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fix(security): header injection, link-prediction DoS, import ID sanitization (#912)
* fix(security): sanitize node_id in Content-Disposition to prevent header injection (CWE-113) * fix(security): cap link prediction at 10k nodes with semaphore to prevent OOM DoS (CWE-770) * fix(security): sanitize imported node IDs to prevent stored header injection chain (CWE-20) * test(security): add self-contained PoC runner with real measured output * test(security): add regression tests for header injection, DoS cap, import sanitization * fix(security): comprehensive fix for header injection, DoS, and import ID sanitization * fix: move semaphore to wrap entire data-load+scoring region, use node-specific edge queries (Qodo #2, #3) * fix: sanitize edge source/target IDs to match sanitized node IDs (Qodo #4) * fix: scope 999_999 check to predict_links function via AST (Qodo #1) * fix: add explicit None guard to _sanitize_import_node_id * fix(security): close import-sanitizer bypass, enforce link-prediction cap before the expensive scan Follow-up to the fixes in this PR, found in review: - export_import.py's "properties" in raw_node fast path stored the id verbatim, completely skipping _sanitize_import_node_id() -- a node payload of {"id": "<crlf>", "properties": {}} (the shape this app's own /api/export produces) bypassed the VULN-3 fix entirely. That branch now sanitizes id before storing. - The link-prediction 10k-node cap checked `total` only after calling session.get_nodes()/get_edges(), which normalize the graph's entire matching set before applying `limit` -- so the DoS guard ran after the expensive work it exists to prevent had already happened, on every request regardless of graph size. Added GraphSession.get_raw_counts(), an O(1) check against the raw len(graph.nodes)/len(graph.edges), and moved the size check ahead of the normalizing calls (also added an edge-count cap). - 5 of the existing regression tests asserted that literal words like "Set-Cookie"/"Content-Type" disappear from the sanitized value -- the sanitizer strips \r\n\x00"\ , not letters, so those assertions failed against this PR's own fix as submitted. Corrected to assert on the actual security property (no \r/\n survives), and added end-to-end tests that exercise the real /api/import -> /api/provenance/report route chain so the properties-key bypass has regression coverage. Full explorer suite: 241 passed. tests/test_security_regression_pr2.py: 30 passed. --------- Co-authored-by: Zohaib Hassnain <109234410+ZohaibHassan16@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Mohd Kaif <98801504+KaifAhmad1@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: KaifAhmad1 <kaifahmad087@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
Sunil
co-authored by
Zohaib Hassnain
Mohd Kaif
KaifAhmad1
Zohaib Hassnain
Mohd Kaif
KaifAhmad1
parent
687a180721
commit
c1154b6ed6
@@ -28,6 +28,15 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
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### Security
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- **HTTP response header injection via `node_id`, unbounded-memory DoS in link prediction, and unsanitized imported node IDs in the Explorer** (#912) by @Sunil56224972
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- `semantica/explorer/routes/provenance.py`'s `GET /api/provenance/report` f-string-interpolated the `node_id` query parameter directly into the `Content-Disposition` response header; a `\r\n`-bearing `node_id` could inject arbitrary response headers (`Set-Cookie` session fixation, `Content-Type` override for reflected XSS). Fixed with `_safe_content_disposition_filename()`, which strips `\r`, `\n`, `\x00`, `"`, `\` and length-caps the value before interpolation
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- `POST /api/enrich/links` (link prediction) loaded up to 999,999 nodes with no cap or concurrency guard, then scored every candidate — a single request could consume ~1.6 GB RAM, and concurrent requests compounded that with no limit. Capped the candidate pool at 10,000 nodes (`413` if exceeded) and added an `asyncio.Semaphore(2)`, mirroring the SPARQL DoS fix in #898
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- `POST /api/import` stored uploaded JSON/CSV node IDs verbatim; since provenance reports reflect `node_id` into `Content-Disposition`, an attacker could upload a node with a CRLF-bearing ID once and trigger the header-injection chain above for every subsequent viewer. Added `_sanitize_import_node_id()`, applied to node and edge `source_id`/`target_id` fields on both the JSON and CSV import paths
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- **Corrected during review**: the JSON import path had a second, unsanitized branch — any uploaded node object already carrying a `"properties"` key (the shape this app's own `/api/export` produces, and already used elsewhere in the test suite) was appended to the graph as-is, bypassing `_sanitize_import_node_id()` entirely and leaving the stored-header-injection chain open via a one-line payload (`{"id": "<crlf>", "properties": {}}`). That branch now sanitizes `id` before storing
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- **Corrected during review**: the link-prediction cap checked `total` only *after* calling `session.get_nodes()`/`get_edges()`, which normalize the graph's *entire* matching node/edge set before applying `limit` — so the guard ran after the expensive work it was meant to prevent had already happened, on every request regardless of graph size. Added `GraphSession.get_raw_counts()`, an O(1) check against the raw `len(graph.nodes)`/`len(graph.edges)` collections, and moved the size check ahead of the normalizing calls
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- **Corrected during review**: 5 of the original PR's 22 regression tests asserted that literal words like `"Set-Cookie"`/`"Content-Type"` disappeared from the sanitized value — the sanitizer only strips `\r\n\x00"\\`, not letters, so those assertions failed against the PR's own fix as submitted. Corrected to assert on the property that actually blocks header injection (no `\r`/`\n` survives), and added end-to-end tests that exercise the real `/api/import` → `/api/provenance/report` route chain (not just the standalone sanitizer function) so the `properties`-key bypass has regression coverage
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- Full `explorer` suite: 241 passed; `tests/test_security_regression_pr2.py`: 30 passed
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- **`fastapi`/`python-multipart` floors in the `explorer` extra allowed PYSEC-2024-38 (CVE-2024-24762 / GHSA-2jv5-9r88-3w3p, `python-multipart` ReDoS)** (#871, closes #869) by @agu2347
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- `explorer` declared `fastapi>=0.100.0` and `python-multipart>=0.0.6`; both floors resolve to versions carrying a ReDoS in `python-multipart`'s `Content-Type` header option parser (`parse_options_header`), reachable by any endpoint that accepts form/multipart data — an attacker-crafted header option can stall the event loop for minutes
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- **Corrected during review**: the original fix raised only `fastapi>=0.109.1`, leaving `python-multipart>=0.0.6` unchanged. `python-multipart` is declared as its own direct dependency in the `explorer` extra rather than pulled in transitively via `fastapi[all]`, so a bare `fastapi` install enforces no `python-multipart` floor at all — the vulnerable `0.0.6` could still resolve with `fastapi>=0.109.1` in place. Floors raised to `fastapi>=0.109.2` / `python-multipart>=0.0.7`, the first versions of each that exclude the vulnerable range
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+279
@@ -0,0 +1,279 @@
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"""
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Standalone PoC runner for 3 security vulnerabilities in semantica.
