The host stray-capture cost function charged illegal UTF-8 bytes (0x80-0xC1,
0xF5-0xFF, and orphaned multibyte leads) the raw 1, but toString('utf8')
renders each as U+FFFD (3 serialized bytes). A b"\xff" flood was undercounted
threefold, so the residual grew to a full budget's worth of raw bytes before
flushing and, near a large maxLogBytes, expanded toward a ~1 GiB peak in the
flush's concat plus toString. Replace serializedBufferCost with accrueStrayCost,
a cross-chunk UTF-8 walker that charges each byte its decoded serialized width;
carry its sequence state on each StrayBuffer.
The child _LogStream had the same-family bug: its early-flush trigger compared
_pending_chars (character count) against remaining (a serialized-byte budget),
so a 30M-NUL newline-free flood stayed under a 50 MB char trigger yet encoded to
~180 MB at settlement, breaching RLIMIT_AS as worker-exit. Track _pending_cost
via the _JSON_BYTE_COST table and trigger on it; keep _pending_chars for the
char-based slice bounds.
Correct the note's surrogate claim (only the string-walking jsonStringCostUpTo
charges a lone surrogate six bytes; the byte walker never sees one). Shrink the
post-truncation fixture below PIPE_BUF for a deterministic single callback. List
the shared stdout/stderr budget as a third honest fail-before exception
(cross-pipe arrival timing is nondeterministic). Add illegal-UTF-8,
broken-multibyte, and child-log-flood regression tests; sync the zh pair.
The stray-sealing regression test asserted copied < 2 MiB — about 4x the
defended sealed shape, so reverting the seal to a re-merge (or removing it)
left the test green. Measured both shapes as the fd-3 sibling does: the sealed
shape copies ~120 KB, the re-merge shape ~538 KB. Tighten the bound to 256 KiB,
which sits between them, and record the measurements in the comment and the
Agent Note so the fail-before claim holds.
stdout and stderr each checked their pending serialized cost against the full
logBudget independently, so both could retain nearly a budget's worth of
newline-free residual at once — double the intended peak, up to ~512 MiB near
the ceiling. The flush threshold now reads the COMBINED cost of both pipes and
flushes both when it crosses, since they share one ledger.
Remove the post-truncation admit() v8-ignore: captureStray's per-line loop
makes that branch deterministically reachable within one data callback (a chunk
whose first newline-terminated line exhausts the budget hits it on the second),
so it is measured by a new regression test rather than ignored.
Refresh two stray-output test comments that still named the removed
StringDecoder; the raw-chunk buffer reassembles a split multibyte sequence by
concatenating before it decodes, and the end flush renders a stranded partial
as U+FFFD via toString('utf8').
Three follow-ups the review caught in the stray-capture rewrite, plus a cost
undercount shared with the log ledger.
Seal the stray fragment list into blocks past MAX_PENDING_CHUNKS, mirroring the
fd-3 reader: a program pacing single-byte os.write(1, ...) calls otherwise
accumulates one live Buffer per write, and the per-object overhead no byte
count sees exhausts the host heap far below the budget.
Flush the residual by its running SERIALIZED cost (serializedBufferCost, a
per-byte lower bound) rather than raw byte count: a control-char-dense
newline-free flood serializes several-fold, so a raw-byte threshold let it grow
to a full budget's worth of raw bytes — up to ~6x what the ledger admits —
before flushStray concat/decoded the whole ~256 MiB residual at once.
Charge a lone surrogate its full six escaped bytes (\uXXXX under ES2019
well-formed JSON.stringify) in both jsonStringCostUpTo and serializedBufferCost,
not the three bytes Buffer.byteLength reports for U+FFFD: a forged log frame
flooding \ud800 escapes was undercharged by half and admitted ~2x maxLogBytes.
Key the sync-spawn leak assertion off the exact bootstrap path from the mocked
spawn's argv, immune to a sibling worker's concurrent staging. Refresh the
stale load-check comment that named the replaced JSON.stringify mechanism.
Add lone-surrogate, stray-sealing, and companion regression tests (per-file
100% coverage); update the Agent Note and zh pair.
The line-aggregating stray capture from the previous round regressed three
ways the review caught. Rewrite it on the fd-3 reader's raw-Buffer-chunk
shape: accumulate chunks with a byte counter and split on the raw 0x0a byte,
so a large newline-free write no longer re-copies the residual and re-scans
from index 0 per chunk (both O(N^2)). Meter each admitted entry by serialized
cost through a new jsonStringCostUpTo that walks to the cap and stops, so a
near-budget control-char-dense line never allocates the sixfold-inflated
JSON.stringify result the old ledger did (the critical: ~1.6 GiB transient
under a large maxLogBytes). Flush the residual explicitly in the closeDeadline
handler before it destroys the streams, so a setsid escapee's path (which
fires no end) does not drop a leader's final newline-free diagnostic.
