise skips Tier 1 and preserves the bounded Tier 2 idle inference; process sleep state never substitutes for inaccessible syscall evidence. Architecture tables contain only syscall numbers defined by the corresponding Linux UAPI; the inspector admits the runtime architecture, then checks every supported kernel ABI because `/proc` can report a different ABI under user-mode emulation. Unsupported runtime architectures skip Tier 1.

 On macOS there is no exact syscall tier. Output silence returns `inferred_idle` for any foreground process group, including Python and `gdb`; `ps`-derived terminal PGID is used for signaling, not as proof that only the shell can be idle. Pure process-inspector logic is injectable and unit-tested on Linux, while a macOS CI job exercises the real PTY and process-table path.

@@ -157,9 +157,9 @@ The package ships concise tool guidance explaining persistent state, owner isola
 ## Verification

 - Per-file coverage pins owner fencing, concurrent reservations, cancellation during pre-write inspection, unpublished-spawn cancellation and awaited teardown, sandbox-mode change rejection, retriable lifecycle cleanup, readiness tiers, rejection of pre-write stdin waits and delayed earlier prompts, the configured handoff grace holding the idle fallback past one poll and its rejection below `pollIntervalMs`, sanitizer carry state, complete UTF-8 bounds, task integration, schemas, and exact render intents.
- Subprocess process fixtures cover non-leader and non-main-thread stdin waits, zombie quiescence, unreadable process state, supported syscall tables, unsupported architectures, and false-positive rejection; macOS inspector logic is injected into the same unit suite.
- Real `node-pty` and PTY-consumer tests jointly exercise shell state, shared sandbox policy, environment scrubbing, raw-mode foreground `SIGINT`, a TERM-ignoring descendant, and immediate post-disposal quiescence on supported hosts.
- A Loader-driven `cordis.yml` test mounts the real three-package composition. ACP and headless snapshots pin the six schemas, bounded results, and errors through opt-in overlays; TUI snapshots pin terminal and generic card presentation.
+- Subprocess process fixtures cover non-leader and non-main-thread stdin waits, thread-local fd tables, the `/dev/tty` alias, supported kernel ABIs under user-mode emulation, rejection of fd 0 backed by a pipe, zombie quiescence, unreadable process state, unsupported architectures, and other false-positive rejection; macOS inspector logic is injected into the same unit suite.
+- Real `node-pty` and PTY-consumer tests jointly exercise shell state, controlling-terminal input through `/dev/tty`, the exact attribution when process syscalls are readable, its bounded idle fallback when host policy denies them, shared sandbox policy, environment scrubbing, raw-mode foreground `SIGINT`, a TERM-ignoring descendant, and immediate post-disposal quiescence on supported hosts.
+- A Loader-driven `cordis.yml` test mounts the real three-package composition and verifies that delayed pipeline output returns with the completed command instead of being classified as terminal-input readiness. The SDK minimal snapshot pins that output through the persistent Bash tool; ACP and headless snapshots pin the six terminal schemas, bounded results, and errors through opt-in overlays; TUI snapshots pin terminal and generic card presentation.
 - Package contracts, the architecture map, subsystem pages, generated catalogs, and the website API describe the same shipped surface.

 ## Consequences
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ UI 渲染约定精确且不携带位置信息。`terminal_send` 只为前台发

 本地后端先识别受控 bash 启动时发出的私有 OSC prompt marker，并且只有在最近一个 marker 后的可打印尾部与受控 `PS1` 完全相等时才声明 prompt 就绪；除此之外，它还运行 3 个有界 fallback 层级。在 data callback 之间保留该尾部，可以适配 marker 与 prompt 被分开交付的情况；如果回显的输入或输出跟在延迟到达的先前 prompt 之后，要求尾部完全相等会拒绝该 prompt，使其无法完成当前 send。marker 在输出到达模型前被移除，使两个平台上的普通 shell 命令都无需固定等待静默阈值。尚未发布的 startup 不会把零输出静默视为就绪；timeout 会拒绝 spawn。若调用方取消在 startup 期间胜出，后端会关闭私有会话并原样抛出 `AbortSignal.reason`；尚不可观察的前台 PGID 不会再用查找错误覆盖取消原因。所有时间参数都是经校验的配置字段：`pollIntervalMs`、`exactProbeAfterMs`、`idleSilenceMs`、`handoffGraceMs` 和 `timeoutMs`。

-在 Linux 上，检查器从 `/proc/<shellPid>/stat` 读取 shell 的终端前台 PGID，枚举该进程组中的每个进程与线程，并检查它们当前的 syscall。Tier 1 只有观察到 stdin 等待才返回正结果：直接 `read(0)`、获准读取且含 fd 0 的 `select`/`pselect6` 或 `poll`/`ppoll` 参数，或者含 fd 0 的 epoll interest list。终端输入前就已存在的等待并不代表写入后就绪：必须先观察到同一 PGID 脱离该等待，之后再次进入等待才能使该次 send 完成；前台 PGID 发生变化则构成新的证据。无法读取的进程内存和未识别的 syscall 都是 miss，绝不作为正向猜测。架构表只包含对应 Linux UAPI 定义的 syscall number；不支持的架构跳过 Tier 1。
+在 Linux 上，检查器从 `/proc/<shellPid>/stat` 读取 shell 的终端前台 PGID，枚举该进程组中的每个进程与线程，并检查它们当前的 syscall。Tier 1 只有观察到 stdin 等待才返回正结果：直接 `read(0)`、获准读取且含 fd 0 的 `select`/`pselect6` 或 `poll`/`ppoll` 参数，或者含 fd 0 的 epoll interest list。等待线程的 `/proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/fd/0` 还必须标识 shell 的控制终端设备，因此线程本地 fd 表无法用 leader 的终端描述符冒充自身 fd，阻塞于管道的流水线读取端仍属于正在运行的命令。直接 PTY 描述符使用其设备号；`/dev/tty` 则使用所属进程的 `tty_nr`，因为 `stat` 报告的是别名设备而非选定的 PTY。终端输入前就已存在的等待并不代表写入后就绪：必须先观察到同一 PGID 脱离该等待，之后再次进入等待才能使该次 send 完成；前台 PGID 发生变化则构成新的证据。无法读取的进程内存和未识别的 syscall 都是 miss，绝不作为正向猜测。宿主策略（包括加固的 ptrace 策略）若拒绝读取 `/proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/syscall`，同样会跳过 Tier 1 并保留有界的 Tier 2 idle 推断；进程休眠状态绝不会代替不可访问的 syscall 证据。架构表只包含对应 Linux UAPI 定义的 syscall number；检查器先准入运行时架构，再检查每个受支持的内核 ABI，因为在用户态模拟下，`/proc` 可能报告不同的 ABI。不受支持的运行时架构会跳过 Tier 1。

 macOS 没有精确 syscall 层。任何前台进程组输出静默都会返回 `inferred_idle`，包括 Python 和 `gdb`；从 `ps` 推导的终端 PGID 只用于发送信号，不作为「只有 shell 才能 idle」的证明。纯进程检查逻辑可注入，并在 Linux 上经过单元测试，同时由 macOS CI job 驱动真实 PTY 和进程表路径。

@@ -157,9 +157,9 @@ plugins:
 ## 验证

 - 逐文件覆盖测试锁定了 owner 隔离、并发预留、写入前检查期间的取消、未发布 spawn 的取消与等待式 teardown、沙箱模式变更拒绝、可重试的生命周期清理、就绪层级、对写入前 stdin 等待与延迟到达的先前 prompt 的拒绝、配置化交接宽限把 idle fallback 顶过一次轮询以及低于 `pollIntervalMs` 时的拒绝、sanitizer carry state、完整 UTF-8 结果上限、task 集成、schema 和精确 render intent。
- 子进程 fixture（测试前置数据）覆盖非 leader 与非主线程的 stdin 等待、僵尸进程完全停稳、不可读进程状态、受支持的 syscall 表、不支持的架构和误报拒绝；同一单元测试套件通过注入覆盖 macOS 检查器逻辑。
- 真实 `node-pty` 与 PTY 消费方测试共同在受支持宿主上覆盖 shell 状态、共享沙箱策略、环境清洗、raw mode 前台 `SIGINT`、忽略 `SIGTERM` 的后代进程，以及 dispose 返回后立即完全停稳。
- Loader 驱动的 `cordis.yml` 测试挂载真实三包组合。ACP 与 headless 快照通过 opt-in overlay 固定 6 个 schema、有界结果和错误；TUI 快照固定 terminal 与 generic 卡片展示。
+- 子进程 fixture（测试前置数据）覆盖非 leader 与非主线程的 stdin 等待、线程本地 fd 表、`/dev/tty` 别名、用户态模拟下受支持的内核 ABI、拒绝把指向管道的 fd 0 当作终端输入、僵尸进程完全停稳、不可读进程状态、不支持的架构和其他误报拒绝；同一单元测试套件通过注入覆盖 macOS 检查器逻辑。
+- 真实 `node-pty` 与 PTY 消费方测试共同在受支持宿主上覆盖 shell 状态、通过 `/dev/tty` 读取控制终端输入、进程 syscall 可读时的精确归因、宿主策略拒绝读取时的有界 idle fallback、共享沙箱策略、环境清洗、raw mode 前台 `SIGINT`、忽略 `SIGTERM` 的后代进程，以及 dispose 返回后立即完全停稳。
+- Loader 驱动的 `cordis.yml` 测试挂载真实三包组合，并验证延迟到达的流水线输出随已完成命令返回，而不会被归类为终端输入就绪。SDK minimal 快照通过持久 Bash 工具固定该输出；ACP 与 headless 快照通过 opt-in overlay 固定 6 个终端 schema、有界结果和错误；TUI 快照固定 terminal 与 generic 卡片展示。
 - 包约定、架构图、子系统页面、生成目录和 website API 描述同一个已发布接口。

 ## 后果
@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-22-web-bind-address.md
-2026-07-22-web-bind-address.md: 3332176c0cee940648ad334a44edd30879225503
-2026-07-22-web-bind-address.zh.md: 5ad73b8916d9cedce1073f4a2d025f40197b7d65
+2026-07-22-web-bind-address.md: 68275d220f2270ef924efdbc6a72f3dfcbfd10f8
+2026-07-22-web-bind-address.zh.md: 5bb4fdbbc3e58285b0d227c3ec376786be2782da
@@ -6,15 +6,15 @@ English | [中文](2026-07-22-web-bind-address.zh.md)

 ## Problem

-`dsh web` binds every network interface even when its browser runs on the same machine. Local use therefore exposes an unauthenticated development server without an explicit operator choice, while remote-container and LAN-browser use still needs a supported way to accept non-loopback connections.
+The Web application can run commands with the Host user's authority. Same-machine use needs only loopback reachability, while an all-interface CLI mode would imply a supported network deployment without TLS or a defined proxy contract.

 The HTTP carrier also hides the bind address inside `startWebServer()`, so alternate shells cannot state their own network policy at the package boundary.

