Config catalog, module graph, event producer-consumer tables, and
third-party notices regenerate over the webworker surface; the oxlint
rule fingerprint and the ui-renderer NodeNext import face follow.
One Vite build emits dist/index.html and dist/preview.html sharing every
chunk; the only difference is one prepended bootstrap entry whose module
connects the worker host, so the page from the stock entry onward is the
served startup chain verbatim. The dist moves to a relative base so the
preview mounts under any static directory, and the served form anchors
deep SPA-fallback paths with a rendered <base href="/">. The preview-boot
e2e serves the real built pages, packs the VFS image when absent, and
holds the boot line's lowering contract, the interactive hero, and a
clean page-error channel in headless Chromium.
The webserver renders a boot-readiness tail after the injection rows and
AppWebEntry.run awaits the __DSH_BOOT_READY__ deferred before reading any
injected state. Whichever bootstrap applies the injection table settles
the deferred - the served renderer resolves it inline, an asynchronous
bootstrap installs it ahead of the entry module and settles it with the
handshake - so both deployments run one startup chain and a failed
handshake surfaces on the boot page instead of proceeding on missing
globals.
Buy the grammar, own the execution: @yarnpkg/parsers parses the command
line - aliased at bundle time to its shell entry so the root barrel's
syml/js-yaml closure stays out of the worker - and a VFS-backed evaluator
with a coreutils command table runs it inside the worker host. Each shell
process is a real child WebWorker spawned from the same bundle (the first
frame decides the role), so the TERM-then-KILL ladder is real - TERM
requests, KILL terminates the worker - and the file face stays
asynchronous end to end, since the deployment target serves no COOP/COEP
headers and SharedArrayBuffer never exists there. node:child_process
reports through the ChildProcess surface the subprocess service consumes;
execSync, execFileSync and fork refuse, and node-pty stays stubbed.
Two private experimental packages run the whole harness tree inside one
dedicated Web Worker. dsh-experimental-webworker-runtime owns the in-memory
VFS (BigInt stats with per-path identity and strictly increasing mtimes),
the CommonJS wrapper loader over a lazily-evaluated builtin table whose
shims typecheck against Node's own module types, the postMessage tunnel
speaking plain HTTP, the AsyncLocalStorage runtime, and the worker
assembly. dsh-experimental-webworker-packer lowers every module body at
pack time against the shared wrapper contract, sweeps the profile closure
by static reachability, and writes a deterministically gzip-compressed tar
the worker inflates through the browser's native DecompressionStream while
it downloads.
Review-round hardening of canonical admission:
- passthrough now requires a single-frame source free of EXIF/XMP/IPTC
metadata, so location/device metadata never enters durable storage and
stored dimensions always describe the perceived pixels; animated WebP joins
GIF on the always-re-encode path (first frame only)
- SourceImageInfo records orientation-applied dimensions, keeping source and
stored raster on shared axes for coordinate mapping
- validateImage runs a canonical-encoding dry run, so a validated batch can no
longer be refused mid-write by the byte target (no partial writes)
- read_image names per-axis multipliers when rounding splits the two ratios
and maps IMAGE_TOO_LARGE to actionable downscale guidance
READMEs (both languages) describe the wide source envelope, the canonical
encoding and its fixed encoder parameters, and read_image's downscale
envelope; tool/config catalogs regenerate for the new schema and Config
fields. The read-image-dimension scenario now pins the acceptance the old
2000px admission cap refused: the 2001x1 source is admitted and stored
byte-identically, so the fixture stays platform-independent.
The canonical ref serializes mediaType, width, height, bytes in the order the
pre-canonicalization store used, so existing session-log fixtures and logged
histories keep byte-identical reference JSON.
When the attachment store's canonical encoding shrinks the file on disk, the
read_image envelope names the original dimensions and the multiplier that
maps coordinates measured on the attached image back onto the file, and the
output schema carries sourceWidth/sourceHeight for programmatic callers.
Admission now validates a wide source envelope (32MiB, 100MP, 16384px per
side) and persists a canonical encoding instead of refusing large sources:
EXIF orientation baked in, metadata stripped, long edge downscaled to the
configured canonical target (default 2048px), PNG palette for alpha/PNG/GIF
sources and a fixed JPEG quality ladder (85/75/60/45) until the canonical
byte target holds (default 1MiB). In-budget PNG/JPEG/WebP passes through
byte-identically so equal sources keep deduplicating to the same content
address; GIF always re-encodes to the PNG of its first frame, pinning the
first-frame meaning providers apply. Encoder parameters are fixed by design;
only the canonical budget is deployment configuration.
AttachmentStore.saveImage now resolves SavedImageAttachment: the durable
reference paired with the submitted raster's intrinsic facts, so a store may
persist a canonical re-encoding while callers keep the source dimensions for
coordinate mapping. saveImages keeps returning refs; every fake store and the
cordis API catalog follow the new signature.
imccyu