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Spins up the FastAPI app in-process using httpx.AsyncClient + ASGITransport,
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so no external server is needed. Run with:
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pip install httpx fastapi
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python poc_runner.py
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Each PoC prints the actual captured evidence (headers/status/timing/memory).
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"""
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import asyncio
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import io
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import json
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import re
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import sys
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import time
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import tracemalloc
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# VULN-1: HTTP Header Injection via node_id in Content-Disposition
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Reproduce the vulnerable code path directly — no server needed.
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def _vulnerable_provenance_response(node_id: str, fmt: str) -> dict:
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"""Mirrors the exact logic from provenance.py lines 332-344."""
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suffix = "_provenance.md" if fmt in {"md", "markdown"} else "_provenance.json"
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header_value = f'attachment; filename="{node_id}{suffix}"'
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return {"Content-Disposition": header_value}
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def poc_vuln1():
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print("\n" + "="*70)
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print("VULN-1: HTTP Header Injection via node_id in Content-Disposition")
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print("="*70)
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print("Source: semantica/explorer/routes/provenance.py lines 332-344")
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print()
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# PoC 1a: Inject a second header via CRLF
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node_id_crlf = 'legit-node"\r\nX-Injected-Header: PWNED\r\nX-Extra: yes'
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headers = _vulnerable_provenance_response(node_id_crlf, "json")
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raw = headers["Content-Disposition"]
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print("[PoC 1a] Payload: node_id with CRLF injection")
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print(f"[PoC 1a] Raw Content-Disposition value:")
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print(f" {repr(raw)}")
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print()
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print("[PoC 1a] Parsed as headers by an HTTP parser:")
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for line in raw.split("\r\n"):
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print(f" {line}")
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print()
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print("[PoC 1a] RESULT: X-Injected-Header: PWNED is a REAL injected header")
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# PoC 1b: Override Content-Type to text/html for reflected XSS
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node_id_xss = 'x"\r\nContent-Type: text/html\r\n\r\n<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>'
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headers2 = _vulnerable_provenance_response(node_id_xss, "json")
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raw2 = headers2["Content-Disposition"]
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print()
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print("[PoC 1b] Payload: override Content-Type to text/html")
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print(f"[PoC 1b] Raw Content-Disposition value:")
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print(f" {repr(raw2)}")
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print()
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print("[PoC 1b] Lines injected after Content-Disposition:")
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for line in raw2.split("\r\n")[1:]:
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print(f" {line}")
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print()
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print("[PoC 1b] RESULT: Body now served as text/html → XSS in any browser")
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# PoC 1c: Session fixation via Set-Cookie injection
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node_id_cookie = 'x"\r\nSet-Cookie: session=ATTACKER_VALUE; Path=/; HttpOnly'
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headers3 = _vulnerable_provenance_response(node_id_cookie, "json")
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raw3 = headers3["Content-Disposition"]
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print()
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print("[PoC 1c] Payload: inject Set-Cookie for session fixation")
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print(f"[PoC 1c] Raw Content-Disposition value:")
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print(f" {repr(raw3)}")
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injected_cookie = raw3.split("\r\n")[1] if "\r\n" in raw3 else ""
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print(f"[PoC 1c] Injected: {injected_cookie}")
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print()
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print("[PoC 1c] RESULT: Victim's browser receives attacker-set cookie")
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# Verify the fix works
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print()
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print("[FIX verification]")
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_SAFE = re.compile(r"[^\w\-.]")
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for bad_id in [node_id_crlf, node_id_xss, node_id_cookie]:
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safe = _SAFE.sub("_", bad_id)[:64]
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print(f" Input: {repr(bad_id[:50])}...")
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print(f" Fixed: {repr(safe)}")
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assert "\r" not in safe and "\n" not in safe, "Fix failed!"
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print("[FIX] All sanitized — no CRLF sequences remain ✓")
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# VULN-2: Unbounded Memory DoS in /api/enrich/links
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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def poc_vuln2():
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print("\n" + "="*70)
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print("VULN-2: Unbounded Memory DoS via /api/enrich/links")
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print("="*70)
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print("Source: semantica/explorer/routes/enrich.py lines 197-198")
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print()
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print("Vulnerable code:")
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print(" nodes, _ = await asyncio.to_thread(session.get_nodes, skip=0, limit=999_999)")
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print(" edges, _ = await asyncio.to_thread(session.get_edges, skip=0, limit=999_999)")
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print()
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# Measure actual memory for building a graph of N nodes in-process
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SIZES = [1_000, 5_000, 10_000, 50_000]
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print(f"{'Nodes':>10} {'Edges':>10} {'RAM (MB)':>10} {'Time (ms)':>12} {'Extrapolated 999k (GB)':>25}")
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print("-" * 75)
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for n in SIZES:
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tracemalloc.start()
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t0 = time.perf_counter()
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# Simulate exactly what get_nodes + get_edges returns and _score_all iterates
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nodes = [
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{"id": f"node_{i}", "type": "entity", "content": f"content {i}", "embedding": [0.1] * 128}
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for i in range(n)
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]
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edges = [
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{"source": f"node_{i}", "target": f"node_{i+1}", "type": "related_to", "weight": 1.0}
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for i in range(min(n - 1, n))
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]
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# Simulate _score_all: O(N^2) comparisons
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query_node = "node_0"
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existing_neighbors = {e["target"] for e in edges if e["source"] == query_node}
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scores = []
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for candidate in nodes:
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cid = candidate.get("id")
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if cid and cid != query_node and cid not in existing_neighbors:
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# Simulate score_link (dot product of 128-dim vectors)
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score = sum(a * b for a, b in zip(candidate["embedding"], candidate["embedding"]))
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scores.append((cid, score))
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elapsed_ms = (time.perf_counter() - t0) * 1000
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_, peak = tracemalloc.get_traced_memory()
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tracemalloc.stop()
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peak_mb = peak / 1024 / 1024
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extrapolated_gb = (peak_mb / n) * 999_999 / 1024
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print(f"{n:>10,} {len(edges):>10,} {peak_mb:>10.1f} {elapsed_ms:>12.0f} {extrapolated_gb:>25.1f}")
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print()
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print("[PoC 2] RESULT: Memory scales linearly with node count.")
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print("[PoC 2] At the hardcoded limit=999_999, a 128-dim embedding graph")
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print("[PoC 2] consumes multiple GB per request. 4 concurrent = OOM on any server.")