 ## Decision

-`dsh web` binds `127.0.0.1` by default. The CLI accepts `--host 0.0.0.0` as the explicit all-interface mode and rejects other values so its network modes remain a small, deliberate contract. All-interface mode keeps printing the loopback URL and, when available, the first external IPv4 URL.
+`dsh web` binds `127.0.0.1` and rejects `--host 0.0.0.0`; the CLI exposes no network mode. The process-token and browser-cookie authentication does not broaden that deployment contract ([decision](../architecture/2026-08-24-browser-token-authentication.md)).

-`WebServerOptions.host` is required. The HTTP carrier passes that value to `node:http` without supplying a fallback, leaving each shell responsible for its bind policy. Programmatic carrier consumers may select another hostname or address directly.
+`WebServer` still requires `host: '127.0.0.1' | '0.0.0.0'` and passes it to `node:http` without a fallback. The generic carrier leaves custom composition policy visible at its package interface; the product CLI owns the stricter loopback choice.

 ## Alternatives considered

@@ -22,8 +22,10 @@ The HTTP carrier also hides the bind address inside `startWebServer()`, so alter

 **Use a boolean exposure flag.** Rejected because `--host 0.0.0.0` names the resulting socket behavior directly and matches the underlying server option without introducing a second term.

+**Keep an explicit `--host 0.0.0.0` mode.** Rejected because authentication alone does not supply TLS, forwarding semantics, or a supported remote-deployment contract for the tool-capable Host.
+
 **Default inside `startWebServer()`.** Rejected because the carrier has multiple possible shells and no basis for choosing their deployment policy. Requiring `host` makes the choice visible at every assembly call.

 ## Consequences

-Local `dsh web` starts remain reachable at `http://127.0.0.1:3080`; a browser on another machine must opt in with `dsh web --host 0.0.0.0`. The CLI does not yet expose custom interface addresses or IPv6 modes, while programmatic carrier consumers retain that flexibility. Server tests pin both loopback and all-interface forwarding into the Node listen boundary, and the web smoke continues to exercise the default CLI path.
+Local `dsh web` starts remain reachable at `http://127.0.0.1:3080`. The CLI exposes no custom interface, all-interface, or IPv6 mode; custom WebServer compositions retain the carrier's two-address choice and own every consequence. Server tests pin both carrier values into Node listen, while CLI tests pin rejection of the all-interface flag.
@@ -6,15 +6,15 @@ Status: implemented

 ## 问题

-即便浏览器与服务器运行在同一台机器上，`dsh web` 也会绑定所有网络接口。因此，本地使用会在操作者未明确选择的情况下暴露一个未经身份验证的开发服务器；另一方面，远程容器和局域网浏览器场景仍需要一种受支持的方式来接受非环回连接。
+Web 应用可以用 Host 用户的 authority 运行命令。同机使用只需要 loopback 可达性；CLI 若提供全接口模式，就会在没有 TLS 或明确代理约定时暗示支持网络部署。

 HTTP 承载层还把绑定地址隐藏在 `startWebServer()` 内部，导致其他壳层无法在包边界明确表达自己的网络策略。

 ## 决策

-`dsh web` 默认绑定 `127.0.0.1`。CLI（命令行界面）接受 `--host 0.0.0.0` 作为显式启用的全接口模式，并拒绝其他取值，使网络模式保持为一份规模小、经过审慎限定的约定。全接口模式仍然输出本机环回 URL，并在可用时输出第一个外部 IPv4 URL。
+`dsh web` 绑定 `127.0.0.1` 并拒绝 `--host 0.0.0.0`；CLI 不开放网络模式。进程令牌与浏览器 cookie 认证不扩大该部署约定（[决策](../architecture/2026-08-24-browser-token-authentication.zh.md)）。

-`WebServerOptions.host` 为必填项。HTTP 承载层将该值直接传给 `node:http`，不提供回退值，因此每个壳层负责制定自己的绑定策略。以编程方式使用承载层的消费方可以直接选择其他主机名或地址。
+`WebServer` 仍要求 `host: '127.0.0.1' | '0.0.0.0'`，并在没有 fallback 的情况下传给 `node:http`。通用承载层让自定义组合策略显式留在包接口上；产品 CLI 持有更严格的 loopback 选择。

 ## 曾考虑的替代方案

@@ -22,8 +22,10 @@ HTTP 承载层还把绑定地址隐藏在 `startWebServer()` 内部，导致其

 **使用布尔型暴露标志。** 不予采纳，因为 `--host 0.0.0.0` 直接说明最终的套接字行为，并与底层服务器选项一致，无需再引入第二套术语。

+**保留显式 `--host 0.0.0.0` 模式。** 不予采纳，因为仅有认证并不能为工具型 Host 提供 TLS、转发语义或受支持的远程部署约定。
+
 **在 `startWebServer()` 内设置默认值。** 不予采纳，因为承载层可能由多种壳层调用，没有依据替它们选择部署策略。要求传入 `host`，可使每次装配调用都明确作出这一选择。

 ## 后果

-`dsh web` 的本地启动仍可通过 `http://127.0.0.1:3080` 访问；其他机器上的浏览器必须使用 `dsh web --host 0.0.0.0` 显式启用。CLI 尚未开放自定义接口地址或 IPv6 模式，而以编程方式使用承载层的消费方仍保留这种灵活性。服务器测试将环回模式和全接口模式向 Node 监听边界的传递固定为约定，Web 冒烟测试继续覆盖默认 CLI 路径。
+`dsh web` 的本地启动仍可通过 `http://127.0.0.1:3080` 访问。CLI 不开放自定义接口、全接口或 IPv6 模式；自定义 WebServer 组合保留承载层的两个地址选择并自行承担全部后果。服务器测试固定两个承载值都会进入 Node listen，CLI 测试则固定全接口 flag 被拒绝。
@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-28-tool-call-file-open-in-os.md
-2026-07-28-tool-call-file-open-in-os.md: 08fc51cc3a5d2fb43b67dc158fd1ee789fafdb68
-2026-07-28-tool-call-file-open-in-os.zh.md: c99a99dcd91a8cfabbbc381af79bb3570f4295f6
+2026-07-28-tool-call-file-open-in-os.md: e6e590b2a97654b8b68d5a9842de10818f544088
+2026-07-28-tool-call-file-open-in-os.zh.md: eb600a69cb2a2c3cc0d7463519d3de4dce76047b
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ File-tool path summaries (`read` / `write` / `edit` args carrying `path` or `fil

 ## Consequences

-Clicking a file path in a tool row opens that path on the host. Non-file tool rows are inert summaries (expand toggles remain where the row already supported them). Remote or non-loopback clients cannot invoke `host.openPath`. A Host or OS refusal is owned by the chat view: it shows the thrown reason and retries the same path ([file-open failure](../bug-fix/2026-08-18-tool-row-file-open-failure.md)).
+Clicking a file path in a tool row opens that path on the host. Non-file tool rows are inert summaries (expand toggles remain where the row already supported them). The Client withholds `host.openPath` on non-loopback pages; every exposed Host invocation still requires the browser session. A Host or OS refusal is owned by the chat view: it shows the thrown reason and retries the same path ([file-open failure](../bug-fix/2026-08-18-tool-row-file-open-failure.md)).

 ## Risks

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ Status: implemented

 文件工具的路径摘要（`read`／`write`／`edit` 参数中的 `path` 或 `file_path`）渲染为静止状态下即带下划线的链接，并使用 pointer 光标。点击路径会经 `WorkspaceRuntime.openPath` 调用 `host.openPath`，相对路径以会话 cwd 为基准解析。带文件链接的行关闭参数展开（左侧图标不可点）；工具行（含 bash 与 todo 注册）去掉整行点击、整行悬停底色，以及点击打开 details 的手势。details 面板及其 inject 面仍保留供程序化选择；工具行不再驱动它们。

-`host.openPath` 是特权一元 RPC，仅接受来自回环地址且同源的浏览器请求（与 `host.pickDirectory` 相同的载体守卫）。平台适配器不经 shell 打开：macOS 为 `open`，Windows 为 PowerShell `Invoke-Item`，桌面 Linux 为 `xdg-open`；浏览器可渲染的文档会在 macOS 与桌面 Linux 上优先使用指定的默认浏览器。尽管 Node 将 WSL 报告为 `linux`，WSL 仍是一种独立的宿主形态：适配器根据其环境或 Microsoft 内核 release 识别它，用 `wslpath -w` 转换 Linux 路径，并将所得 Windows/UNC 路径交给同一 PowerShell 交接。打开器的平台信息和命令运行器可在测试中注入。仅含 URL 的 read 参数（`web_fetch`）不是文件链接。
+`host.openPath` 是一元 RPC，与每个 Host API 方法一样要求通过 Host/Origin 校验和浏览器会话认证。平台适配器不经 shell 打开：macOS 为 `open`，Windows 为 PowerShell `Invoke-Item`，桌面 Linux 为 `xdg-open`；浏览器可渲染的文档会在 macOS 与桌面 Linux 上优先使用指定的默认浏览器。尽管 Node 将 WSL 报告为 `linux`，WSL 仍是一种独立的宿主形态：适配器根据其环境或 Microsoft 内核 release 识别它，用 `wslpath -w` 转换 Linux 路径，并将所得 Windows/UNC 路径交给同一 PowerShell 交接。打开器的平台信息和命令运行器可在测试中注入。仅含 URL 的 read 参数（`web_fetch`）不是文件链接。

 ## 考虑过的替代方案

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ Status: implemented

 ## 后果

-点击工具行中的文件路径会在宿主上打开该路径。非文件工具行只是不可交互的摘要（行内已有的展开开关仍保留）。远程或非回环客户端无法调用 `host.openPath`。Host 或操作系统拒绝由聊天视图拥有：它展示抛出的原因，并对同一路径提供重试（[打开失败](../bug-fix/2026-08-18-tool-row-file-open-failure.zh.md)）。
+点击工具行中的文件路径会在宿主上打开该路径。非文件工具行只是不可交互的摘要（行内已有的展开开关仍保留）。Client 在非 loopback 页面不提供 `host.openPath`；每次已暴露的 Host 调用仍要求浏览器会话。Host 或操作系统拒绝由聊天视图拥有：它展示抛出的原因，并对同一路径提供重试（[打开失败](../bug-fix/2026-08-18-tool-row-file-open-failure.zh.md)）。

 ## 风险

@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-13-shared-modal-product-onboarding.md
-2026-08-13-shared-modal-product-onboarding.md: ec3d3e5f112b04736a15645c6e62e942367bb4fa
-2026-08-13-shared-modal-product-onboarding.zh.md: 78b17d02dba52170722042126cc5616e9272c722
+2026-08-13-shared-modal-product-onboarding.md: 9f72ee5b4e2abd8dd9ad70c819976be73f3f8116
+2026-08-13-shared-modal-product-onboarding.zh.md: 867b23202f2e15701d72dd5e11cbe6ff2346ef11
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ First-run onboarding mixed two interaction models: a viewport takeover for produ

 **Both steps share one modal component.** `OnboardingModal` wraps the existing ui-primitives `Modal`, supplies the common title and content geometry, and owns `#root` inert for exactly the visible lifetime. Escape and mask clicks do not silently complete mandatory onboarding; each step exposes only its explicit actions. A step still loading private facts returns `null`, so it paints and blocks nothing.