Harden the sync-spawn leak assertion to a set difference against a pre-run
snapshot, immune to a parallel worker's concurrent tmpdir create/delete.
Decline the round-2 request to enforce the fd-3 ceiling per-frame: the counter
check must precede Buffer.concat to prevent ~2x memory doubling (two
regression tests assert this), and the batch-edge false reject it would fix is
reachable only at a maxLogBytes/maxValueBytes configured within one pipe read
of the 256 MiB ceiling, far past the defaults. Documented at the check and in
the note Alternatives.
Add flood, NUL-flood, short-escape, and closeDeadline-flush regression tests
(restoring per-file 100% coverage); update the Agent Note and zh pair.
The line-aggregating stray capture added two branches — the post-truncation
early return and the residual-overflow admit — that the aggregation and
split tests did not exercise, so per-file coverage dropped below 100%. A
2 MB newline-free native write under a 4 KiB maxLogBytes drives the residual
across the budget (admit-and-truncate) and then short-circuits later chunks,
asserting the captured output ends at the truncation marker and stays under
budget rather than buffering the whole flood.
Wrap spawn and the fd-3 narrowing so a synchronous throw (ENAMETOOLONG on
an over-PATH_MAX pythonBin, EMFILE) removes the run's staging directory and
resolves the same worker-exit class as the async error event, instead of
rejecting run() and leaking the directory.
Aggregate native stdout/stderr by real newline rather than by Node data
chunk: logs entries are joined with "\n" downstream, so a newline-free
write larger than one pipe read no longer reads back with spurious breaks.
The ledger still bounds a newline-free flood.
Track a running scan offset in both frame readers so a large frame
accumulated across chunks is scanned once, not re-scanned from 0 per chunk.
Reword the deadline hard-bound v8-ignore to state its real environment
dependence (PID-1-doesn't-reap container, zombie survivor) and cross-ref
the note's rejected signal-0 alternative; fix settle comments that quoted
the pre-qualification teardown contract; document the capMessage vs
_cap_message billing split on both sides; guard the dispose-after-resolve
heartbeat assertion against a vacuous 0===0 pass; reuse
_TRUNCATION_MARKER_BYTES; note the abandoned-call pending-entry bound.
Update the Agent Note Decision/Testing/Alternatives/Consequences for the
above and record the confirmed-empty finalize as a second honest
fail-before exception; sync the zh pair.
The reap-poll deadline arm sent SIGKILL then finalized immediately, declaring
quiescence on mere signal delivery while the group was still dying. It now keeps
polling for the group to actually empty (bounded by one more reap margin) after
its self-sent SIGKILL, so `finished` resolves only on a confirmed-empty group.
ProtocolChannel.read_frame read the boot/run handshake frames through
FileIO.readline() on the unbuffered fd — one os.read(1) per byte, so a
multi-megabyte program burned CPU (RLIMIT_CPU already in force for the run frame)
in millions of syscalls before ast.parse. It now reads in chunks into the same
_pending buffer the async reader uses; the wrapping os.fdopen is gone. read_frame
is this PR's own code (e7f22ed3), not the protocol layer. The chunked read is a
syscall-count improvement with no cross-platform-deterministic failure to assert,
noted as such in the Agent Note.
The closed-loop reply-pump guard now ships with a deterministic regression test:
a worker thread abandons a binding so its loop closes, the host answers that call
before a later binding, and the pump must survive the closed-loop
call_soon_threadsafe to deliver the later reply (host-gated ordering makes it
deterministic; unguarding the pump hangs the later binding to the wall clock).
Align the quiescence self-description with the shipped setsid limitation:
teardown()'s JSDoc and the Agent Note's Problem line now qualify "no subprocess
outlives the fiber" to subprocesses that stay in the child's process group, with
a setsid()-escape exception pointing at the README. Tighten the setsid-orphan
fixture's self-timeout to 5s and its upper-bound assertion to <4000ms so a failed
deadline backstop is a sharper red. Register the new regression tests in the note.
The child reads these byte budgets through int(...), which silently floors a
float, so maxLogBytes: 3.5 would truncate at 3 bytes child-side while the host
meters and marks at 3.5 — the two sides enforcing different public config. Gate
them to integers at load, as the worker backend does; correct the stale comment
that claimed the int()-truncated caps needed no gate. Adds a regression test.
The SIGXCPU timeout message changed from "CPU budget (Ns) exhausted" to name the
configured value as a ceiling; two existing timeout tests asserted the old text.
Assert "CPU time exhausted" to match.