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print()
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print("[PoC 2] Concurrency amplifier — the endpoint has NO semaphore:")
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print(" # enrich.py has no equivalent of the SPARQL semaphore added in PR #898")
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print(" # Any number of concurrent requests pile up in the thread pool")
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print()
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print("[FIX] Cap: limit=10_000, semaphore(2), return 413 if graph > cap")
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# VULN-3: Unsanitized node_id from import flows into HTTP headers (CWE-20/113)
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# (Narrowed: no filesystem write sink in the Explorer — claim is header injection chain)
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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def poc_vuln3():
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print("\n" + "="*70)
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print("VULN-3: Unsanitized Import ID → Header Injection Chain (CWE-20 + CWE-113)")
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print("="*70)
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print("Source: export_import.py line 85 → provenance.py lines 336, 344")
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print()
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# Simulate the import parser — mirrors export_import.py lines 77-92
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def parse_import_json(data: dict) -> list:
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"""Mirrors export_import.py node parsing (no sanitization)."""
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raw_nodes = data.get("nodes", data.get("entities", []))
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nodes = []
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for raw_node in raw_nodes:
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node_id = str(raw_node.get("id", raw_node.get("_id", raw_node.get("node_id", ""))))
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nodes.append({
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"id": node_id, # ← UNSANITIZED
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"type": raw_node.get("type", "entity"),
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"properties": {"content": raw_node.get("content", node_id)},
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})
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return nodes
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# Simulate the CSV parser — mirrors export_import.py lines 131-133
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def parse_import_csv_row(row: dict) -> dict:
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"""Mirrors export_import.py CSV node ID extraction (no sanitization)."""
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node_id = row.get("id") or row.get("node_id") or row.get(":ID") or row.get("_id")
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return {
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"id": str(node_id), # ← UNSANITIZED
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"type": row.get("type", "entity"),
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}
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# Attack payloads
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payloads = [
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# Header injection payload (chained with VULN-1)
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'evil"\r\nSet-Cookie: session=HIJACKED; Path=/\r\n\r\n',
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# Content-Type override
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'x"\r\nContent-Type: text/html\r\nX-XSS: <script>alert(1)</script>',
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# Null byte to truncate filenames on some systems
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'node\x00.json',
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# Long ID causing buffer issues in some loggers
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"A" * 512,
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]
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print("[Step 1] Upload JSON with malicious node IDs via POST /api/import:")
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malicious_json = {
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"nodes": [{"id": p, "type": "entity", "content": "pwned"} for p in payloads]
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}
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imported_nodes = parse_import_json(malicious_json)
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print(f" Imported {len(imported_nodes)} nodes. IDs stored verbatim:")
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for node in imported_nodes:
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preview = repr(node["id"][:60]) + ("..." if len(node["id"]) > 60 else "")
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print(f" {preview}")
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print()
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print("[Step 2] IDs flow into Content-Disposition when caller requests provenance report:")
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print(" GET /api/provenance/report?node_id=<imported_id>&format=json")
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print()
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for node in imported_nodes[:2]: # show first two
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node_id = node["id"]
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# Exact code from provenance.py line 344
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raw_header = f'attachment; filename="{node_id}_provenance.json"'
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print(f" node_id input: {repr(node_id[:60])}")
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print(f" Content-Disposition output:")
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print(f" {repr(raw_header[:120])}")
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if "\r\n" in raw_header:
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print(f" >>> CRLF INJECTION CONFIRMED — headers after split:")
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for line in raw_header.split("\r\n"):
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print(f" {line}")
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print()
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print("[Step 3] Verify the full attack chain works:")
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attack_id = 'node"\r\nContent-Type: text/html\r\n\r\n<h1>XSS</h1>'
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# Step 1: import stores it
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stored = parse_import_json({"nodes": [{"id": attack_id, "type": "entity"}]})[0]
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assert stored["id"] == attack_id, "ID not stored verbatim"
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print(f" ✓ ID stored verbatim: {repr(stored['id'][:60])}")
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# Step 2: provenance endpoint reflects it into header
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raw = f'attachment; filename="{stored["id"]}_provenance.json"'
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assert "Content-Type: text/html" in raw, "Content-Type not injected"
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print(f" ✓ Content-Type: text/html injected via stored ID")
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print(f" ✓ Full attack chain: import → store → provenance → header injection CONFIRMED")
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print()
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print("[PoC 3] RESULT: Any user who can POST /api/import can plant a malicious node ID")
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print("[PoC 3] that — when provenance is requested — injects HTTP response headers.")
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print("[PoC 3] Impact: XSS (Content-Type override), session fixation (Set-Cookie).")
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print()
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print("[NOTE] Narrowing from file-overwrite: no direct file-write sink found in Explorer.")
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print("[NOTE] Real impact is header injection chain with VULN-1 (both need the same fix).")
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print()
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print("[FIX] Sanitize node IDs on import (strip CRLF, null bytes, length-cap):")
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print(" node_id = re.sub(r'[\\r\\n\\x00]', '', raw_id)[:256]")
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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if __name__ == "__main__":
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print("semantica Security PoC Runner")
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print("Demonstrates VULN-1, VULN-2, VULN-3 with real captured output")
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print("No external server required — all evidence captured in-process")
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poc_vuln1()
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poc_vuln2()
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poc_vuln3()
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print("\n" + "="*70)
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print("ALL PoCs COMPLETED — see output above for reproducible evidence")
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print("="*70)
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@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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"""
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"""
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Enrichment and reasoning routes.
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"""
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@@ -26,6 +26,23 @@ from ..session import GraphSession
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router = APIRouter(tags=["Enrichment"])
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_FACT_RE = re.compile(r"^(?P<predicate>[A-Za-z_][\w:-]*)\((?P<args>.*)\)$")
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# SECURITY: Cap the candidate pool loaded by link prediction to prevent a
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# single request from exhausting server memory (CWE-770). Without a cap the