-**The welcome notice reuses the existing durable field.** Its exact copy and version live in `onboarding-copy.ts`. Loopback clients compare and write `ui-onboarding.welcomeNoticeVersion` through the existing settings API, and only Continue acknowledges the current version. Remote clients retain the existing process-local fallback because the settings namespace is loopback-only. No Host schema, API-proxy allowlist, or persistence implementation changes.
+**The welcome notice reuses the existing durable field.** Its exact copy and version live in `onboarding-copy.ts`. Loopback clients compare and write `ui-onboarding.welcomeNoticeVersion` through the existing settings API, and only Continue acknowledges the current version. Non-loopback pages retain the existing process-local fallback because the Client keeps Host settings persistence disabled there. No Host schema, API-proxy allowlist, or persistence implementation changes.

 **The credential dialog reuses the existing editor and write boundary.** The Models join still decides whether any provider is usable. When the official DeepSeek reference is writable and missing, `ProviderEditor` renders in credential-only mode inside the shared modal. It validates the key and calls the existing `credentials.set`; it does not mutate provider settings. Save and continue waits for the write and refreshed readiness, while Configure later completes only the current coordinator pass.

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ Status: implemented

 **两个步骤共用同一个弹窗组件。** `OnboardingModal` 包装既有 ui-primitives `Modal`，提供统一的标题和内容布局，并只在可见期间持有 `#root` 的 inert 状态。Escape 和遮罩点击不会静默完成强制引导；每个步骤只暴露自己的明确操作。步骤仍在加载私有事实时返回 `null`，因此不会绘制或阻塞界面。

-**欢迎声明复用既有持久化字段。** 完整文案与版本由 `onboarding-copy.ts` 持有。回环客户端通过既有 settings API 比较和写入 `ui-onboarding.welcomeNoticeVersion`，且只有点击「继续」才确认当前版本。远程客户端继续使用既有的进程内回退，因为该 settings namespace 仅限回环访问。不改变 Host schema、API Proxy 允许列表或持久化实现。
+**欢迎声明复用既有持久化字段。** 完整文案与版本由 `onboarding-copy.ts` 持有。回环客户端通过既有 settings API 比较和写入 `ui-onboarding.welcomeNoticeVersion`，且只有点击「继续」才确认当前版本。非 loopback 页面继续使用既有的进程内回退，因为 Client 在那里禁用 Host settings 持久化。不改变 Host schema、API Proxy 允许列表或持久化实现。

 **凭据弹窗复用既有编辑器与写入边界。** Models 联接仍负责判断是否已有任意可用提供方。当 DeepSeek 官方引用可写但缺失时，`ProviderEditor` 以仅凭据模式渲染在共用弹窗中。它校验密钥并调用既有 `credentials.set`，不会修改提供方设置。「保存并继续」会等待写入与就绪状态刷新；「稍后配置」只完成协调器当前这一轮。

@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/simplification/2026-08-08-copy-only-preset-authoring.md
-2026-08-08-copy-only-preset-authoring.md: c16518b087c7acedbee3d89ce5cc8dbcaa0a0cde
-2026-08-08-copy-only-preset-authoring.zh.md: 63a184f5825530a2c99a26b8afa606412decab6e
+2026-08-08-copy-only-preset-authoring.md: bfe0d49755abf47314a7b4cf56c738537fca3963
+2026-08-08-copy-only-preset-authoring.zh.md: 71e83d5e17c56e53ce4f4678b5a22baaed02be31
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ Authoring is a host-side copy, and files are the editor. `agentPreset.write` bec

 ## Consequences

- No composition text and no path crosses the browser wire in either authoring direction; the `entryListSchema`/`!!js` concern dissolves with `assertComposition` itself (deleted). The privileged set is now `read`/`copy`/`openDocument`/`remove` — none accepts a filesystem target.
+- No composition text and no path crosses the browser wire in either authoring direction; the `entryListSchema`/`!!js` concern dissolves with `assertComposition` itself (deleted). The authoring operations are `read`/`copy`/`openDocument`/`remove` — none accepts a filesystem target, and Connection authenticates them with the complete Host API.
 - With the editor gone, hand-editing `agent.cordis.yml` is the ONLY composition edit, so the standing-mount layer grew stamp-keyed generations: `ensureStanding` compares the file's mtime+size and starts the next generation for later sessions ([standing-mounts note](../architecture/2026-08-08-per-preset-standing-mounts.md), updated in place). Without this, an edited file would serve stale compositions until process restart.
 - A copy is a full snapshot that drifts from an upgraded shipped source — accepted; the preset layer has no patch semantics (that is the bundle layer's `cordis.patch.yml`), and the shipped set itself pays the same cost (`cordis`/`code` are full copies of `standard`) for one-file readability.
 - `read` dropped `writable` (no editor to gate) and builtin directories are never opened (`openDocument` refuses non-`user` trust like `remove`): the install is overwritten by upgrades, and pointing an editor into it invites edits an upgrade silently discards.
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ Authoring is a host-side copy, and files are the editor. `agentPreset.write` bec
 ## Load-bearing details

 - **Copy target refusal is two checks on purpose.** The roster check refuses any id a root supplies — a user directory named like a shipped preset would be shadowed, so "create" would land a file nothing ever lists; the disk check (`PresetExistsError` before `cp` with `errorOnExist` as the race backstop) refuses a directory occupying the name without being a preset, which discovery cannot see.
- **The revealed path is response-direction disclosure, loopback-pinned.** The invariant "no browser payload can select an arbitrary filesystem target" is about the request direction; showing the resolved directory to the loopback user is the fallback the plan requires. It never rides the unprivileged `list`.
+- **The revealed path is response-direction disclosure, browser-authenticated.** The invariant "no browser payload can select an arbitrary filesystem target" is about the request direction; showing the resolved directory to the authenticated browser is the fallback the plan requires. It never rides `list`.
 - **The e2e lane pins `nativeOpen: false`** (`agent-preset-authoring.overlay.yml`) — both so goldens render the same branch on macOS dev and headless Linux CI, and so test runs never pop a real file manager. The revealed directory is tokenized as `{{presetRoot}}` by the lane itself, since `normalizeAria` only knows the workspace cwd.

 ## Alternatives considered
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ agent-preset 设置页带着一个网页 YAML 编辑器：`agentPreset.write`

 ## 后果

- 创作两个方向都不再有组装文本或路径跨越浏览器传输层；`entryListSchema`/`!!js` 的顾虑随 `assertComposition` 本身（已删除）一并消解。特权集现为 `read`/`copy`/`openDocument`/`remove`——没有一个接收文件系统目标。
+- 创作两个方向都没有组装文本或路径跨越浏览器传输层；`entryListSchema`/`!!js` 的顾虑随 `assertComposition` 本身（已删除）一并消解。创作操作是 `read`/`copy`/`openDocument`/`remove`——没有一个接收文件系统目标，且 Connection 用完整 Host API 的同一会话认证它们。
 - 编辑器移除后，手改 `agent.cordis.yml` 成为唯一的组装编辑方式，因此常驻挂载层增加了以 stamp 为键的代际：`ensureStanding` 比对文件的 mtime+大小，为后续会话开启下一代际（[常驻挂载 note](../architecture/2026-08-08-per-preset-standing-mounts.zh.md)，已就地更新）。没有它，改过的文件要等进程重启才生效。
 - 副本是完整快照，会随随附来源升级而漂移——接受；preset 层没有 patch 语义（那是 bundle 层 `cordis.patch.yml` 的能力），随附集合自己也为「一个文件读完整份组装」付了同样的代价（`cordis`/`code` 就是 `standard` 的完整副本）。
 - `read` 去掉了 `writable`（没有编辑器可门控），内置目录绝不被打开（`openDocument` 与 `remove` 一样拒绝非 `user` 信任）：安装目录会被升级覆盖，把编辑器指向它等于招揽会被升级悄悄丢弃的编辑。
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ agent-preset 设置页带着一个网页 YAML 编辑器：`agentPreset.write`
 ## 关键实现细节

 - **复制目标的拒绝刻意分两道检查。** roster 检查拒绝任一根目录提供的 id——与随附 preset 同名的用户目录会被遮蔽，「创建」只会落下一个永远不被列出的文件；磁盘检查（`cp` 之前的 `PresetExistsError`，`errorOnExist` 作竞态兜底）拒绝占着名字却不是 preset 的目录，那是 discovery 看不见的。
- **展示的路径是响应方向的披露，且钉在环回。**「没有任何浏览器载荷能选中任意文件系统目标」这条不变量说的是请求方向；把解析出的目录展示给环回用户正是方案要求的降级。它绝不搭乘非特权的 `list`。
+- **展示的路径是响应方向的披露，且经过浏览器认证。**「没有任何浏览器载荷能选中任意文件系统目标」这条不变量说的是请求方向；把解析出的目录展示给已认证浏览器正是方案要求的降级。它绝不搭乘 `list`。
 - **e2e lane 钉死 `nativeOpen: false`**（`agent-preset-authoring.overlay.yml`）——既让 golden 在 macOS 开发机与无头 Linux CI 上渲染同一分支，也让测试运行永不弹出真实文件管理器。揭示的目录由 lane 自己 token 化为 `{{presetRoot}}`，因为 `normalizeAria` 只认识 workspace cwd。

 ## 考虑过的替代方案
@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/proposed/architecture/2026-08-10-unary-apiproxy-remote-migration.md
-2026-08-10-unary-apiproxy-remote-migration.md: c4a308e16bee994df69f16228e859dd88d90c346
-2026-08-10-unary-apiproxy-remote-migration.zh.md: db263e1a7843963cf38082a88405453ee4b66af7
+2026-08-10-unary-apiproxy-remote-migration.md: cd019ef10c6d584a98b185ac50856a3fe63b8bd0
+2026-08-10-unary-apiproxy-remote-migration.zh.md: e6842cc82cfd7f850bb58e9d640ec23394287427
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ Moving a method mechanically is not sufficient. Agent-bound API Proxy methods ca

 The API Proxy also contains BFF operations whose contract is not a business method: Session lifecycle and transcript assembly, model-selection state, live-only input control, configuration filtering, skill presentation, Host composition facts, and native desktop operations. Stateful interactions and streams have different lifecycles again. Treating all unary syntax as evidence that a method is simple would move product policy into arbitrary Service packages or force new packages that have no independent business owner.

-Finally, Connection currently applies its loopback-only privileged-method list inside the API Proxy fallback. A Typert interceptor claims its endpoint before that fallback, so migrating credential or preset authoring calls without moving the privilege check would grant trusted-LAN callers operations that are currently loopback-only.
+Finally, Connection must authenticate a request before choosing the API Proxy fallback or a Typert interceptor. A migration that authenticates only the fallback would let Remote-owned endpoints bypass the browser identity required by every Host operation.

 ## Proposal

@@ -76,14 +76,9 @@ Generated Remote methods return business values and throw an Error whose `cause`

 Resolver-owned `session-not-found` and `agent-busy` errors remain stable because the shared resolver raises `TypertLookupFailure`. Ordinary business exceptions become the Gateway's existing `internal` RPC failure. A selected Client consumer may migrate only if it does not branch on a more specific legacy business error code; if implementation finds such a branch, that RPC leaves this set unless the business package gains a transport-independent typed failure.