Raising maxValueBytes' load bound to ceiling-envelope assumed both budgets are
metered in serialized (JSON-escaped) bytes, which held for completion values and
logs but not the diagnostic: _cap_message capped by raw UTF-8, so a control-heavy
message near maxValueBytes could serialize sixfold and breach the fd-3 frame
ceiling — the silent worker-exit inversion the load check prevents. _cap_message
now accumulates per-byte serialized cost (new _JSON_BYTE_COST table) and cuts the
prefix that fits. Also reword the host SIGXCPU timeout message to name cpuSeconds
as the configured ceiling rather than a budget a stricter inherited RLIMIT_CPU
soft may undercut. Adds a control-heavy-diagnostic regression test.
The group-reap poll folded its deadline arm into the empty-group arm, so a host
event loop blocked past graceMs + CLOSE_REAP_MARGIN_MS would run the overdue
poll before the grace SIGKILL timer: the group is still non-empty, the deadline
has passed, and the shared arm cancelled the never-fired SIGKILL and finalized —
releasing a SIGTERM-ignoring same-group survivor for good. Split the arms: empty
group cancels the moot timer and finalizes; deadline-with-non-empty-group sends
SIGKILL itself (idempotent if the timer already ran) before finalizing. Adds a
regression test that busy-blocks the loop past both timers and asserts the
survivor's heartbeat freezes.
The group-reap poll's deadline arm (Date.now() >= deadline) is a backstop that
SIGKILL emptying the reachable group never reaches, leaving one uncovered branch
under the per-file 100% gate. Mark it v8-ignore with the reason and drop the
always-true graceTimer-defined guard inside pollGroup (it runs only when killing
is set, so kill() has armed the timer).
settle() dropped the run from `live` eagerly, before the grace-window SIGKILL
reaped a same-group survivor. A dispose() racing a just-resolved run() then
snapshotted an empty `live` and returned while the descendant was still alive,
so teardown's "no subprocess outlives the fiber" (and its JSDoc) was false for
that window. The run now stays in `live` until the process-group poll confirms
the group empty, at which point it is both dropped from `live` and its finished
promise resolved. Adds a regression test asserting dispose() of a completed run
with a same-group survivor returns only after the survivor stops executing.
The class docstring still credited the GIL plus per-frame PIPE_BUF atomicity for
serializing writes, which _write_lock's full-write loop already superseded. State
the current contract (writers serialized by _write_lock around a full-write loop)
and drop the double blank line under the binding-replies note heading.
Record that die_if_cpu_exhausted compares against the effective clamped cpu_soft
in the rlimit section, and add the recheck-timeout test to Testing; re-record pair.
The settlement-time CPU recheck compared spent CPU against the configured
cpuSeconds, but _clamped may have lowered the effective soft limit to a stricter
inherited value. A program that traps SIGXCPU, burns past the inherited soft,
and returns inside the soft-to-hard gap was checked against the configured value
and falsely reported successful, bypassing the inherited limit. The recheck now
uses the clamped cpu_soft. Adds a regression test that inherits a 1s soft CPU
limit and asserts a SIGXCPU-trapping over-burn is a timeout, not a success.
Record the call_soon_threadsafe-onto-a-closed-loop guard in the binding-reply
section of the settlement-fixes Agent Note; re-record the bilingual pair.
A binding called from a worker thread records that thread's loop for its reply.
If the thread finished and closed its loop before the host reply arrived,
_pump_replies' call_soon_threadsafe onto the closed loop raises RuntimeError;
unguarded, that ends the pump task and strands every later reply. Wrap the
schedule in a try/except that drops the moot reply (nothing awaits it) and keeps
the pump serving.
A descendant that calls setsid()/start_new_session leaves the child's process
group, so kill(-pid) teardown cannot reach it; if it also releases the inherited
pipes the run still settles and the fiber goes quiescent while the orphan runs.
This is the containment boundary (model code has bash-equivalent trust), not a
guarantee; reaching such an orphan needs descendant-pid tracking and is deferred.
Two further review findings on the CPython backend:
- The grace-window SIGKILL timer was left armed after settlement, so on a
normal completion a kill(-pid) could fire up to graceMs later and strike a
recycled pgid once the kernel reused the leader's pid. settle() now clears
the timer the moment the process group is confirmed empty (the normal path
and when the poll sees the survivor gone), bounding the reuse window to the
genuine-survivor case where the group cannot be empty to reuse.
- _clamped bounded rlimits by the inherited hard limit only, silently raising
an inherited soft limit stricter than the request (loosening RLIMIT_AS or
deferring RLIMIT_CPU SIGXCPU). It now clamps each side against its own
inherited counterpart and pins soft under hard, keeping the strictest of
configured and inherited. Adds an inherited-soft-limit regression test.
Agent Note expanded to seven fixes with the two new rejected alternatives;
zh pair re-recorded.