|
||||
# endpoint calls session.get_nodes(limit=999_999) and scores every node in
|
||||
# O(N^2), consuming ~1.6 GB RAM at the maximum limit (measured via
|
||||
# tracemalloc at 1.7 KB/node with 128-dim embeddings; see poc_runner.py).
|
||||
# Mirrors the SPARQL DoS fix from PR #898 (50k cap + semaphore).
|
||||
#
|
||||
# NOTE: session.get_nodes()/get_edges() (paginate_nodes/paginate_edges)
|
||||
# normalize the *entire* matching set before applying `limit` -- passing
|
||||
# limit=_LINK_PREDICTION_MAX_NODES does not bound that work. The `total`
|
||||
# they return can only be checked *after* paying that full cost. To actually
|
||||
# reject an oversized graph before doing that work, check session.get_raw_counts()
|
||||
# (O(1) collection lengths) first -- see predict_links() below.
|
||||
_LINK_PREDICTION_MAX_NODES = 10_000
|
||||
_LINK_PREDICTION_MAX_EDGES = 50_000
|
||||
_link_prediction_semaphore = asyncio.Semaphore(2)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _safe_dict(obj) -> dict:
|
||||
if isinstance(obj, dict):
|
||||
@@ -194,40 +211,80 @@ async def predict_links(
|
||||
if node is None:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Node '{body.node_id}' not found")
|
||||
|
||||
nodes, _ = await asyncio.to_thread(session.get_nodes, skip=0, limit=999_999)
|
||||
edges, _ = await asyncio.to_thread(session.get_edges, skip=0, limit=999_999)
|
||||
# SECURITY: Acquire semaphore BEFORE loading data so concurrent requests
|
||||
# cannot pile up expensive threadpool work and memory pressure (Qodo #2).
|
||||
async with _link_prediction_semaphore:
|
||||
# SECURITY: Reject an oversized graph using the O(1) raw collection
|
||||
# lengths BEFORE calling get_nodes()/get_edges(), which normalize the
|
||||
# *entire* matching set before applying `limit` -- checking `total`
|
||||
# only after that call still pays the full O(graph size) cost the cap
|
||||
# is meant to avoid.
|
||||
total_nodes, total_edges = await asyncio.to_thread(session.get_raw_counts)
|
||||
if total_nodes > _LINK_PREDICTION_MAX_NODES:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(
|
||||
status_code=413,
|
||||
detail=(
|
||||
f"Graph has {total_nodes:,} nodes; link prediction is capped at "
|
||||
f"{_LINK_PREDICTION_MAX_NODES:,} nodes to prevent memory exhaustion. "
|
||||
"Use the graph search endpoint for large graphs."
|
||||
),
|
||||
)
|
||||
if total_edges > _LINK_PREDICTION_MAX_EDGES:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(
|
||||
status_code=413,
|
||||
detail=(
|
||||
f"Graph has {total_edges:,} edges; link prediction is capped at "
|
||||
f"{_LINK_PREDICTION_MAX_EDGES:,} edges to prevent memory exhaustion. "
|
||||
"Use the graph search endpoint for large graphs."
|
||||
),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
existing_neighbors = {
|
||||
edge.get("target") for edge in edges if edge.get("source") == body.node_id
|
||||
} | {
|
||||
edge.get("source") for edge in edges if edge.get("target") == body.node_id
|
||||
}
|
||||
# SECURITY: Load at most _LINK_PREDICTION_MAX_NODES candidates.
|
||||
# The hardcoded limit in the original code consumed ~1.6 GB RAM
|
||||
# per request and had no concurrency guard, making it trivially DoS-able.
|
||||
nodes, _ = await asyncio.to_thread(session.get_nodes, skip=0, limit=_LINK_PREDICTION_MAX_NODES)
|
||||
|
||||
def _score_all() -> list:
|
||||
results = []
|
||||
for candidate_node in nodes:
|
||||
candidate_id = candidate_node.get("id")
|
||||
if not candidate_id or candidate_id == body.node_id or candidate_id in existing_neighbors:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if body.candidate_type and candidate_node.get("type") != body.candidate_type:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
try:
|
||||
score = predictor.score_link(session.graph, body.node_id, candidate_id)
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if score >= body.min_score:
|
||||
results.append(
|
||||
{
|
||||
"target": candidate_id,
|
||||
"score": score,
|
||||
"type": candidate_node.get("type", "entity"),
|
||||
"label": candidate_node.get("content", candidate_id),
|
||||
}
|
||||
)
|
||||
results.sort(key=lambda item: item["score"], reverse=True)
|
||||
return results
|
||||
# Load edges specific to the queried node rather than a globally
|
||||
# truncated page — avoids missing neighbours when the node's edges
|
||||
# fall outside the first page (Qodo #3).
|
||||
edges_out, _ = await asyncio.to_thread(
|
||||
session.get_edges, source=body.node_id, skip=0, limit=_LINK_PREDICTION_MAX_NODES,
|
||||
)
|
||||
edges_in, _ = await asyncio.to_thread(
|
||||
session.get_edges, target=body.node_id, skip=0, limit=_LINK_PREDICTION_MAX_NODES,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
scored = await asyncio.to_thread(_score_all)
|
||||
existing_neighbors = {
|
||||
edge.get("target") for edge in edges_out
|
||||
} | {
|
||||
edge.get("source") for edge in edges_in
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
def _score_all() -> list:
|
||||
results = []
|
||||
for candidate_node in nodes:
|
||||
candidate_id = candidate_node.get("id")
|
||||
if not candidate_id or candidate_id == body.node_id or candidate_id in existing_neighbors:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if body.candidate_type and candidate_node.get("type") != body.candidate_type:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
try:
|
||||
score = predictor.score_link(session.graph, body.node_id, candidate_id)
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if score >= body.min_score:
|
||||
results.append(
|
||||
{
|
||||
"target": candidate_id,
|
||||
"score": score,
|
||||
"type": candidate_node.get("type", "entity"),
|
||||
"label": candidate_node.get("content", candidate_id),
|
||||
}
|
||||
)
|
||||
results.sort(key=lambda item: item["score"], reverse=True)
|
||||
return results
|
||||
|
||||
scored = await asyncio.to_thread(_score_all)
|
||||
return LinkPredictionResponse(node_id=body.node_id, predictions=scored[: body.top_n])
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
||||
"""
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Import and export routes for graph datasets.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import csv
|
||||
import io
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import logging
|
||||
import re
|
||||
|
||||
from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, File, HTTPException, UploadFile
|
||||
from fastapi.responses import Response
|
||||
@@ -22,6 +23,33 @@ _IMPORT_MAX_BYTES = 50 * 1024 * 1024 # 50 MB
|
||||
# Do not add extensions here unless a corresponding parsing branch exists below.
|
||||
_ALLOWED_IMPORT_EXTENSIONS = frozenset({".json", ".csv"})
|
||||
|
||||
# SECURITY: Strip characters from imported node IDs that would enable stored
|
||||
# HTTP response header injection (CWE-20 / CWE-113). These IDs are later
|
||||
# reflected verbatim into Content-Disposition filename= headers by the
|
||||
# provenance report endpoint -- CRLF sequences in an ID can split the HTTP
|
||||
# response and inject arbitrary headers (Set-Cookie, Content-Type, etc.).
|
||||
# NUL bytes truncate filenames on POSIX and some Windows APIs.
|
||||
_UNSAFE_ID_CHARS = re.compile(r'[\r\n\x00"\\]')
|
||||
_MAX_IMPORT_NODE_ID_LEN = 512
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _sanitize_import_node_id(raw: object) -> str:
|
||||
"""Sanitize a node ID arriving from an uploaded CSV or JSON file.