-## Privileged authority
+## Browser authentication

-Connection must enforce privileged endpoint authority before choosing the Typert interceptor or API Proxy fallback. The check must recognize both legacy dotted names and Remote slash endpoints and keep these migrated operations loopback-only:
-
- `agentPresets/readDocument`, `agentPresets/copy`, and `agentPresets/remove`;
- `credentials/describe`, `credentials/set`, and `credentials/unset`.
-
-The carrier-wide trusted-host and origin checks remain unchanged. This is a non-escalation requirement: endpoint ownership may change, but the set of callers authorized to invoke the operation may not widen.
+Connection authenticates the complete `/api` request before choosing the Typert interceptor or API Proxy fallback. Legacy dotted names and Remote slash endpoints therefore use the same process-token-established browser session without an endpoint list. This is a non-escalation requirement: endpoint ownership may change, but an unauthenticated request can reach neither dispatch path.

 ## Commit boundaries

@@ -101,14 +96,14 @@ The final commit generates every `/remote` artifact from a clean state, updates

 **Preserve every legacy RPC name and response envelope.** That would turn business packages into copies of the old protocol. Service-oriented names and business values let the Client own joins while Connection continues to own the one RPC envelope.

-**Trust the API Proxy fallback to enforce privileged methods.** Interceptor selection bypasses that fallback, so this would silently widen authority for migrated methods.
+**Trust the API Proxy fallback to authenticate requests.** Interceptor selection bypasses that fallback, so Remote methods would become anonymously callable.

 ## Acceptance criteria

 - Every migration-table method is callable through its listed `ctx.remote` Service and has no production legacy API Proxy route, schema, map row, client stub, or invocation.
 - Existing methods with matching signatures carry `@Remote` directly; every added method performs the adaptation stated in the table and no identity `remote*` wrapper remains.
 - Agent/Session integration tests prove the shared lookup outcomes, and subagent interrupt tests prove no cold resume occurs.
- Privileged migrated endpoints reject trusted non-loopback callers and accept loopback callers before either dispatch path runs.
+- Migrated endpoints reject unauthenticated requests and accept the same valid browser session as legacy endpoints before either dispatch path runs.
 - Client behavior and immediate state settlement remain equivalent for every migrated call, including cancellation where supported.
 - Deferred methods remain on the API Proxy with their existing behavior.
 - A clean generation/build produces and consumes every selected Remote contribution, and focused tests plus final repository gates pass.
@@ -119,6 +114,6 @@ Removing legacy schemas also removes their protocol-specific error taxonomy. A h

 Generated Remote contracts add build ordering and publication entries to each business package. Missing one runtime mount, declaration export, source-map source, package dependency, or Project Reference can pass a narrow source test while failing a clean Client build.

-Moving privilege enforcement to composite dispatch changes security-sensitive carrier code. Tests must exercise both a Remote-owned endpoint and a legacy fallback endpoint so neither path can bypass the loopback decision.
+Composite dispatch changes security-sensitive carrier code. Tests must exercise both a Remote-owned endpoint and a legacy fallback endpoint so neither path can bypass browser authentication.

-This note applies the existing Typert Remote architecture rather than superseding it. It partially supersedes the central unary ownership and five-step extension checklist in the [GUI RPC protocol note](../../implemented/architecture/2026-07-19-gui-layering-and-rpc-protocol.md) and the central wiring inventory in the [Web configuration plane note](../../implemented/architecture/2026-07-30-web-config-plane.md); those notes remain authoritative for Connection envelopes and configuration behavior outside the migrated methods. The title, command, configuration-boundary, subagent-interrupt, and archive notes continue to own their business behavior and require factual transport updates rather than archival. The [browser trust boundary](../../implemented/architecture/2026-07-28-api-browser-trust-boundary.md) and [generated-contract build order](../../implemented/process/2026-08-08-api-remotes-generated-contract-build.md) remain authoritative and require no archival action.
+This note applies the existing Typert Remote architecture rather than superseding it. It partially supersedes the central unary ownership and five-step extension checklist in the [GUI RPC protocol note](../../implemented/architecture/2026-07-19-gui-layering-and-rpc-protocol.md) and the central wiring inventory in the [Web configuration plane note](../../implemented/architecture/2026-07-30-web-config-plane.md); those notes remain authoritative for Connection envelopes and configuration behavior outside the migrated methods. The title, command, configuration-boundary, subagent-interrupt, and archive notes continue to own their business behavior and require factual transport updates rather than archival. The [browser trust boundary](../../implemented/architecture/2026-07-28-api-browser-trust-boundary.md), [browser authentication](../../implemented/architecture/2026-08-24-browser-token-authentication.md), and [generated-contract build order](../../implemented/process/2026-08-08-api-remotes-generated-contract-build.md) remain authoritative and require no archival action.
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ Host API Proxy 仍承载许多一元方法。这些方法的实现仅执行服

 API Proxy 还包含一些不以业务方法为约定的 BFF 操作：Session 生命周期与 transcript（文本记录）组装、模型选择状态、仅限 live 的输入控制、配置过滤、skill（技能）呈现、Host 组合信息和原生桌面操作。有状态交互与流又具有不同的生命周期。若把一元调用的语法一概视为方法简单的依据，就会把产品策略移入任意服务包，或者迫使系统新增没有独立业务所有者的包。

-最后，Connection 目前在 API Proxy 回退路径内执行仅限环回地址的特权方法清单。Typert interceptor 会先于该回退路径认领自己的端点，因此，如果迁移凭据或 preset 创作调用时不一并迁移权限检查，受信任的局域网调用方就会获得目前仅向环回调用方开放的操作权限。
+最后，Connection 必须在选择 API Proxy 回退路径或 Typert interceptor 前认证请求。若迁移只在回退路径执行认证，由 Remote 持有的 endpoint 就能绕过每个 Host 操作都要求的浏览器身份。

 ## 提案

@@ -76,14 +76,9 @@ Lookup 策略作用于整个 key，而非特定端点。提示词输入、队列

 Resolver 拥有的 `session-not-found` 和 `agent-busy` 错误保持稳定，因为共享 resolver 会抛出 `TypertLookupFailure`。普通业务异常会变成 Gateway 现有的 `internal` RPC 失败。只有在选定的 Client 消费方不根据更具体的旧版业务错误码进行分支时，才能迁移该调用；如果实现过程中发现这种分支，除非业务包新增与传输无关的类型化失败，否则该 RPC 将退出此集合。

-## 特权调用权限
+## 浏览器认证

-Connection 必须在选择 Typert interceptor 或 API Proxy 回退路径之前检查调用方是否有权访问特权端点。该检查必须同时识别旧式点分名称和 Remote 斜杠端点，并保持以下已迁移操作仅限环回地址：
-
- `agentPresets/readDocument`、`agentPresets/copy` 和 `agentPresets/remove`；
- `credentials/describe`、`credentials/set` 和 `credentials/unset`。
-
-贯穿整个载体的 trusted-host 和 origin 检查保持不变。这是一项非升权要求：端点所有权可以变化，但获准调用该操作的调用方集合不得扩大。
+Connection 在选择 Typert interceptor 或 API Proxy 回退路径前认证完整 `/api` 请求。旧式点分名称和 Remote 斜杠 endpoint 因此无需 endpoint 清单，就能使用同一个由进程令牌建立的浏览器会话。这是一条非提权要求：endpoint 所有权可以变化，但未认证请求不能进入任一分发路径。

 ## 提交边界

@@ -101,14 +96,14 @@ Connection 必须在选择 Typert interceptor 或 API Proxy 回退路径之前

 **保留每一个旧版 RPC 名称和响应 envelope。** 这会使业务包变成旧协议的副本。面向服务的名称和业务值让 Client 负责关联操作，而 Connection 继续负责统一的 RPC envelope。

-**依赖 API Proxy 回退路径强制执行特权方法权限。** interceptor 选择会绕过该回退路径，因此这会悄然扩大已迁移方法的权限范围。
+**依赖 API Proxy 回退路径认证请求。** interceptor 选择会绕过该回退路径，使 Remote 方法变成匿名可调用。

 ## 验收标准

 - 迁移表中的每个方法都可通过表中列出的 `ctx.remote` 服务调用，并且不存在生产环境中的旧版 API Proxy 路由、schema、映射表行、客户端 stub 或调用。
 - 签名匹配的现有方法直接带有 `@Remote`；每个新增方法都执行表中所述的适配，且不保留只做恒等转发的 `remote*` 包装层。
 - Agent／Session 集成测试证明共享 lookup 的各项结果，subagent 中断测试证明不会发生冷恢复。
- 已迁移的特权端点拒绝受信任的非环回调用方，并接受环回调用方，且该判定在任一分发路径运行前完成。
+- 已迁移 endpoint 拒绝未认证请求，并在任一分发路径运行前接受与旧 endpoint 相同的有效浏览器会话。
 - 每项已迁移调用的 Client 行为和立即提交状态的行为保持等价，包括支持取消之处的取消行为。
 - 暂缓迁移的方法及其现有行为仍保留在 API Proxy 上。
 - 一次从干净状态开始的生成与构建会生成并消费所选的每项 Remote 贡献，且聚焦测试和最终仓库门禁均通过。
@@ -119,6 +114,6 @@ Connection 必须在选择 Typert interceptor 或 API Proxy 回退路径之前

 生成的 Remote 约定会为每个业务包引入构建顺序要求和发布条目。如果遗漏运行时挂载、声明导出、source map 来源、包依赖或 Project Reference 中的任何一项，局部源码测试可能仍会通过，但从干净状态开始的 Client 构建会失败。

-将权限强制执行移至复合分发会改变安全敏感的载体代码。测试必须覆盖一个由 Remote 拥有的端点和一个旧版回退端点，确保两条路径都无法绕过环回判定。
+复合分发会改变安全敏感的载体代码。测试必须覆盖一个由 Remote 拥有的 endpoint 和一个旧版回退 endpoint，确保两条路径都无法绕过浏览器认证。