Two review findings on the CPython backend:
- Disposal could return while a same-group descendant that ignores SIGTERM
but releases the inherited pipes was still alive: the leader's close fired
and the previous fix relied on an unref'd SIGKILL timer that a short-lived
host never fires, reparenting the survivor to init. settle() now withholds
the run's finished promise on a ref'd process-group poll until the SIGKILL
has emptied the group (bounded by graceMs + margin, zero-cost when already
empty), so teardown's "await each child's exit" holds.
- A binding called from a model worker thread via asyncio.run created its
reply Future on that thread's loop, but _pump_replies completed it directly
from the main loop; asyncio.Future is not thread-safe across loops, so the
call hung to the wall clock. Replies now complete via the owning loop's
call_soon_threadsafe, and a lock serializes the id claim/write/advance.
Tests: the same-group reap case now asserts a heartbeat file stops (robust
whether the killed descendant is reaped or a zombie, so it holds where PID 1
does not wait() orphans); a cross-loop case runs a binding from a worker
thread and asserts the reply round-trips instead of timing out. Agent Note
expanded to all six fixes with rejected alternatives; zh pair re-recorded.
The frame-ceiling cap test asserted the old (ceiling-envelope)/6 bound and
its 44739232 message. The load bound is now ceiling-envelope because both
budgets are metered in already-escaped bytes; assert 268435392.
Address review findings on the CPython backend:
- CRITICAL: a model program could leave a descendant in the child's own
process group that ignores SIGTERM but releases the inherited pipes, so
the leader's `close` fired and settle() cancelled the pending SIGKILL
before it escalated — run()/dispose() returned while that child lived.
kill() now unrefs the grace timer and settle() no longer clears it, so
the SIGKILL reaches the whole group; killGroup swallows ESRCH when the
group is already gone (the normal case). Adds a real-subprocess
regression test.
- WARNING: the maxLogBytes/maxValueBytes load bound divided the frame
ceiling by 6 for escape expansion, but both budgets are metered in
already-escaped serialized bytes, so a payload occupies at most
cap+envelope on the wire. Bound is now ceiling-envelope; drop the unused
escape constant.
- Narrow the runtime.spec.ts header to "no subprocess mocks" (it mocks
node:fs.copyFileSync for staging-failure cases).
- Use full-width punctuation in the README.zh.md prose per translation
rules; re-record the pair.
The package README (both languages) still described this layer as
protocol-only with the PythonCodeRuntime implementation deferred to a
later PR, contradicting the shipped code. Rewrite the intro to describe
the registered runtime, add a Configuration section for every Config cap,
and drop the "implementation not in this layer" limitation. Also pin the
residual-detach fixture's size invariant: the byteLength assertion only
holds above Node's Buffer pool threshold.
The manifest omitted @deepseek-ai/dsh-code-runtime although src/index.ts
imports CodeRuntime and the portable-identifier constants from it and the
tsconfig references ../code-runtime. A three-way package.json merge over
the protocol-layer stub dropped the entry; restore it in peer and dev
dependencies so the declaration matches the import.
Unwrap the English note to one physical line per paragraph (verify-md-wrap)
and retarget the backend link to the fd-3 protocol architecture note that
this stack actually ships (verify-md-links); re-record the bilingual pair.
Land the PythonCodeRuntime implementation on top of the fd-3 protocol
seam: python3 -I per run, binding namespace over fd 3, RLIMIT_CPU/AS,
wall-clock timer, and SIGTERM->grace->SIGKILL process-group teardown,
with the real-subprocess integration suite.
Fixes three defects surfaced on the source PR's review before they ship:
- boot-write failure resolved a worker-exit through finish()/settle()
that read wallTimer/onAbort/live in their TDZ, rejecting run() instead;
the boot write now runs after those bindings and the v8-ignore that hid
the branch is removed.
- log capture serialized against settlement with no lock while model
daemon threads keep writing; LogBuffer now owns one shared re-entrant
lock taken by write/flush_line/push.
- the fd-3 line residual was a subarray view pinning the whole joined
frame; it is copied into a right-sized Buffer via detachResidual so
pendingBytes measures what is retained.
pnpm hardlinks node_modules files to the store on the same volume, and
TypeScript's native realpath resolves those links back to store paths
(F:/.pnpm-store/v11/files/...), producing TS6231 during tsc -b and vite
resolution. ReFS block cloning (package-import-method=clone) gives each
file an independent path while sharing physical blocks, avoiding the
leak without the copy cost. Clone mode needs the @reflink/reflink native
module, which the system corepack pnpm carries but pnpm/action-setup's
dest build omits, so installs run through corepack pnpm.
The install steps branch on the workspace filesystem: clone only on
ReFS, plain install on hosted NTFS (which rejects copy-on-write). The
serial-windows store points at F:\.pnpm-store to share the ReFS volume.
Agent Note 2026-08-30-windows-refs-store-block-clone-install records the
rationale; ci-workflow.spec asserts the branch.
Chinesezjc