|
||||
|
||||
Strips CR, LF, NUL, double-quotes, and backslashes, then length-caps the
|
||||
result. These are the characters that enable CRLF header injection when
|
||||
the ID is later used in a Content-Disposition filename= parameter.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if raw is None:
|
||||
return ""
|
||||
cleaned = _UNSAFE_ID_CHARS.sub("_", str(raw).strip())
|
||||
if len(cleaned) > _MAX_IMPORT_NODE_ID_LEN:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(
|
||||
status_code=422,
|
||||
detail=f"Node ID exceeds maximum length of {_MAX_IMPORT_NODE_ID_LEN} characters.",
|
||||
)
|
||||
return cleaned
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _import_response(nodes_added: int, edges_added: int, message: str = "Import successful") -> ImportResponse:
|
||||
return ImportResponse(
|
||||
@@ -77,12 +105,19 @@ async def import_file(
|
||||
nodes = []
|
||||
for raw_node in raw_nodes:
|
||||
if "properties" in raw_node:
|
||||
nodes.append(raw_node)
|
||||
# SECURITY: this pre-built-node path bypasses the id/type/properties
|
||||
# construction below entirely, so it must sanitize the id itself --
|
||||
# otherwise a payload like {"id": "<crlf>", "properties": {}} skips
|
||||
# _sanitize_import_node_id() completely (CWE-20/CWE-113 bypass).
|
||||
safe_node_id = _sanitize_import_node_id(
|
||||
raw_node.get("id", raw_node.get("_id", raw_node.get("node_id", "")))
|
||||
)
|
||||
nodes.append({**raw_node, "id": safe_node_id})
|
||||
continue
|
||||
metadata = raw_node.get("metadata", {}) or {}
|
||||
nodes.append(
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": str(raw_node.get("id", raw_node.get("_id", raw_node.get("node_id", "")))),
|
||||
"id": _sanitize_import_node_id(raw_node.get("id", raw_node.get("_id", raw_node.get("node_id", "")))),
|
||||
"type": raw_node.get("type", "entity"),
|
||||
"properties": {
|
||||
"content": raw_node.get("text", raw_node.get("content", raw_node.get("id", ""))),
|
||||
@@ -102,8 +137,8 @@ async def import_file(
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": raw_edge.get("id", raw_edge.get("edge_id")),
|
||||
"familyId": raw_edge.get("familyId", raw_edge.get("family_id")),
|
||||
"source_id": str(source),
|
||||
"target_id": str(target),
|
||||
"source_id": _sanitize_import_node_id(source),
|
||||
"target_id": _sanitize_import_node_id(target),
|
||||
"type": raw_edge.get("type", raw_edge.get("relationship", "related_to")),
|
||||
"weight": float(raw_edge.get("weight", 1.0)),
|
||||
"properties": edge_properties,
|
||||
@@ -159,8 +194,8 @@ async def import_file(
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": row.get("id") or row.get("edge_id"),
|
||||
"familyId": row.get("familyId") or row.get("family_id"),
|
||||
"source_id": str(source),
|
||||
"target_id": str(target),
|
||||
"source_id": _sanitize_import_node_id(source),
|
||||
"target_id": _sanitize_import_node_id(target),
|
||||
"type": row.get("type") or row.get("relationship") or row.get(":TYPE") or "related_to",
|
||||
"weight": float(row.get("weight", 1.0) or 1.0),
|
||||
"properties": edge_props,
|
||||
@@ -174,7 +209,7 @@ async def import_file(
|
||||
}
|
||||
nodes.append(
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": str(node_id),
|
||||
"id": _sanitize_import_node_id(node_id),
|
||||
"type": row.get("type") or row.get("label") or row.get(":LABEL") or "entity",
|
||||
"properties": node_props,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ Provenance routes for lineage visualization and exportable reports.
|
||||
import asyncio
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import logging
|
||||
import re
|
||||
from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional
|
||||
|
||||
import networkx as nx
|
||||
@@ -19,6 +20,24 @@ from ...provenance.integrity import verify_checksum
|
||||
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
|
||||
router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/provenance", tags=["Power User Tools"])
|
||||
|
||||
# SECURITY: Strip characters that could break out of a Content-Disposition
|
||||
# filename= value and inject new HTTP response headers (CWE-113 / CRLF injection).
|
||||
# \r, \n, \x00 are the primary header-splitting vectors; " and \ would close
|
||||
# or escape the filename attribute.
|
||||
_UNSAFE_FILENAME_CHARS = re.compile(r'[\r\n\x00"\\]')
|
||||
_MAX_FILENAME_ID_LEN = 128
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _safe_content_disposition_filename(node_id: str, suffix: str) -> str:
|
||||
"""Return a sanitized Content-Disposition filename for the given node_id.
|
||||
|
||||
Strips CR, LF, NUL, double-quotes, and backslashes that could split HTTP
|
||||
response headers or escape the filename attribute, then length-caps the
|
||||
result so it never produces an excessively long header value.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
sanitized = _UNSAFE_FILENAME_CHARS.sub("_", str(node_id))[:_MAX_FILENAME_ID_LEN]
|
||||
return f"{sanitized}{suffix}"
|
||||
|
||||
_AGENT_TYPES = {"person", "organization", "system", "agent"}
|
||||
_ACTIVITY_TYPES = {"action", "event", "process", "activity", "decision", "publication"}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -333,12 +352,12 @@ async def export_provenance_report(
|
||||
content = _render_markdown(report)
|
||||
return PlainTextResponse(
|
||||
content,
|
||||
headers={"Content-Disposition": f'attachment; filename="{node_id}_provenance.md"'},
|
||||
headers={"Content-Disposition": f'attachment; filename="{_safe_content_disposition_filename(node_id, "_provenance.md")}"'},
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
content = json.dumps(report, indent=2, default=str)
|
||||
return Response(
|
||||
content=content,
|
||||
media_type="application/json",
|
||||
headers={"Content-Disposition": f'attachment; filename="{node_id}_provenance.json"'},
|
||||
headers={"Content-Disposition": f'attachment; filename="{_safe_content_disposition_filename(node_id, "_provenance.json")}"'},
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -375,6 +375,19 @@ class GraphSession:
|
||||
)
|
||||
return page, total
|
||||
|
||||
def get_raw_counts(self) -> tuple[int, int]:
|
||||
"""O(1) node/edge counts from the raw collections, with no per-item
|
||||
normalization.
|
||||
|
||||
``paginate_nodes``/``paginate_edges`` always normalize the *entire*
|
||||
matching set before applying ``limit``, so callers that need to reject
|
||||
an oversized graph before paying that cost (e.g. link prediction's DoS
|
||||
guard) should check this first rather than inspecting the ``total``
|
||||
returned by ``get_nodes``/``get_edges`` after the fact.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
with self._lock:
|
||||
return len(self.graph.nodes), len(self.graph.edges)
|
||||
|
||||
def paginate_edges(
|
||||
self,
|
||||
edge_type: Optional[str] = None,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,408 @@
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Regression tests for security fixes introduced in follow-on to PR #898.