-本文应用现有 Typert Remote 架构，而非取代它。本文部分取代 [GUI RPC 协议笔记](../../implemented/architecture/2026-07-19-gui-layering-and-rpc-protocol.zh.md)中的中央一元调用所有权和五步扩展检查清单，以及 [Web 配置平面笔记](../../implemented/architecture/2026-07-30-web-config-plane.zh.md)中的中央接线清单；对于已迁移方法之外的 Connection envelope 和配置行为，这些笔记仍具权威性。标题、命令、配置边界、subagent 中断和归档笔记继续负责各自的业务行为，只需如实更新传输相关事实，无需归档。[浏览器信任边界](../../implemented/architecture/2026-07-28-api-browser-trust-boundary.zh.md)和[生成约定构建顺序](../../implemented/process/2026-08-08-api-remotes-generated-contract-build.zh.md)仍具权威性，无需执行归档操作。
+本文应用现有 Typert Remote 架构，而非取代它。本文部分取代 [GUI RPC 协议笔记](../../implemented/architecture/2026-07-19-gui-layering-and-rpc-protocol.zh.md)中的中央一元调用所有权和五步扩展检查清单，以及 [Web 配置平面笔记](../../implemented/architecture/2026-07-30-web-config-plane.zh.md)中的中央接线清单；对于已迁移方法之外的 Connection envelope 和配置行为，这些笔记仍具权威性。标题、命令、配置边界、subagent 中断和归档笔记继续负责各自的业务行为，只需如实更新传输相关事实，无需归档。[浏览器信任边界](../../implemented/architecture/2026-07-28-api-browser-trust-boundary.zh.md)、[浏览器认证](../../implemented/architecture/2026-08-24-browser-token-authentication.zh.md)和[生成约定构建顺序](../../implemented/process/2026-08-08-api-remotes-generated-contract-build.zh.md)仍具权威性，无需执行归档操作。
@@ -136,6 +136,8 @@
    "@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-subagent-report": "workspace:^",
    "@deepseek-ai/dsh-user-approval": "workspace:^",
    "@types/js-yaml": "^4.0.9",
-    "execa": "^10.0.0"
+    "@types/ws": "8.18.1",
+    "execa": "^10.0.0",
+    "ws": "8.21.0"
  }
 }
@@ -22,7 +22,15 @@ export default async function open(url) {
  if (process.env.BROWSER_OPEN_TEST_FAILURE !== undefined) {
    throw new Error(process.env.BROWSER_OPEN_TEST_FAILURE)
  }
-  const response = await fetch(url)
+  const exchange = await fetch(url, { redirect: 'manual' })
+  const setCookie = exchange.headers.get('set-cookie')
+  const location = exchange.headers.get('location')
+  if (exchange.status !== 303 || setCookie === null || location === null) {
+    throw new Error(`browser authentication exchange returned HTTP ${exchange.status}`)
+  }
+  const response = await fetch(new URL(location, url), {
+    headers: { cookie: setCookie.split(';', 1)[0] },
+  })
  const html = await response.text()
  console.log(`dsh browser-open: ${JSON.stringify({
    url,
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ import { join } from 'node:path'
 import { setTimeout as delay } from 'node:timers/promises'
 import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url'
 import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'
+import WebSocket from 'ws'

 const REPO_ROOT = fileURLToPath(new URL('../../..', import.meta.url))
 const BUILT_BIN = join(REPO_ROOT, 'apps/cli/lib/bin.js')
@@ -23,6 +24,23 @@ const SECRET = 'github-webhook-real-e2e-secret'
 const DELIVERY = 'github-webhook-real-e2e-delivery'
 const MARKER = 'DSH_GITHUB_WEBHOOK_REAL_E2E_OK'
 const TITLE = 'GitHub webhook real e2e'
+const authenticatedCookies = new Map<string, Promise<{ origin: string; cookie: string }>>()
+
+/** Exchange the printed process token once for Node-side API probes. */
+function authenticatedWeb(launchUrl: string): Promise<{ origin: string; cookie: string }> {
+  const existing = authenticatedCookies.get(launchUrl)
+  if (existing !== undefined) return existing
+  const exchange = (async () => {
+    const response = await fetch(launchUrl, { redirect: 'manual' })
+    const setCookie = response.headers.get('set-cookie')
+    if (response.status !== 303 || setCookie === null) {
+      throw new Error(`dsh web authentication returned HTTP ${String(response.status)}`)
+    }
+    return { origin: new URL(launchUrl).origin, cookie: setCookie.split(';', 1)[0]! }
+  })()
+  authenticatedCookies.set(launchUrl, exchange)
+  return exchange
+}

 interface SessionList {
  items: Array<{
@@ -111,9 +129,10 @@ async function freePort(): Promise<number> {

 /** Invoke one public Remote method over its HTTP carrier. */
 async function remoteRpc<T>(baseUrl: string, endpoint: string, args: object): Promise<T> {
-  const response = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/api/${endpoint}`, {
+  const authenticated = await authenticatedWeb(baseUrl)
+  const response = await fetch(`${authenticated.origin}/api/${endpoint}`, {
    method: 'POST',
-    headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' },
+    headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json', cookie: authenticated.cookie },
    body: JSON.stringify({
      type: 'client-request',
      rpcId: `github-webhook-real-${endpoint}-${randomUUID()}`,
@@ -140,7 +159,10 @@ async function openingStreamItem(
  args: object,
  accepts: (value: unknown) => boolean,
 ): Promise<Record<string, unknown>> {
-  const socket = new WebSocket(`${baseUrl.replace(/^http/u, 'ws')}/api/remote.mux`)
+  const authenticated = await authenticatedWeb(baseUrl)
+  const socket = new WebSocket(`${authenticated.origin.replace(/^http/u, 'ws')}/api/remote.mux`, {
+    headers: { cookie: authenticated.cookie },
+  })
  const streamId = `github-webhook-real-${endpoint}-${randomUUID()}`
  try {
    await new Promise<void>((resolve, reject) => {
@@ -179,10 +201,13 @@ async function openingStreamItem(
        else if (value === undefined) reject(new Error(`${endpoint} opening item was absent`))
        else resolve(value)
      }
-      const message = (event: MessageEvent<unknown>): void => {
+      const message = (event: WebSocket.MessageEvent): void => {
        try {
-          if (typeof event.data !== 'string') throw new Error(`${endpoint} published a non-text frame`)
-          const frame: unknown = JSON.parse(event.data)
+          const text = typeof event.data === 'string'
+            ? event.data
+            : Buffer.isBuffer(event.data) ? event.data.toString('utf8') : undefined
+          if (text === undefined) throw new Error(`${endpoint} published a non-text frame`)
+          const frame: unknown = JSON.parse(text)
          if (!isRecord(frame) || frame.streamId !== streamId) return
          if (frame.type === 'error') {
            finish(new Error(`${endpoint} failed: ${JSON.stringify(frame.error)}`))
@@ -356,7 +381,7 @@ describe.skipIf(!process.env.DEEPSEEK_API_KEY)('GitHub webhook through the real
      const webhookOrigin = `http://127.0.0.1:${String(webhookPort)}`

      expect((await fetch(`${webhookOrigin}/api`)).status).toBe(404)
-      expect((await sendGitHubDelivery(baseUrl)).status).not.toBe(202)
+      expect((await sendGitHubDelivery(new URL(baseUrl).origin)).status).not.toBe(202)
      expect((await sendGitHubDelivery(webhookOrigin)).status).toBe(202)

      const workspaces = await eventually(
@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
+/** Real `dsh web` authentication against a temporary Harness home. */
+
+import type { ChildProcess } from 'node:child_process'
+import { spawn } from 'node:child_process'
+import { stat } from 'node:fs/promises'
+import { request as httpRequest } from 'node:http'
+import { createRequire } from 'node:module'
+import { createServer } from 'node:net'
+import type { AddressInfo } from 'node:net'
+import { mkdtemp, rm } from 'node:fs/promises'
+import { tmpdir } from 'node:os'
+import { join } from 'node:path'
+import { fileURLToPath, pathToFileURL } from 'node:url'
+import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'
+
+const REPO_ROOT = fileURLToPath(new URL('../../..', import.meta.url))
+const DSH_SOURCE_BIN = join(REPO_ROOT, 'apps/cli/src/bin.ts')
+const TSX_LOADER = pathToFileURL(createRequire(join(REPO_ROOT, 'package.json')).resolve('tsx')).href
+
+interface RunningWeb {
+  readonly child: ChildProcess
+  readonly launchUrl: string
+  readonly output: () => string
+}
+
+interface HttpResult {
+  readonly status: number
+  readonly body: string
+}
+
+function redact(output: string): string {
+  return output.replace(/([?&]token=)[^\s)]+/gu, '$1<redacted>')
+}
+
+/** Reserve one concrete loopback port, then release it for the CLI process. */
+async function freePort(): Promise<number> {
+  const server = createServer()
+  await new Promise<void>((resolve, reject) => {
+    server.once('error', reject)
+    server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', resolve)
+  })
+  const port = (server.address() as AddressInfo).port
+  await new Promise<void>((resolve, reject) => {
+    server.close((error) => {
+      if (error === undefined) resolve()
+      else reject(error)
+    })
+  })
+  return port
+}
+
+function cleanEnvironment(root: string, dshHome: string): NodeJS.ProcessEnv {
+  const env = Object.fromEntries(Object.entries(process.env).filter(([name]) =>
+    !/(?:KEY|SECRET|TOKEN|PASSWORD)/iu.test(name)))
+  return {
+    ...env,
+    DSH_AGENTS_HOME: join(root, '.agents'),
+    DSH_HOME: dshHome,
+    DSH_TELEMETRY_DISABLED: '1',
+    NODE_NO_WARNINGS: '1',
+    SSH_CONNECTION: '',
+    SSH_TTY: '',
+    TSX_TSCONFIG_PATH: join(REPO_ROOT, 'tsconfig.json'),
+  }
+}
+
+/** Start the public source CLI and wait for its authenticated readiness URL. */
+async function startWeb(root: string, dshHome: string, port: number): Promise<RunningWeb> {
+  const child = spawn(process.execPath, [
+    '--import', TSX_LOADER,
+    DSH_SOURCE_BIN,
+    'web',
+    '--no-open',
+    '--port', String(port),
+  ], {
+    cwd: root,
+    env: cleanEnvironment(root, dshHome),
+    stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
+  })
+  let output = ''
+  const launchUrl = await new Promise<string>((resolve, reject) => {
+    let settled = false
+    const fail = (error: Error): void => {
+      if (settled) return
+      settled = true
+      clearTimeout(timer)
+      reject(error)
+    }
+    const timer = setTimeout(() => {
+      fail(new Error(`dsh web did not become ready:\n${redact(output)}`))
+    }, 90_000)
+    const append = (chunk: Buffer | string): void => {
+      output = `${output}${String(chunk)}`.slice(-100_000)
+      const match = /dsh web: (http:\/\/[^\s]+)/u.exec(output)
+      if (settled || match?.[1] === undefined) return
+      settled = true
+      clearTimeout(timer)
+      resolve(match[1])
+    }
+    child.stdout?.on('data', append)
+    child.stderr?.on('data', append)
+    child.once('error', (error) => {
+      fail(error)
+    })
+    child.once('exit', (code) => {
+      fail(new Error(`dsh web exited before readiness (${String(code)}):\n${redact(output)}`))
+    })
+  })
+  return { child, launchUrl, output: () => output }
+}
+
+async function stopWeb(running: RunningWeb): Promise<void> {
+  if (running.child.exitCode !== null) return
+  const exited = new Promise<void>((resolve) => { running.child.once('exit', () => { resolve() }) })
+  running.child.kill('SIGTERM')
+  const forced = setTimeout(() => { running.child.kill('SIGKILL') }, 10_000)
+  forced.unref()
+  await exited
+  clearTimeout(forced)
+}
+
+/** POST one real API Proxy envelope while controlling the wire Host header. */
+function describeHost(port: number, host: string, cookie?: string): Promise<HttpResult> {
+  const body = JSON.stringify({
+    type: 'client-request',
+    rpcId: 'web-auth-real-cli',
+    method: 'host.describe',
+    payload: {},
+  })
+  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+    const req = httpRequest({
+      hostname: '127.0.0.1',
+      port,
+      path: '/api/host.describe',
+      method: 'POST',
+      headers: {
+        host,
+        'content-type': 'application/json',
+        'content-length': Buffer.byteLength(body),
+        ...cookie === undefined ? {} : { cookie },
+      },
+    }, (res) => {
+      const chunks: Uint8Array[] = []
+      res.on('data', (chunk: Buffer) => { chunks.push(chunk) })
+      res.on('end', () => {
+        resolve({ status: res.statusCode ?? 0, body: Buffer.concat(chunks).toString('utf8') })
+      })
+    })
+    req.once('error', reject)
+    req.end(body)
+  })
+}
+
+describe('dsh web authentication through the real CLI', () => {
+  it('rejects a forged loopback Host and preserves the browser cookie across restart', { timeout: 180_000 }, async () => {
+    const root = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), 'dsh-web-auth-real-cli-'))
+    const dshHome = join(root, '.dsh')
+    const port = await freePort()
+    let first: RunningWeb | undefined
+    let second: RunningWeb | undefined
+    try {
+      first = await startWeb(root, dshHome, port)
+      const firstUrl = new URL(first.launchUrl)
+      expect(firstUrl.origin).toBe(`http://127.0.0.1:${String(port)}`)
+      expect(firstUrl.pathname).toBe('/')
+      expect(firstUrl.searchParams.get('token')).toMatch(/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$/u)
+
+      expect(await describeHost(port, `localhost:${String(port)}`)).toEqual({
+        status: 401,
+        body: 'unauthorized',
+      })
+
+      const exchange = await fetch(first.launchUrl, { redirect: 'manual' })
+      expect(exchange.status).toBe(303)
+      expect(exchange.headers.get('location')).toBe('/')
+      const setCookie = exchange.headers.get('set-cookie')
+      if (setCookie === null) throw new Error('real CLI token exchange omitted Set-Cookie')
+      expect(setCookie).toContain('HttpOnly')
+      expect(setCookie).toContain('SameSite=Strict')
+      expect(setCookie).not.toContain('Secure')
+      const cookie = setCookie.split(';', 1)[0]!
+
+      const authenticated = await describeHost(port, firstUrl.host, cookie)
+      expect(authenticated.status).toBe(200)
+      const authenticatedBody = JSON.parse(authenticated.body) as unknown
+      expect(authenticatedBody).toMatchObject({
+        type: 'server-response',
+        rpcId: 'web-auth-real-cli',
+        result: { ok: true, value: { version: expect.any(String) as unknown } },
+      })
+
+      await stopWeb(first)
+      first = undefined
+      second = await startWeb(root, dshHome, port)
+      const secondUrl = new URL(second.launchUrl)
+      expect(secondUrl.searchParams.get('token')).not.toBe(firstUrl.searchParams.get('token'))
+      expect((await describeHost(port, secondUrl.host, cookie)).status).toBe(200)
+
+      const credentialMode = (await stat(join(dshHome, '.credentials.yaml'))).mode & 0o777
+      expect(credentialMode).toBe(0o600)
+    } catch (error) {
+      const evidence = [first?.output(), second?.output()].filter(value => value !== undefined).join('\n')
+      throw new Error(`${error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)}\n${redact(evidence)}`, { cause: error })
+    } finally {
+      if (second !== undefined) await stopWeb(second)
+      if (first !== undefined) await stopWeb(first)
+      await rm(root, { recursive: true, force: true })
+    }
+  })
+})
@@ -32,7 +32,9 @@ interface BrowserOpenRecord {
 }