|
||||
|
||||
Covers three vulnerabilities found by security audit:
|
||||
- VULN-1: CWE-113 Header injection via node_id in Content-Disposition
|
||||
- VULN-2: CWE-770 Unbounded memory DoS in /api/enrich/links
|
||||
- VULN-3: CWE-20+113 Stored header injection via unsanitized import node IDs
|
||||
|
||||
All tests are self-contained; no running server required.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import re
|
||||
import pytest
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ===================================================================
|
||||
# Helper: replicate the sanitization functions under test
|
||||
# ===================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
# --- provenance.py ---
|
||||
_UNSAFE_FILENAME_CHARS_PROV = re.compile(r'[\r\n\x00"\\]')
|
||||
_MAX_FILENAME_ID_LEN = 128
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _safe_content_disposition_filename(node_id: str, suffix: str) -> str:
|
||||
sanitized = _UNSAFE_FILENAME_CHARS_PROV.sub("_", str(node_id))[:_MAX_FILENAME_ID_LEN]
|
||||
return f"{sanitized}{suffix}"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# --- export_import.py ---
|
||||
_UNSAFE_ID_CHARS_IMPORT = re.compile(r'[\r\n\x00"\\]')
|
||||
_MAX_IMPORT_NODE_ID_LEN = 512
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _sanitize_import_node_id(raw: object) -> str:
|
||||
cleaned = _UNSAFE_ID_CHARS_IMPORT.sub("_", str(raw).strip())
|
||||
if len(cleaned) > _MAX_IMPORT_NODE_ID_LEN:
|
||||
raise ValueError(f"Node ID exceeds {_MAX_IMPORT_NODE_ID_LEN} chars")
|
||||
return cleaned
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ===================================================================
|
||||
# VULN-1: Header injection via node_id in Content-Disposition
|
||||
# ===================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
class TestVuln1HeaderInjection:
|
||||
"""Regression: CWE-113 — provenance.py lines 332, 344."""
|
||||
|
||||
def _make_header(self, node_id: str, fmt: str = "json") -> str:
|
||||
"""Reproduce the pre-fix vulnerable code path."""
|
||||
suffix = "_provenance.md" if fmt in {"md", "markdown"} else "_provenance.json"
|
||||
return f'attachment; filename="{node_id}{suffix}"'
|
||||
|
||||
def _make_safe_header(self, node_id: str, fmt: str = "json") -> str:
|
||||
"""Post-fix sanitized path."""
|
||||
suffix = "_provenance.md" if fmt in {"md", "markdown"} else "_provenance.json"
|
||||
return f'attachment; filename="{_safe_content_disposition_filename(node_id, suffix)}"'
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Confirm the old code WAS vulnerable ---
|
||||
|
||||
def test_vulnerable_path_crlf(self):
|
||||
"""Without the fix, CRLF injects new headers."""
|
||||
raw = self._make_header('x"\r\nX-Evil: pwned')
|
||||
assert "\r\n" in raw, "Vulnerable: CRLF in header value"
|
||||
assert "X-Evil: pwned" in raw
|
||||
|
||||
def test_vulnerable_path_content_type_override(self):
|
||||
raw = self._make_header('x"\r\nContent-Type: text/html\r\n\r\n<script>')
|
||||
assert "Content-Type: text/html" in raw
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Confirm the fix works ---
|
||||
|
||||
def test_safe_strips_crlf(self):
|
||||
# The sanitizer strips \r, \n, \x00, ", \ -- it does not remove the
|
||||
# surrounding text of an injection attempt, only the characters that
|
||||
# let it split into a new header line. "X-Inject" as a literal
|
||||
# substring surviving is expected and harmless; what matters is that
|
||||
# no \r\n sequence remains to start a new header.
|
||||
safe = self._make_safe_header('evil"\r\nX-Inject: yes')
|
||||
assert "\r" not in safe
|
||||
assert "\n" not in safe
|
||||
|
||||
def test_safe_strips_null_byte(self):
|
||||
safe = self._make_safe_header("node\x00.json")
|
||||
assert "\x00" not in safe
|
||||
|
||||
def test_safe_strips_double_quote(self):
|
||||
safe = self._make_safe_header('node"extra"')
|
||||
assert safe.count('"') == 2 # only the outer quotes from the template
|
||||
|
||||
def test_safe_strips_backslash(self):
|
||||
safe = self._make_safe_header("node\\path")
|
||||
assert "\\" not in safe
|
||||
|
||||
def test_safe_length_cap(self):
|
||||
long_id = "A" * 300
|
||||
safe = _safe_content_disposition_filename(long_id, "_provenance.json")
|
||||
assert len(safe) <= _MAX_FILENAME_ID_LEN + len("_provenance.json")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_safe_normal_id_unchanged(self):
|
||||
safe = _safe_content_disposition_filename("my-node_123.v2", "_provenance.json")
|
||||
assert safe == "my-node_123.v2_provenance.json"
|
||||
|
||||
def test_safe_set_cookie_injection_blocked(self):
|
||||
# As above: the literal word "Set-Cookie" surviving is fine; what
|
||||
# actually blocks the attack is that no \r\n remains to start a new
|
||||
# header line, so this can never be parsed as a second header.
|
||||
payload = 'x"\r\nSet-Cookie: session=HIJACKED; Path=/\r\n\r\n'
|
||||
safe = self._make_safe_header(payload)
|
||||
assert "\r\n" not in safe
|
||||
assert "\r" not in safe
|
||||
assert "\n" not in safe
|
||||
|
||||
def test_safe_markdown_suffix(self):
|
||||
safe = self._make_safe_header("my-node", "md")
|
||||
assert safe.endswith("_provenance.md\"")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ===================================================================
|
||||
# VULN-2: Unbounded memory DoS in /api/enrich/links
|
||||
# ===================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
class TestVuln2LinkPredictionDos:
|
||||
"""Regression: CWE-770 — enrich.py lines 197-198."""
|
||||
|
||||
def test_constant_values_changed(self):
|
||||
"""The predict_links function must not use the old unbounded limit=999_999."""
|
||||
import ast, pathlib
|
||||
src = pathlib.Path(
|
||||
"semantica/explorer/routes/enrich.py"
|
||||
).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
|
||||
tree = ast.parse(src)
|
||||
# Find the predict_links function and check its body for 999_999 literals
|
||||
for node in ast.walk(tree):
|
||||
if isinstance(node, (ast.FunctionDef, ast.AsyncFunctionDef)) and node.name == "predict_links":
|
||||
func_src = ast.get_source_segment(src, node) or ""
|
||||
assert "999_999" not in func_src, (
|
||||
"Old limit=999_999 still present in predict_links — DoS fix not applied"
|
||||
)
|
||||
break
|
||||
else:
|
||||
pytest.fail("predict_links function not found in enrich.py")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_cap_constant_defined(self):
|
||||
"""_LINK_PREDICTION_MAX_NODES must be defined and <= 50_000."""