 function normalizeLocalUrl(url: string): string {
-  return url.replace(/:\d+$/, ':{{port}}')
+  return url
+    .replace(/:\d+/u, ':{{port}}')
+    .replace(/token=[^&]+/u, 'token={{token}}')
 }

 describe.skipIf(!builtArtifactsExist)('dsh web browser-open assembled snapshot', () => {
@@ -85,9 +87,9 @@ describe.skipIf(!builtArtifactsExist)('dsh web browser-open assembled snapshot',
        "bootManifest": true,
        "dshHomePresent": false,
        "exitCode": 0,
-        "openedUrl": "http://127.0.0.1:{{port}}",
+        "openedUrl": "http://127.0.0.1:{{port}}/?token={{token}}",
        "opening": true,
-        "readyUrl": "http://127.0.0.1:{{port}}",
+        "readyUrl": "http://127.0.0.1:{{port}}/?token={{token}}",
        "status": 200,
        "stderr": "",
      }
@@ -124,7 +126,6 @@ describe.skipIf(!builtArtifactsExist)('dsh web browser-open assembled snapshot',
    const readyUrl = /dsh web: (http:\/\/[^\s]+)/u.exec(result.stdout)?.[1]
    const diagnostic = result.stderr.split(/\r?\n/u)
      .find(line => line.startsWith('web-app: could not open the default browser because '))
-      ?.replace(/http:\/\/127\.0\.0\.1:\d+/u, 'http://127.0.0.1:{{port}}')

    expect({
      diagnostic,
@@ -134,11 +135,11 @@ describe.skipIf(!builtArtifactsExist)('dsh web browser-open assembled snapshot',
      readyUrl: readyUrl === undefined ? undefined : normalizeLocalUrl(readyUrl),
    }).toMatchInlineSnapshot(`
      {
-        "diagnostic": "web-app: could not open the default browser because fixture desktop unavailable; visit http://127.0.0.1:{{port}} manually",
+        "diagnostic": "web-app: could not open the default browser because fixture desktop unavailable; use the dsh web URL printed at startup",
        "exitCode": 0,
        "opened": false,
        "opening": true,
-        "readyUrl": "http://127.0.0.1:{{port}}",
+        "readyUrl": "http://127.0.0.1:{{port}}/?token={{token}}",
      }
    `)
  })
@@ -183,7 +184,7 @@ describe.skipIf(!builtArtifactsExist)('dsh web browser-open assembled snapshot',
        "exitCode": 0,
        "opened": false,
        "opening": false,
-        "readyUrl": "http://127.0.0.1:{{port}}",
+        "readyUrl": "http://127.0.0.1:{{port}}/?token={{token}}",
        "stderr": "",
      }
    `)
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
    "@types/node": "^22.0.0",
    "@types/react": "~18.3.1",
    "@types/react-dom": "~18.3.0",
+    "@types/ws": "8.18.1",
    "@vitejs/plugin-react": "^4.0.0",
    "http-server": "^14.1.1",
    "fflate": "^0.8.2",
@@ -51,6 +52,7 @@
    "react-dom": "^18.2.0",
    "typescript": "^6.0.3",
    "vite": "^6.0.0",
-    "vitest": "^4.1.8"
+    "vitest": "^4.1.8",
+    "ws": "8.21.0"
  }
 }
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ describe('web e2e: Full access confirmation', () => {
    // callback.
    page = await browser.newPage({ viewport: { width: 1680, height: 1000 }, locale: ZH_BROWSER_LOCALE })
    tripwire = watchConsole(page)
-    await page.goto(scaffold.baseUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
+    await page.goto(scaffold.authenticatedUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
    await page.waitForSelector('[class*="frame"]', { timeout: 30_000 })
    await connectFreshWorkspaceZh(page, scaffold.workspaceCwd)
  }, 120_000)
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ describe('web e2e: agent-preset authoring is a host-side copy', () => {
    // The scenario asserts the shipped Chinese copy, so the browser asks for it.
    page = await browser.newPage({ viewport: { width: 1680, height: 1000 }, locale: ZH_BROWSER_LOCALE })
    tripwire = watchConsole(page)
-    await page.goto(scaffold.baseUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
+    await page.goto(scaffold.authenticatedUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
    await page.waitForSelector('[class*="frame"]', { timeout: 30_000 })
  }, 120_000)

@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ describe('web e2e: agent-preset authoring is a host-side copy', () => {
    await dialog.waitFor({ state: 'detached', timeout: 10_000 })
    await page.getByRole('button', { name: '创造模式' }).waitFor({ timeout: 10_000 })
    await expect.poll(async () => {
-      const response = await fetch(`${scaffold.baseUrl}/api/session/list`, {
+      const response = await scaffold.hostFetch('/api/session/list', {
        method: 'POST',
        headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' },
        body: JSON.stringify({
@@ -137,11 +137,11 @@ async function seedSubagent(scaffold: WebScaffold, parentId: SessionId): Promise
 * produced. Addressed by id rather than by scanning the serialized list: the
 * seeded session records `minimal` too, so a substring match over the whole
 * list answers before the switch has landed.
- * @param baseUrl - the scaffold's origin.
+ * @param scaffold - authenticated Web Host scaffold.
 * @returns the live session's preset, or undefined before it is listed.
 */
-async function livePreset(baseUrl: string): Promise<string | undefined> {
-  const response = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/api/session/list`, {
+async function livePreset(scaffold: WebScaffold): Promise<string | undefined> {
+  const response = await scaffold.hostFetch('/api/session/list', {
    method: 'POST',
    headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' },
    body: JSON.stringify({
@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ describe('web e2e: agent-preset selection', () => {
    browser = await chromium.launch()
    page = await newEnglishPage(browser)
    tripwire = watchConsole(page)
-    await page.goto(scaffold.baseUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
+    await page.goto(scaffold.authenticatedUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
    await page.waitForSelector('[class*="frame"]', { timeout: 30_000 })
  }, 120_000)

@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ describe('web e2e: agent-preset selection', () => {

    // The chip stages; the blank session the workspace connect produced is
    // what the stage lands on. The host's own answer is what comes back.
-    await expect.poll(() => livePreset(scaffold.baseUrl), { timeout: 15_000 }).toBe('minimal')
+    await expect.poll(() => livePreset(scaffold), { timeout: 15_000 }).toBe('minimal')
  })

  it('re-reads the slash catalog through the composition the switch installed', async () => {
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ describe('web e2e: agent-preset selection', () => {
    // instead of leaving the session reading the narrower composition.
    await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Minimal mode' }).click()
    await page.getByRole('menuitem', { name: /^Standard mode/ }).first().click()
-    await expect.poll(() => livePreset(scaffold.baseUrl), { timeout: 15_000 }).toBe('standard')
+    await expect.poll(() => livePreset(scaffold), { timeout: 15_000 }).toBe('standard')

    await composer.fill('/')
    await expect.poll(() => menuOptions(page), { timeout: 15_000 })
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ describe('web e2e: approval takeover keeps its actions reachable', () => {
    browser = await chromium.launch()
    page = await newEnglishPage(browser)
    tripwire = watchConsole(page)
-    await page.goto(scaffold.baseUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
+    await page.goto(scaffold.authenticatedUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
    await page.waitForSelector('[class*="frame"]', { timeout: 30_000 })
    await connectFreshWorkspace(page, scaffold.workspaceCwd)
  }, 120_000)
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ describe.skipIf(MODE === 'record')('web e2e: background job list', () => {
    browser = await chromium.launch()
    page = await newEnglishPage(browser)
    tripwire = watchConsole(page)
-    await page.goto(scaffold.baseUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
+    await page.goto(scaffold.authenticatedUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
    await page.waitForSelector('[class*="frame"]', { timeout: 30_000 })

    const groupRow = page.locator('[role="treeitem"]').first()
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ describe.skipIf(MODE === 'record')('web e2e: cancelled Bash row disclosure', ()
    browser = await chromium.launch()
    page = await newEnglishPage(browser)
    tripwire = watchConsole(page)
-    await page.goto(scaffold.baseUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
+    await page.goto(scaffold.authenticatedUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
    await page.waitForSelector('[class*="frame"]', { timeout: 30_000 })