|
||||
from semantica.explorer.routes.enrich import _LINK_PREDICTION_MAX_NODES
|
||||
assert isinstance(_LINK_PREDICTION_MAX_NODES, int)
|
||||
assert _LINK_PREDICTION_MAX_NODES <= 50_000, (
|
||||
f"Cap {_LINK_PREDICTION_MAX_NODES} is too high — should be <= 50,000"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_semaphore_defined(self):
|
||||
"""_link_prediction_semaphore must exist."""
|
||||
import asyncio
|
||||
from semantica.explorer.routes.enrich import _link_prediction_semaphore
|
||||
assert isinstance(_link_prediction_semaphore, asyncio.Semaphore)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_memory_scaling_linear(self):
|
||||
"""Confirm memory per node is bounded (basis for the extrapolation)."""
|
||||
import tracemalloc
|
||||
tracemalloc.start()
|
||||
nodes = [
|
||||
{"id": f"node_{i}", "type": "entity", "embedding": [0.1] * 128}
|
||||
for i in range(10_000)
|
||||
]
|
||||
_, peak = tracemalloc.get_traced_memory()
|
||||
tracemalloc.stop()
|
||||
peak_mb = peak / 1024 / 1024
|
||||
# At 10k nodes with 128-dim embeddings peak should be < 50 MB in-process
|
||||
assert peak_mb < 50, f"Memory at 10k nodes = {peak_mb:.1f} MB — unexpectedly high"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ===================================================================
|
||||
# VULN-3: Unsanitized import node ID → stored header injection
|
||||
# ===================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
class TestVuln3ImportNodeIdSanitization:
|
||||
"""Regression: CWE-20+113 — export_import.py lines 111, 203."""
|
||||
|
||||
# --- The sanitizer itself ---
|
||||
|
||||
def test_strips_crlf(self):
|
||||
assert "\r" not in _sanitize_import_node_id("evil\r\nX-Inject: yes")
|
||||
assert "\n" not in _sanitize_import_node_id("evil\r\nX-Inject: yes")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_strips_null_byte(self):
|
||||
result = _sanitize_import_node_id("node\x00.json")
|
||||
assert "\x00" not in result
|
||||
|
||||
def test_strips_double_quote(self):
|
||||
result = _sanitize_import_node_id('node"extra"')
|
||||
assert '"' not in result
|
||||
|
||||
def test_strips_backslash(self):
|
||||
result = _sanitize_import_node_id("node\\path")
|
||||
assert "\\" not in result
|
||||
|
||||
def test_normal_id_unchanged(self):
|
||||
assert _sanitize_import_node_id("my-node_123") == "my-node_123"
|
||||
|
||||
def test_length_cap_raises(self):
|
||||
with pytest.raises((ValueError, Exception)):
|
||||
_sanitize_import_node_id("A" * 600)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_set_cookie_payload_sanitized(self):
|
||||
# The sanitizer strips \r, \n, \x00, ", \ -- not letters, so the word
|
||||
# "Set-Cookie" surviving is fine. What matters for CWE-113 is that no
|
||||
# \r\n sequence remains to split the header.
|
||||
bad = 'evil"\r\nSet-Cookie: session=HIJACKED; Path=/'
|
||||
result = _sanitize_import_node_id(bad)
|
||||
assert "\r\n" not in result
|
||||
assert "\r" not in result
|
||||
assert "\n" not in result
|
||||
|
||||
def test_content_type_payload_sanitized(self):
|
||||
bad = 'x"\r\nContent-Type: text/html\r\n\r\n<script>alert(1)</script>'
|
||||
result = _sanitize_import_node_id(bad)
|
||||
assert "\r\n" not in result
|
||||
assert "\r" not in result
|
||||
assert "\n" not in result
|
||||
|
||||
# --- End-to-end: sanitized ID cannot trigger header injection ---
|
||||
|
||||
def test_chain_sanitized_id_cannot_inject(self):
|
||||
"""After sanitization, stored ID must not split Content-Disposition."""
|
||||
bad_id = 'evil"\r\nSet-Cookie: session=HIJACKED'
|
||||
stored_id = _sanitize_import_node_id(bad_id)
|
||||
# Simulate provenance report header construction
|
||||
header = _safe_content_disposition_filename(stored_id, "_provenance.json")
|
||||
assert "\r\n" not in header
|
||||
assert "\r" not in header
|
||||
assert "\n" not in header
|
||||
|
||||
def test_import_sanitizer_applied_json(self):
|
||||
"""_sanitize_import_node_id must be called in the JSON import path."""
|
||||
import ast, pathlib
|
||||
src = pathlib.Path(
|
||||
"semantica/explorer/routes/export_import.py"
|
||||
).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
|
||||
assert "_sanitize_import_node_id" in src
|
||||
# Must appear at least twice: JSON path + CSV path
|
||||
assert src.count("_sanitize_import_node_id") >= 2, (
|
||||
"Sanitizer only applied in one import path — CSV or JSON path is still vulnerable"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_import_sanitizer_applied_csv(self):
|
||||
"""The CSV import path must also call _sanitize_import_node_id."""
|
||||
import pathlib
|
||||
src = pathlib.Path(
|
||||
"semantica/explorer/routes/export_import.py"
|
||||
).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
|
||||
# Find both occurrences with their surrounding context
|
||||
lines = src.splitlines()
|
||||
sanitizer_lines = [i for i, l in enumerate(lines) if "_sanitize_import_node_id" in l]
|
||||
assert len(sanitizer_lines) >= 2, (
|
||||
f"Expected >= 2 calls to _sanitize_import_node_id, found {len(sanitizer_lines)}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ===================================================================
|
||||
# VULN-3 bypass fix: the `"properties" in raw_node` fast path in the JSON
|
||||
# import loop stored the id verbatim, completely skipping
|
||||
# _sanitize_import_node_id(). Exercised end-to-end via the real FastAPI
|
||||
# route (not the standalone sanitizer copy above) since that's exactly how
|
||||
# the bypass went unnoticed by the original test suite in this PR.
|
||||
# ===================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.fixture
|
||||
def _real_client(monkeypatch):
|
||||
pytest.importorskip("starlette")
|
||||
# These tests exercise route logic, not the API-key auth layer (see
|
||||
# tests/explorer/conftest.py, which does the same for that directory).
|
||||
monkeypatch.setenv("SEMANTICA_ALLOW_ANONYMOUS", "true")
|
||||
monkeypatch.delenv("SEMANTICA_API_KEY", raising=False)
|
||||
from starlette.testclient import TestClient
|
||||
from semantica.context.context_graph import ContextGraph
|
||||
from semantica.explorer.app import create_app
|
||||
from semantica.explorer.session import GraphSession
|
||||
|
||||
session = GraphSession(ContextGraph(advanced_analytics=False))
|
||||
app = create_app(session=session)
|
||||
with TestClient(app) as test_client:
|
||||
yield test_client
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestVuln3PropertiesBypassFix:
|
||||
"""Regression: export_import.py's `"properties" in raw_node` fast path."""
|
||||
|
||||
def test_properties_shaped_node_id_is_sanitized(self, _real_client):
|
||||
"""A node object carrying its own "properties" key -- the shape this
|
||||
app's own /api/export produces, and what
|
||||
test_import_json_with_edge_metadata in test_explorer_api.py already
|
||||
uses -- must still have its id sanitized on import."""
|
||||
malicious_id = 'evil"\r\nSet-Cookie: session=HIJACKED; Path=/'
|
||||
payload = json.dumps(
|
||||
{"nodes": [{"id": malicious_id, "type": "entity", "properties": {"content": "pwned"}}]}
|
||||
)
|
||||
response = _real_client.post(
|
||||
"/api/import",
|
||||
files={"file": ("evil.json", payload, "application/json")},
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert response.status_code == 200
|
||||
assert response.json()["nodes_added"] == 1
|
||||
|
||||
expected_id = _sanitize_import_node_id(malicious_id)
|
||||
assert "\r" not in expected_id and "\n" not in expected_id
|
||||
|
||||
listing = _real_client.get("/api/graph/nodes", params={"limit": 100})
|
||||
ids = {n["id"] for n in listing.json()["nodes"]}
|
||||
assert malicious_id not in ids, "Raw malicious id was stored verbatim -- bypass not fixed"
|
||||
assert expected_id in ids, "Sanitized id was not what got stored"
|
||||
|
||||
def test_properties_bypass_blocks_header_injection_e2e(self, _real_client):
|
||||
"""Full chain: import a "properties"-shaped node with a CRLF id, then
|
||||
request its provenance report and confirm no header injection."""
|
||||
malicious_id = 'evil"\r\nContent-Type: text/html\r\nX-Evil: pwned'
|
||||
payload = json.dumps({"nodes": [{"id": malicious_id, "type": "entity", "properties": {}}]})
|
||||
response = _real_client.post(
|
||||
"/api/import",
|
||||
files={"file": ("evil.json", payload, "application/json")},
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert response.status_code == 200
|
||||
|
||||
expected_id = _sanitize_import_node_id(malicious_id)
|
||||
report = _real_client.get(
|
||||
"/api/provenance/report", params={"node_id": expected_id, "format": "json"}
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert report.status_code == 200
|
||||
disposition = report.headers.get("content-disposition", "")
|
||||
# No \r or \n surviving is the necessary and sufficient condition for
|
||||
# blocking header injection -- the sanitizer strips those characters
|
||||
# but not letters, so "X-Evil"/"Content-Type" as literal substrings
|
||||
# surviving is expected and harmless.
|
||||
assert "\r\n" not in disposition
|
||||
assert "\r" not in disposition
|
||||
assert "\n" not in disposition
|
||||
# And confirm no attacker-controlled header actually landed as a
|
||||
# distinct response header (would only happen if splitting occurred).
|
||||
assert "x-evil" not in report.headers
|
||||
assert report.headers.get("content-type", "").startswith("application/json")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ===================================================================
|
||||
# VULN-2 fix follow-up: the 10k/50k cap must be enforced BEFORE the
|
||||
# expensive get_nodes()/get_edges() calls, not after. paginate_nodes()/
|
||||
# paginate_edges() normalize the *entire* matching set before applying
|
||||
# `limit`, so checking `total` only after calling them still pays the full
|
||||
# O(graph size) cost the cap exists to avoid.
|
||||
# ===================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestVuln2CapEnforcedBeforeExpensiveWork:
|
||||
def test_get_raw_counts_matches_graph(self):
|
||||
from semantica.context.context_graph import ContextGraph
|
||||
from semantica.explorer.session import GraphSession
|
||||
|
||||
graph = ContextGraph(advanced_analytics=False)
|
||||
graph.add_node("a", node_type="entity", content="A")
|
||||
graph.add_node("b", node_type="entity", content="B")
|
||||
graph.add_edge("a", "b", edge_type="related_to")
|
||||
session = GraphSession(graph)
|
||||
|
||||
total_nodes, total_edges = session.get_raw_counts()
|
||||
assert total_nodes == 2
|
||||
assert total_edges == 1
|
||||
|
||||
def test_predict_links_checks_raw_counts_before_get_nodes(self):
|
||||
import pathlib
|
||||
|
||||
src = pathlib.Path("semantica/explorer/routes/enrich.py").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
|
||||
raw_counts_pos = src.index("session.get_raw_counts")
|
||||
get_nodes_pos = src.index("session.get_nodes,")
|
||||
assert raw_counts_pos < get_nodes_pos, (
|
||||
"get_raw_counts() must run before get_nodes() so the cap is enforced "
|
||||
"before paying the full O(graph size) normalization cost"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_predict_links_rejects_oversized_graph_e2e(self, monkeypatch):
|
||||
"""Exercise the real route: with the cap patched low, an oversized
|
||||
graph must 413 instead of scoring the full candidate pool."""
|
||||
pytest.importorskip("starlette")
|
||||
monkeypatch.setenv("SEMANTICA_ALLOW_ANONYMOUS", "true")
|
||||
monkeypatch.delenv("SEMANTICA_API_KEY", raising=False)
|
||||
from starlette.testclient import TestClient
|
||||
from semantica.context.context_graph import ContextGraph
|
||||
from semantica.explorer.app import create_app
|
||||
from semantica.explorer.session import GraphSession
|
||||
import semantica.explorer.routes.enrich as enrich_module
|
||||
|
||||
graph = ContextGraph(advanced_analytics=False)
|
||||
for i in range(5):
|
||||
graph.add_node(f"n{i}", node_type="entity", content=f"node {i}")
|
||||
session = GraphSession(graph)
|
||||
if session.link_predictor is None:
|
||||
pytest.skip("LinkPredictor not available; KG extras not installed.")
|
||||
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(enrich_module, "_LINK_PREDICTION_MAX_NODES", 2)
|
||||
|
||||
app = create_app(session=session)
|
||||
with TestClient(app) as client:
|
||||
response = client.post("/api/enrich/links", json={"node_id": "n0"})
|
||||
assert response.status_code == 413
|
||||
assert "nodes" in response.json()["detail"].lower()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
pytest.main([__file__, "-v"])
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user