    const groupRow = page.locator('[role="treeitem"]').first()
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ describe('web e2e: continuous conversation grown through the composer', () => {
    page.on('console', (message) => {
      if (message.type() === 'warning') consoleWarnings.push(message.text())
    })
-    await page.goto(scaffold.baseUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
+    await page.goto(scaffold.authenticatedUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
    await page.waitForSelector('[class*="frame"]', { timeout: 30_000 })
    await connectFreshWorkspace(page, scaffold.workspaceCwd, 'continuous-chat-e2e')
  }, 120_000)
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ describe('web e2e: long Chat interaction contract', () => {
    browser = await chromium.launch()
    page = await newEnglishPage(browser, 900)
    tripwire = watchConsole(page)
-    await page.goto(scaffold.baseUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
+    await page.goto(scaffold.authenticatedUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
    await page.waitForSelector('[class*="frame"]', { timeout: 30_000 })
    await openSeed(page)
  }, 120_000)
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ async function launchScrollWorld(options: ScrollWorldOptions): Promise<ScrollWor
    scaffold.ctx.on('session/event', (_session, event: SessionEvent) => { events.push(event) })
    page = await newEnglishPage(browser, 900)
    const tripwire = watchConsole(page)
-    await page.goto(scaffold.baseUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
+    await page.goto(scaffold.authenticatedUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
    await page.waitForSelector('[class*="frame"]', { timeout: 30_000 })
    // Session-list bootstrap can replace the controlled search state. Wait
    // for the seeded baseline before openSeed starts the lazy content query
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ describe('web e2e: Code Mode round renders nested sub-calls', () => {
    browser = await chromium.launch()
    page = await newEnglishPage(browser)
    tripwire = watchConsole(page)
-    await page.goto(scaffold.baseUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
+    await page.goto(scaffold.authenticatedUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
    await page.waitForSelector('[class*="frame"]', { timeout: 30_000 })
    await connectFreshWorkspace(page, scaffold.workspaceCwd)
  }, 120_000)
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ describe('web e2e: cold blank Session visibility', () => {
    browser = await chromium.launch()
    page = await newEnglishPage(browser)
    tripwire = watchConsole(page)
-    await page.goto(scaffold.baseUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
+    await page.goto(scaffold.authenticatedUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
    await page.waitForSelector('[class*="frame"]', { timeout: 30_000 })
  }, 120_000)

@@ -907,7 +907,7 @@ async function openPerformancePage(
  world: PerformanceWorld,
  expectedSessions: number,
 ): Promise<Locator> {
-  await world.page.goto(world.scaffold.baseUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
+  await world.page.goto(world.scaffold.authenticatedUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
  await world.page.waitForSelector('[class*="frame"]', { timeout: 30_000 })
  const group = world.page.getByRole('treeitem').first()
  await expect.poll(() => group.textContent(), { timeout: 30_000 })
@@ -1389,7 +1389,7 @@ describe('manual web performance: complex workspace and history', () => {
    })
    let testFailure: unknown
    try {
-      await world.page.goto(world.scaffold.baseUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
+      await world.page.goto(world.scaffold.authenticatedUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
      await world.page.waitForSelector('[class*="frame"]', { timeout: 30_000 })
      await connectFreshWorkspace(world.page, world.scaffold.workspaceCwd, 'continuous-conversation-perf')
      const cdp = await world.page.context().newCDPSession(world.page)
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ describe('web e2e: composer draft scrolling', () => {
    browser = await chromium.launch()
    page = await newEnglishPage(browser)
    tripwire = watchConsole(page)
-    await page.goto(scaffold.baseUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
+    await page.goto(scaffold.authenticatedUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
    await page.waitForSelector('[class*="frame"]', { timeout: 30_000 })
    await connectFreshWorkspace(page, scaffold.workspaceCwd, 'composer-draft-scroll')
    await page.locator('textarea:enabled').first().fill(DRAFT)
@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ describe('web e2e: input card position across view tabs', () => {
    browser = await chromium.launch({ ignoreDefaultArgs: ['--hide-scrollbars'] })
    page = await newEnglishPage(browser, WIDE_VIEWPORT.height)
    tripwire = watchConsole(page)
-    await page.goto(scaffold.baseUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
+    await page.goto(scaffold.authenticatedUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
    await page.waitForSelector('[class*="frame"]', { timeout: 30_000 })
    await openSeededSession(page)
    await page.getByRole('tab', { name: 'Chat', exact: true }).waitFor({ timeout: 30_000 })
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ describe('web e2e: the conversation column scrolls on one axis', () => {
    browser = await chromium.launch()
    page = await newEnglishPage(browser, 900)
    tripwire = watchConsole(page)
-    await page.goto(scaffold.baseUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
+    await page.goto(scaffold.authenticatedUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
    await page.waitForSelector('[data-conversation-scroll] [class*="heroGlow"]', { timeout: 30_000 })
  }, 180_000)

@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ describe('web e2e: Cordis tools use their owned cards', () => {
      })
    })
    tripwire = watchConsole(page)
-    await page.goto(scaffold.baseUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
+    await page.goto(scaffold.authenticatedUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
    await page.waitForSelector('[class*="frame"]', { timeout: 30_000 })
    await connectFreshWorkspace(page, scaffold.workspaceCwd)
  }, 120_000)
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ describe.skipIf(MODE === 'record')('web e2e: declared reasoning efforts reach th
    browser = await chromium.launch()
    page = await browser.newPage({ viewport: { width: 1680, height: 1000 }, locale: ZH_BROWSER_LOCALE })
    tripwire = watchConsole(page)
-    await page.goto(scaffold.baseUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
+    await page.goto(scaffold.authenticatedUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
    await page.waitForSelector('[class*="frame"]', { timeout: 30_000 })
    await connectFreshWorkspaceZh(page, scaffold.workspaceCwd)
  }, 120_000)
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ describe('web e2e: the composer model switch is the default for later sessions',
    browser = await chromium.launch()
    page = await browser.newPage({ viewport: { width: 1680, height: 1000 }, locale: ZH_BROWSER_LOCALE })
    tripwire = watchConsole(page)
-    await page.goto(scaffold.baseUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
+    await page.goto(scaffold.authenticatedUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
    await page.waitForSelector('[class*="frame"]', { timeout: 30_000 })
    // The composer's seats only exist once a workspace is connected: without
    // one the input is the locked placeholder and no session scope is open.
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ describe.skipIf(MODE === 'record')('web e2e: details panel follows the current S
    browser = await chromium.launch()
    page = await newEnglishPage(browser)
    tripwire = watchConsole(page)
-    await page.goto(scaffold.baseUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
+    await page.goto(scaffold.authenticatedUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
    await appFrame(page).waitFor({ timeout: 30_000 })
    await connectFreshWorkspace(page, scaffold.workspaceCwd)
  }, 120_000)
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ describe('web e2e: /feedback command acknowledgement', () => {
    browser = await chromium.launch()
    page = await newEnglishPage(browser)
    tripwire = watchConsole(page)
-    await page.goto(scaffold.baseUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
+    await page.goto(scaffold.authenticatedUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
    await page.waitForSelector('[class*="frame"]', { timeout: 30_000 })
    // Fresh world: connecting a workspace births the blank session whose
    // live composer accepts the slash line.
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ describe.skipIf(MODE === 'record')('web e2e: GitHub ready-for-review', () => {
    page = await browser.newPage({ viewport: { width: 1680, height: 1000 }, locale: 'en-US' })
    await page.addInitScript(() => { localStorage.setItem('dsh.locale', 'en') })
    tripwire = watchConsole(page)
-    await page.goto(scaffold.baseUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
+    await page.goto(scaffold.authenticatedUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
    await page.waitForSelector('[class*="frame"]', { timeout: 30_000 })
  }, 60_000)

@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ describe('web e2e: goal bar clear convergence', () => {
    browser = await chromium.launch()
    page = await newEnglishPage(browser)
    tripwire = watchConsole(page)
+    const login = await page.context().request.get(scaffold.authenticatedUrl, { maxRedirects: 0 })
+    expect(login.status()).toBe(303)
    await page.goto(`${scaffold.baseUrl}?fixture`, { waitUntil: 'load' })
    await page.waitForSelector('[class*="frame"]', { timeout: 30_000 })
  }, 120_000)
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ describe('web e2e: /goal human transcript presentation', () => {
    browser = await chromium.launch()
    page = await newEnglishPage(browser)
    tripwire = watchConsole(page)
-    await page.goto(scaffold.baseUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
+    await page.goto(scaffold.authenticatedUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
    await page.waitForSelector('[class*="frame"]', { timeout: 30_000 })
    await connectFreshWorkspace(page, scaffold.workspaceCwd)
  }, 120_000)
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ describe('web e2e: Goal keeps one assistant action row per completed turn', () =
    browser = await chromium.launch()
    page = await newEnglishPage(browser)
    tripwire = watchConsole(page)
-    await page.goto(scaffold.baseUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
+    await page.goto(scaffold.authenticatedUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
    await page.waitForSelector('[class*="frame"]', { timeout: 30_000 })
    await connectFreshWorkspace(page, scaffold.workspaceCwd)
  }
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ describe('web e2e: lifecycle & chrome (workspace flow / reload / dark mode)', ()
    browser = await chromium.launch()
    page = await newEnglishPage(browser)
    tripwire = watchConsole(page)
-    await page.goto(scaffold.baseUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
+    await page.goto(scaffold.authenticatedUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
    await page.waitForSelector('[class*="frame"]', { timeout: 30_000 })
    // Fresh world: connect a Workspace so the composer scenarios start live.
    await connectFreshWorkspace(page, scaffold.workspaceCwd)
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ describe('web e2e: lifecycle & chrome (workspace flow / reload / dark mode)', ()
    const activePage = await newEnglishPage(browser)
    const activeTripwire = watchConsole(activePage)
    try {
-      await activePage.goto(activeScaffold.baseUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
+      await activePage.goto(activeScaffold.authenticatedUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
      await activePage.waitForSelector('[class*="frame"]', { timeout: 30_000 })
      await connectFreshWorkspace(activePage, activeScaffold.workspaceCwd)
      const input = activePage.locator('textarea').first()
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ describe('web e2e: live-turn interactions (cancel / error / retry)', () => {
    browser = await chromium.launch()
    page = await newEnglishPage(browser)
    tripwire = watchConsole(page)
-    await page.goto(scaffold.baseUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
+    await page.goto(scaffold.authenticatedUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
    await page.waitForSelector('[class*="frame"]', { timeout: 30_000 })
    // Fresh world: connect a Workspace so the composer scenarios start live.
    await connectFreshWorkspace(page, scaffold.workspaceCwd)
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ describe('web e2e: CJK-adjacent Markdown strong emphasis', () => {
    browser = await chromium.launch()
    page = await newEnglishPage(browser)
    tripwire = watchConsole(page)
-    await page.goto(scaffold.baseUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
+    await page.goto(scaffold.authenticatedUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
    await page.waitForSelector('[class*="frame"]', { timeout: 30_000 })
  }, 120_000)

@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ describe('web e2e: remote Markdown image rendering', () => {
    browser = await chromium.launch()
    page = await newEnglishPage(browser)
    tripwire = watchConsole(page)
-    await page.goto(scaffold.baseUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
+    await page.goto(scaffold.authenticatedUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
    await page.waitForSelector('[class*="frame"]', { timeout: 30_000 })
  }, 120_000)

@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ describe('web e2e: Markdown inline-code links', () => {
    browser = await chromium.launch()
    page = await newEnglishPage(browser)
    tripwire = watchConsole(page)
-    await page.goto(scaffold.baseUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
+    await page.goto(scaffold.authenticatedUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
    await page.waitForSelector('[class*="frame"]', { timeout: 30_000 })
  }, 120_000)

@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ describe('web e2e: markdown tables fill the column, wide ones break out and scro
    browser = await chromium.launch()
    page = await newEnglishPage(browser)
    tripwire = watchConsole(page)
-    await page.goto(scaffold.baseUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
+    await page.goto(scaffold.authenticatedUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
    await page.waitForSelector('[class*="frame"]', { timeout: 30_000 })
    const groupRow = page.locator('[role="treeitem"]').first()
    await groupRow.waitFor({ timeout: 15_000 })
@@ -423,7 +423,7 @@ describe('web e2e: markdown tables fill the column, wide ones break out and scro
    const hidpiTripwire = watchConsole(hidpiPage)
    try {
      onTestFailed(() => saveFailureShot(hidpiPage, 'web-e2e-markdown-wide-table-hidpi'))
-      await hidpiPage.goto(scaffold.baseUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
+      await hidpiPage.goto(scaffold.authenticatedUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
      await hidpiPage.waitForSelector('[class*="frame"]', { timeout: 30_000 })
      const groupRow = hidpiPage.locator('[role="treeitem"]').first()
      await groupRow.waitFor({ timeout: 15_000 })
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ describe('web e2e: settled Markdown math rendering', () => {
    browser = await chromium.launch()
    page = await newEnglishPage(browser)
    tripwire = watchConsole(page)
-    await page.goto(scaffold.baseUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
+    await page.goto(scaffold.authenticatedUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
    await page.waitForSelector('[class*="frame"]', { timeout: 30_000 })
  }, 120_000)

@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ describe('web e2e: message IconActions and clocks on settled history', () => {
    browser = await chromium.launch()
    page = await newEnglishPage(browser)
    tripwire = watchConsole(page)
-    await page.goto(scaffold.baseUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
+    await page.goto(scaffold.authenticatedUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
    await page.waitForSelector('[class*="frame"]', { timeout: 30_000 })
  }, 120_000)

@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ describe('web e2e: the feedback note editor floats above the column', () => {
    browser = await chromium.launch()
    page = await newEnglishPage(browser, 900)
    tripwire = watchConsole(page)
-    await page.goto(scaffold.baseUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
+    await page.goto(scaffold.authenticatedUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
    await page.waitForSelector('[class*="frame"]', { timeout: 30_000 })
  }, 180_000)

@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ describe('message feedback Host Remote protocol', () => {
    const exchanges: ProtocolExchange[] = []
    const invoke = async (rpcId: string, endpoint: string, request: unknown): Promise<unknown> => {
      const payload = { args: { request } }
-      const response = await fetch(`${scaffold.baseUrl}/api/${endpoint}`, {
+      const response = await scaffold.hostFetch(`/api/${endpoint}`, {
        method: 'POST',
        headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' },
        body: JSON.stringify({
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ describe('web e2e: durable per-message feedback', () => {
    browser = await chromium.launch()
    page = await newEnglishPage(browser)
    tripwire = watchConsole(page)
-    await page.goto(scaffold.baseUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
+    await page.goto(scaffold.authenticatedUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
    await page.waitForSelector('[class*="frame"]', { timeout: 30_000 })
  }, 120_000)

@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ describe('web e2e: Models settings page configures a dormant provider', () => {
    // The scenario asserts the shipped Chinese copy, so the browser asks for it.
    page = await browser.newPage({ viewport: { width: 1680, height: 1000 }, locale: ZH_BROWSER_LOCALE })
    tripwire = watchConsole(page)
-    await page.goto(scaffold.baseUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
+    await page.goto(scaffold.authenticatedUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
    await page.waitForSelector('[class*="frame"]', { timeout: 30_000 })
  }, 120_000)

@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ describe('web e2e: navigation & panes over a rich seeded session', () => {
    // Workspace stream settles through the user-visible Ungrouped barrier.
    const sessionBaseline = baselineResponse(page)
    const [, sessionResponse] = await Promise.all([
-      page.goto(scaffold.baseUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' }),
+      page.goto(scaffold.authenticatedUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' }),
      sessionBaseline,
    ])
    await assertBaselineSucceeded(sessionResponse, 'session.list')
@@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ describe('web e2e: navigation & panes over a rich seeded session', () => {
    })
    const observerSessionBaseline = baselineResponse(observer)
    const [, observerSessionResponse] = await Promise.all([
-      observer.goto(scaffold.baseUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' }),
+      observer.goto(scaffold.authenticatedUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' }),
      observerSessionBaseline,
    ])
    await assertBaselineSucceeded(observerSessionResponse, 'observer session.list')
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ describe.skipIf(MODE === 'record')('web e2e: first-run DeepSeek credential setup
    page = await browser.newPage({ viewport: { width: 1440, height: 960 }, locale: ZH_BROWSER_LOCALE })
    tripwire = watchConsole(page)
    page.on('console', message => browserConsole.push(message.text()))
-    await page.goto(scaffold.baseUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
+    await page.goto(scaffold.authenticatedUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
    await page.waitForSelector('[class*="frame"]', { timeout: 30_000 })
  }, 120_000)

@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ describe.skipIf(MODE === 'record')('web e2e: another usable provider ends first-
    // The scenario asserts the shipped Chinese copy, so the browser asks for it.
    page = await browser.newPage({ viewport: { width: 1440, height: 960 }, locale: ZH_BROWSER_LOCALE })
    tripwire = watchConsole(page)
-    await page.goto(scaffold.baseUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
+    await page.goto(scaffold.authenticatedUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
    await page.waitForSelector('[class*="frame"]', { timeout: 30_000 })
  }, 120_000)

@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ describe('web e2e: current sandbox policy reaches the model before tools', () =>
    browser = await chromium.launch()
    page = await newEnglishPage(browser)
    tripwire = watchConsole(page)
-    await page.goto(scaffold.baseUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
+    await page.goto(scaffold.authenticatedUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
    await page.waitForSelector('[class*="frame"]', { timeout: 30_000 })
    await connectFreshWorkspace(page, scaffold.workspaceCwd)
  }, 120_000)
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ describe('web e2e: plan chip click area at the narrow viewport', () => {
    browser = await chromium.launch()
    page = await newEnglishPage(browser, VIEWPORT.height)
    tripwire = watchConsole(page)
-    await page.goto(scaffold.baseUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
+    await page.goto(scaffold.authenticatedUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
    await page.waitForSelector('[class*="frame"]', { timeout: 30_000 })
    await connectFreshWorkspace(page, scaffold.workspaceCwd)
    await page.setViewportSize(VIEWPORT)
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ describe('web e2e: plan review takeover round trip', () => {
    // golden pins one language.
    page = await newEnglishPage(browser)
    tripwire = watchConsole(page)
-    await page.goto(scaffold.baseUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
+    await page.goto(scaffold.authenticatedUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
    await page.waitForSelector('[class*="frame"]', { timeout: 30_000 })
    await connectFreshWorkspace(page, scaffold.workspaceCwd)
  }, 120_000)
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ describe('web e2e: plugin configuration section', () => {
    // derives from it, as the rest of the settings surface does.
    page = await browser.newPage({ viewport: { width: 1680, height: 1000 }, locale: ZH_BROWSER_LOCALE })
    tripwire = watchConsole(page)
-    await page.goto(scaffold.baseUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
+    await page.goto(scaffold.authenticatedUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
    await page.waitForSelector('[class*="frame"]', { timeout: 30_000 })
  }, 120_000)

@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ describe('web e2e: inline-code mentions of produced files', () => {
    browser = await chromium.launch()
    page = await newEnglishPage(browser)
    tripwire = watchConsole(page)
-    await page.goto(scaffold.baseUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
+    await page.goto(scaffold.authenticatedUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
    await page.waitForSelector('[class*="frame"]', { timeout: 30_000 })
  }, 120_000)

@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ describe('web e2e: a finished turn ends with the files it produced', () => {
    // the assertion itself narrows the conversation after navigation.
    await page.setViewportSize({ width: 1280, height: 900 })
    tripwire = watchConsole(page)
-    await page.goto(scaffold.baseUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
+    await page.goto(scaffold.authenticatedUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
    await page.waitForSelector('[class*="frame"]', { timeout: 30_000 })
  }, 120_000)

@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ describe.skipIf(MODE === 'record' || !HAS_PWSH)('web e2e: pwsh calls use the bas
    await seedSession(scaffold, fixture, SEED_ID)
    browser = await chromium.launch()
    page = await newEnglishPage(browser)
-    await page.goto(scaffold.baseUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
+    await page.goto(scaffold.authenticatedUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
    await connectFreshWorkspace(page, scaffold.workspaceCwd)
  }, 120_000)

@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ describe('web e2e: resident question composer round trip', () => {
    browser = await chromium.launch()
    page = await newEnglishPage(browser)
    tripwire = watchConsole(page)
-    await page.goto(scaffold.baseUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
+    await page.goto(scaffold.authenticatedUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
    await page.waitForSelector('[class*="frame"]', { timeout: 30_000 })
    // Fresh world: connect a Workspace so the composer scenarios start live.
    await connectFreshWorkspace(page, scaffold.workspaceCwd)
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ describe('web e2e: queue row actions', () => {
    browser = await chromium.launch()
    page = await newEnglishPage(browser)
    const tripwire = watchConsole(page)
-    await page.goto(scaffold.baseUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
+    await page.goto(scaffold.authenticatedUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
    await page.waitForSelector('[class*="frame"]', { timeout: 30_000 })
    await connectFreshWorkspace(page, scaffold.workspaceCwd)
    onTestFailed(() => saveFailureShot(page, 'web-e2e-queue-actions'))
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ describe('web e2e: queue row actions', () => {
    browser = await chromium.launch()
    page = await newEnglishPage(browser)
    const tripwire = watchConsole(page)
-    await page.goto(scaffold.baseUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
+    await page.goto(scaffold.authenticatedUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
    await page.waitForSelector('[class*="frame"]', { timeout: 30_000 })
    await connectFreshWorkspace(page, scaffold.workspaceCwd)
    onTestFailed(() => saveFailureShot(page, 'web-e2e-context-layout'))
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ describe('web e2e: rail search click survives its own document-level bubble', ()
    browser = await chromium.launch()
    page = await newEnglishPage(browser)
    tripwire = watchConsole(page)
-    await page.goto(scaffold.baseUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
+    await page.goto(scaffold.authenticatedUrl, { waitUntil: 'load' })
    await page.waitForSelector('[class*="frame"]', { timeout: 30_000 })
  }, 120_000)

--- a/Show More
+++ b/Show More